The City of Beardstown v. the City of Va.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1875
• Citation: 76 Ill. 34,1875 WL 8146
• Parties: THE CITY OF BEARDSTOWN et al.v.THE CITY OF VIRGINIA et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

76 Ill. 34

1875 WL 8146 (Ill.)

THE CITY OF BEARDSTOWN et al.

v.THE CITY OF VIRGINIA et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1875.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cass county; the Hon. LYMAN LACEY, Judge, presiding.

This was a suit in chancery, brought by the city of Beardstown and others, against the city of Virginia and others, to contest an election held in the county of Cass, November 12, 1872, on the question of the removal of the county seat of the county from Beardstown to Virginia, and to restrain the county officers from removing their offices or the records of the county, until the final determination of the suit.

The facts necessary to an understanding of the points decided are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. ANTHONY THORNTON, Mr. GARLAND POLLARD, Mr. I. J. KETCHAM, Mr. THOMAS H. CARTER, and Messrs. HAY, GREENE & LITTLER, for the appellants.

Messrs. LAWRENCE, WINSTON, CAMPBELL & LAWRENCE, Mr. C. G. WHITNEY, Mr. J. N. GRIDLEY, and Mr. ISAAC L. MORRISON, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

On the 12th day of November, 1872, an election was held in the county of Cass, to determine whether the county seat should be removed from Beardstown to Virginia, the latter being nearer the centre of the county than the former. By the returns of the board of canvassers, the election was decided in favor of removal, by a majority of 128 votes.

To contest this decision, a bill in chancery was filed by Beardstown against Virginia, and the county officers were made parties, and enjoined from removing their records from the court house at Beardstown, and from transacting any official business in the town of Virginia, pending the suit.

After the cause was at issue, the evidence was taken in vacation by a commission, and finally heard by the court below, at the August term, 1874, the result of whose finding was as follows:

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                ¦Majority for removal, by election returns                                ¦128¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Votes against removal, which were rejected by the court as illegal, on   ¦129¦
                ¦the hearing                                                              ¦   ¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Votes illegally excluded by the judges of election, and received by the  ¦2  ¦
                ¦court                                                                    ¦   ¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Total                                                                    ¦259¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Votes for removal, which were rejected by the court as illegal, on the   ¦102¦
                ¦hearing                                                                  ¦   ¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Legal voters of Cass county, upon the day of election, who did not vote  ¦149¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Total                                                                    ¦251¦
                +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+---¦
                ¦Leaving majority for removal                                             ¦8  ¦
                +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                

In pursuance of this finding of the court, a decree was rendered dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill. This appeal is prosecuted to reverse the decision of the court below, and cross-errors are assigned by defendants.

Several legal questions arose upon the evidence which appellants insist were erroneously determined against them.

One is, are persons of foreign birth, who have never been naturalized, but who were, on the first day of April, 1848, minors, and inhabitants of the State of Illinois, legal voters under the constitution of 1870?

Of this class, 44 voted--10 for and 34 against removal. The court below refused to count these votes.

The suffrage clause of the constitution of 1870 is as follows:

“Every person having resided in this State one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election therein, who was an elector in this State on the first day of April, in the year of our Lord 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in this State, prior to the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord 1870, or who shall be a male citizen of the United States, above the age of 21 years, shall be entitled to vote at such election.” Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 73, sec. 1, art. 7. The right of these persons to vote is based upon the ground that they were electors in the State of Illinois on the first day of April, 1848. Whether they were or not must be determined by reference to the constitution of 1848.

Sec. 1, art. 6, of that constitution, is as follows:

“In all elections, every white male citizen above the age of 21 years, having resided in the State one year next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote at such election; and every white male inhabitant of the age aforesaid, who may be a resident of the State at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall have the right of voting as aforesaid; but no such citizen or inhabitant shall be entitled to vote except in the district or county in which he shall actually reside at the time of such election.” Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 51. That constitution was adopted in convention August 31, 1847, ratified by the people March 6, 1848, and became in force April 1, 1848, and by it persons having the following qualifications were “electors on the 1st day of April, 1848:”

1. White male CITIZENS, above the age of 21 years, having resided in the State one year next preceding any election.

2. White male INHABITANTS, of the age of 21 years, residents of the State at the time of the adoption of the constitution, i. e. March 6, 1848.

These 44 persons were not electors under the first clause, as they were never citizens. It is claimed, however, that they became electors under the second clause; that under this clause they were entitled to vote as soon as they became of age, by reason of the fact that they were white male inhabitants, and residents of the State on the 6th day of March, 1848, the day of the adoption of the constitution of 1848. Without considering whether this is the true construction of the second clause of sec. 1, but upon the hypothesis that it is, and that these persons did become voters, by virtue of the constitution of 1848, when they became of age, we are of opinion that they are not shown to be electors under the constitution of 1870.

That instrument does not provide that all persons who at any time became electors by virtue of the constitution of 1848, should be entitled to vote, or that every person who was or became an elector under that constitution should be so entitled. It only authorizes those persons to vote who were electors on a specified day, to-wit: the first day of April, 1848. But on that day these persons were minors, and therefore, were not electors.

The definition given by Webster, in his dictionary, of “elector,” is, “One who elects, or one who has the right of choice; a person who has, by law or constitution, the right of voting for an officer.”

“Elector--one who has the right to make choice of public officers; one who has a right to vote.” Bouvier Law Dict. letter E.

Not one of these persons had the right to vote on the first day of April, 1848, and so they were not electors on that day.

It is, however, urged that the constitution of 1870 could not have intended to disfranchise those who, though not electors on the 1st day of April, 1848, by reason of their minority on that day, afterwards became voters by virtue of the constitution of 1848, and had exercised the elective franchise ever since; and that it must have intended to include all persons who at any time became voters under the constitution of 1848; and it is insisted that by an equitable construction such should be held to be the meaning of the words “electors on the 1st day of April, 1848.” That the restricting of the elective franchise to the alien born unnaturalized inhabitants, who were residents of the State on the 1st day of April, 1848, to those who were 21 years of age, and to deprive the alien born minors who were inhabitants at that same time of that privilege, would be an odious and unjust discrimination, and there would be no good reason for it.

But the words of the constitution of 1870 are clear and explicit on this point; there is no ambiguity in the language, and no room for construction.

“Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. Possible or even probable meanings, when one is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.” Cooley's Const. Lim. 55, and see cases cited and note.

It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes and contracts should be read and understood according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 601. The rule is well expressed by JOHNSON, J., in Newell v. The People, 3 Seld. 97, in these words: “Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to...