The City of Chicago v. John Martin Et Ux.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1868
• Citation: The City of Chicago v. John Martin Et Ux., 49 Ill. 241, 1868 WL 5212, 95 Am.Dec. 590 (Ill. 1868)
• Parties: THE CITY OF CHICAGOv.JOHN MARTIN et ux.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

49 Ill. 241

1868 WL 5212 (Ill.)

95 Am.Dec. 590

THE CITY OF CHICAGO

v.JOHN MARTIN et ux.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1868.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. ERASTUS S. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, brought by the appellees, in the court below, against the City of Chicago, the appellant, to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have been sustained by the appellee, Bridget Martin, by reason of a defect in one of the public streets of the city. The cause was tried before the court and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, for $1,000, to reverse which, the record is brought to this court by appeal.

Mr. S. A. IRVIN, for the appellant.

Mr. GEORGE A. PARKER, for the appellees.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

There was, probably, some degree of negligence in the city to permit this defect in the culvert to remain so long, but, that thereby, it was guilty of gross negligence, amounting to wilful injury, can not be admitted. This work was on a street in the city, but not in the business part of it,--rather in the outskirts, which localities have never been supposed to demand, and certainly do not receive, the same attention as more populous and fashionable localities. And it is right and just that it should be so. The city authorities of Chicago should take more care of Lake or State street, than they should of streets in the remotest additions to the city, which, though portions of the city, may not be populous or business portions, and therefore not demanding the same care. Such was the street in question, and the defects in which, when the accident occurred, were visible to every one, and where the injury received was of a very slight character. To instruct the jury, under such circumstances, as the court did, in the fifth instruction for the plaintiff, was erroneous. That instruction told the jury, if they found for the plaintiff, they might give exemplary or punitive damages, in addition to the damages for pain and suffering, if they believe, from the evidence, the city was guilty of gross and wilful negligence in not keeping this street in reasonable repair at the point where the injury was received.

This instruction, doubtless, produced the large verdict of one thousand dollars, for a sprained wrist and a slight hernia.

And how could the city be charged with a wilful injury in this case, for gross negligence amounts to that? There is no evidence in the record to sustain such a charge. The neglect to repair this street, was not, under the circumstances, gross or wilful. It was an unimportant street, not demanding or entitled to the special care of the city, other more important matters demanding their care and the expenditure of the money drawn from labor by taxation.

That, in a proper case, a jury may give exemplary or punitive damages, as they are called, will be admitted. If a trespass is committed, wantonly or maliciously, upon real property, it has been held, vindictive damages may be given, Pickens v. Towle, 43 N. H. 220, but whether they should give them or not, is a question which should be submitted, with proper instructions, to the jury. The mere pecuniary injury received, is not, in such cases, the full measure of damages. The intention with which the act was done is to be regarded. In Merest v. Harvey, 1 E. C. Law, 230, which was for trespass, for breaking and entering the plaintiff's close, treading down his grass and hunting for game, it appeared, the defendant refused to leave, when notified, and used insulting language to the plaintiff. It was held a verdict for five hundred pounds was not excessive. GIBBS, Chief Justice, said, “I wish to know, in a case where a man disregards every principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him except large damages?” So, in trespass de bonis asportatis, it was held, in Trcat v. Barlon, 7 Conn. 279, that the jury were not bound by the mere pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff, but may award damages for the malice and insult attending a trespass. Generally, where gross fraud, malice or oppression appears, the jury are not bound to adhere to a strict line of compensation, but may, in the shape of damages, impose a punishment on the defendant, and make an example to the community. These are the elements of vindictive actions, so called, in which juries are allowed to give such damages as shall not only compensate the plaintiff, but operate as a punishment to the defendant, and tend to deter him and others from the commission of similar enormities. Grable v. Margrave, 3 Scam. 373; McNamara v. King, 2 Gilm. 432; Hosley v. Brooks, 20 Ill. 115; Bull v. Griswold, 19 ib. 631; Ously v. Hardin, 23 ib. 403; Foote v. Nichols, 28 ib. 486; Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 ib. 473; Best v. Allen, 30 ib. 30; Ball v. Bruce, 21 ib. 161.

In theory, damages are given as compensation for the injury and the allowance of punitive damages, is a departure from the rule, which once obtained both in England and in this country, yet it has become, by repeated decisions, a settled principle in the law, and...