The City of Chicago v. Louis Rumpff. the City of Chicago v. James Turner.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1867
• Citation: 45 Ill. 90,92 Am.Dec. 196,1867 WL 5226
• Parties: THE CITY OF CHICAGOv.LOUIS RUMPFF.THE CITY OF CHICAGOv.JAMES TURNER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

45 Ill. 90

1867 WL 5226 (Ill.)

92 Am.Dec. 196

THE CITY OF CHICAGO

v.LOUIS RUMPFF.THE CITY OF CHICAGO

v.JAMES TURNER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1867.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago.

These were actions commenced by the appellant against the appellees, in the police court of the city of Chicago, for an alleged violation by them of an ordinance concerning slaughtering within the corporate limits. Appellees were fined in the police court, and appealed to the Superior Court, where a trial was had before the court, who rendered judgment for the appellees, from which appellant has prosecuted appeals to this court. The further facts in these cases are fully stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. W. ARRINGTON and Mr. S. A. IRVIN, for the appellant.

Messrs. BECKWITH, AYER & KALES, for the appellees. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

As these cases present the same questions, they will be considered together in this opinion. It appears that the general assembly granted to the city of Chicago, in its charter, power to “direct the location and management of, and to regulate and license breweries, tanneries and packing houses, and to direct the location, management and construction of, and to regulate, license, restrain, abate and prohibit within the city, and the distance of four miles therefrom, distilleries, slaughtering establishments, establishments for steaming or rendering lard, tallow, offal and such other substances, as can or may be rendered, and all establishments or places where any nauseous, offensive or unwholesome business may be carried on.” Clause 7, § 8, ch. 4, City Charter of 1863.

Under this authority, as it is claimed, the common council, on the 18th day of December, 1865, entered of record what is therein denominated an ordinance. Its material provisions are these: Section one declares, “That, in consideration of the acceptance by John Reid & Co. of said city and their guaranty (provided by bond as hereinafter mentioned, within ten days from the date of the passage of this ordinance), that they will faithfully comply with the provisions of this ordinance, and all existing laws and ordinances, and all laws and ordinances that may hereafter be enacted or passed, relating to nuisances, authority and consent is hereby given and granted to said John Reid & Co., their heirs and assigns, from the 1st day of April, A. D. 1866, to have the exclusive right, to have all the slaughtering (except that done at the regular packing houses for packing purposes) carried on and done on their premises described as follows, to wit, the south half of block ten (10) in the south branch addition to the city of Chicago, in Cook county, in the State of Illinois.”

The second section requires Reid & Co., before the 1st day of April, 1866, to erect good, ample and complete buildings and yards with the necessary conveniences, fixtures and arrangements, including hot and cold water, gas lights, etc., for slaughtering and taking care of animals. It also confers the right on all butchers to take their animals to that place and slaughter them therein. It also provides for furnishing the several butchers with a division or portion of the building, etc. The third section requires Reid & Co. to keep the buildings, yards and premises in good condition; and to remove the filth, etc., therefrom, as they may be required by ordinance.

The fourth section, under which these prosecutions were originated, is this: “After the 1st day of April, A. D. 1866, no other slaughtering establishment or establishments shall be suffered or permitted within the limits of the city of Chicago, nor shall any slaughtering by butchers or others be suffered or permitted, except as provided in section one of this ordinance, under a penalty of not less than twenty-five dollars nor exceeding one hundred dollars for each and every offense: Provided, that the city shall have the right to establish at any time hereafter, two additional slaughter houses, one to be located in the west division, and one in the north division.” The fifth section declares that Reid & Co. may charge for the use of their establishment by the several butchers slaughtering animals therein, the usual offal of the same, and no more.

The sixth section requires Reid & Co. to employ, at their own expense at the establishment, one or more special policemen, and to keep it at all times open to the inspection of the city health officer or any of his deputies. The seventh section declares that the city shall only be answerable to Reid & Co. for the exercise of reasonable diligence in enforcing that portion of section 1, and which confers the exclusive right upon them of having all the slaughtering done upon their premises. It also declares, that, in case the ordinance, or any part thereof, shall be declared inoperative or void by this court, the city shall not be held answerable to Reid & Co. for damages which they may sustain by reason of its non-enforcement. The eighth section requires Reid & Co. to execute a bond, within ten days, for the faithful performance of the conditions of that and other ordinances and laws concerning nuisances. The ninth section declares, that, if Reid & Co. shall permit the establishment to become a nuisance, then the common council shall have the right to repeal the ordinance. These are the substantial parts of the ordinance under consideration.

Afterward, at the session of the general assembly, in 1867, the city charter was amended, and, among others, this provision was adopted:

“That the common council shall have power and authority to regulate and control the slaughtering of all animals in the city, or within four miles thereof, intended for consumption or exposed for sale in the city, and to enforce, by additional ordinances, any regulation, contract or law heretofore made on the subject.”

Appellee contends that this was not an ordinance, and is incapable of being enforced as such. If it is a by-law, it is, to say the least, very informal. On its face it only purports to make a proposition to Reid & Co. for a contract, that they should have the exclusive right to have all animals intended for sale or consumption in the city slaughtered at their establishment. And the city proposed to use all reasonable efforts to compel all such animals to be slaughtered at that place for ten years from the first day of April, 1866, unless they should establish two others in the city at the places named. By the terms of this proposition, Reid & Co. were to have the option of accepting it, and it was not to take effect until they executed the bond as required. Until Reid & Co. complied, the proposition remained open and inchoate. All of its terms and conditions were entirely conditional. Such is not the language of a statute or of a by-law. They speak the language of command, and not that of mere conditional propositions.

It did not declare slaughter houses or the business of slaughtering animals in the city a nuisance, or prohibit all persons from maintaining such establishments or pursuing such an occupation. On the contrary, it excepts from its...