The City of Cleveland v. State

• Decision Date: 29 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009–2280.,2009–2280.
• Citation: 942 N.E.2d 370,128 Ohio St.3d 135
• Parties: The CITY OF CLEVELAND, Appellee,v.The STATE of Ohio, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

128 Ohio St.3d 135

942 N.E.2d 370

2010 -Ohio- 6318

The CITY OF CLEVELAND, Appellee,

v.The STATE of Ohio, Appellant.

No. 2009–2280.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Oct. 12, 2010.Decided Dec. 29, 2010.

[Ohio St.3d 135] Syllabus of the Court

R.C. 9.68 is a general law that displaces municipal firearm ordinances and does not unconstitutionally infringe on municipal home rule authority.

Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, and Gary S. Singletary, Assistant Law Director, for appellee.

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.McNamee & McNamee, P.L.L., Cynthia P. McNamee, and Michael P. McNamee, Beavercreek, urging affirmance for amicus curiae city of Englewood.Bingham McCutchen, L.L.P., William F. Abrams, Karen Lu, East Palo Alto, CA, and Christopher Chang; and David Cannon, urging affirmance for amici curiae Legal Community Against Violence, Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, States United to Prevent Gun Violence, Violence Policy Center, Ohio State University Youth Violence Prevention Advisory Board, National Council of Jewish Women Cleveland Section, Ohio State Public Affairs of the National Council of Jewish Women, Toledo Area Ministries, Toledo Police Patrolman's Association, city of Akron, city of Cincinnati, city of Columbus, city of East Cleveland, city of Parma, city of Shaker Heights, and village of New Albany.Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, Cleveland, and Stephen J. Smith, Columbus; and John Gotherman, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League.Lydy & Moan, Ltd., Daniel T. Ellis, and Frederick E. Kalmbach, Sylvania, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc.Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, L.L.P., and James B. Vogts, Chicago, IL; and Lawrence G. Keane, Newtown, CT, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

Lundberg Stratton, J.

{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether R.C. 9.68, a statute enacted by the General Assembly in 2006 that provides that only federal or state regulations can limit an Ohioan's individual right to bear arms, is a general law. We hold that R.C. 9.68 is a general law that displaces municipal firearm ordinances and does not unconstitutionally infringe on municipal home rule authority.

I. Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 2006, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 9.68 as a component of Sub.H.B. No. 347, effective March 14, 2007, recognizing that the right to keep and bear arms is a “fundamental individual right” that is a “constitutionally protected right in every part of Ohio” but that there was a “need to provide uniform laws throughout the state” regulating ownership and possession of firearms. R.C. 9.68(A), 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8138, 8139.

{¶ 3} Before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 9.68, the city of Cleveland, plaintiff-appellee, enacted several ordinances regulating firearms, including Cleveland Codified Ordinances 627.08 (possession of firearms by minors), 627.09 (possessing deadly weapons on private property), 627.10 (possessing certain weapons at or about public places), 627A.02 (access to firearms, prohibiting children's access to firearms), 628.03 (unlawful conduct, prohibiting possession and sale of assault weapons), and 674.05 (registration of handguns).

{¶ 4} In March 2007, the city filed a complaint against the state of Ohio, defendant-appellant, seeking a declaration that R.C. 9.68 (1) is an unconstitutional [Ohio St.3d 136] infringement of Cleveland's home rule powers under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, (2) is an abuse of legislative power, and (3) violates the single-subject provision of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court denied the city's motion for summary judgment and granted the state's motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that based on this court's holding in Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, R.C. 9.68 is constitutional and does not violate the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. The trial court further held that R.C. 9.68 is a “general law that is part of a comprehensive statewide legislative enactment,” that Sub.H.B. No. 347 did not violate the single subject rule, and that the General Assembly did not abuse its legislative power in enacting the law.

{¶ 5} The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for entry of summary judgment in favor of the city. In so ruling, the court of appeals held that R.C. 9.68 is not a general law, that it unconstitutionally limits municipalities' home rule powers, and that it violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Ohio Constitution. We accepted the state's discretionary appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 6} We begin by recognizing the fundamental principle that a court must “presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.” Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, citing Univ. Hts. v. O'Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 22 O.O.3d 372, 429 N.E.2d 148, and Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 16 O.O.3d 430, 405 N.E.2d 1047. Therefore, we begin by presuming that R.C. 9.68 is constitutional, and so it “will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 39. See also State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 7} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, commonly known as the Home Rule Amendment, gives municipalities the “authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” Today we must determine whether R.C. 9.68 is a general law.

{¶ 8} We first turn to the words of the statute in question. R.C. 9.68 provides:

{¶ 9} “(A) The individual right to keep and bear arms, being a fundamental individual right that predates the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution, and being a constitutionally protected right in every part of Ohio, the [Ohio St.3d 137] general assembly finds the need to provide uniform laws throughout the state regulating the ownership, possession, purchase, other acquisition, transport, storage, carrying, sale, or other transfer of firearms, their components, and their ammunition. Except as specifically provided by the United States Constitution, Ohio Constitution, state law, or federal law, a person, without further license, permission, restriction, delay, or process, may own, possess, purchase, sell, transfer, transport, store, or keep any firearm, part of a firearm, its components, and its ammunition.”

{¶ 10} Traditionally, we have used a three-part test to evaluate conflicts under the Home Rule Amendment. A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when “(1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17.

{¶ 11} The first and third parts of the analysis are not involved in this case. The city acknowledges that its firearm ordinances are an exercise of municipal police power. Further, the city does not argue that its local firearm ordinances do not conflict with R.C. 9.68. Thus, our focus is on the second part of the home rule analysis, which involves determining of whether R.C. 9.68 is a general law.

A. Is R.C. 9.68 a General Law for Purposes of Home Rule Analysis?

{¶ 12} “A general law has been described as one which promotes statewide uniformity.” Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 602 N.E.2d 1147. “Once a matter has become of such general interest that it is necessary to make it subject to statewide control as to require uniform statewide regulation, the municipality can no longer legislate in the field so as to conflict with the state.” State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron (1962), 173 Ohio St. 189, 194, 19 O.O.2d 3, 181 N.E.2d 26.

{¶ 13} In Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, this court held that to constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute must “(1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton at syllabus.

{¶ 14} Applying the Canton test, the court of appeals concluded that R.C. 9.68 is not a general law, because it failed the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Canton test. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

[Ohio St.3d 138] 1. Statewide and Comprehensive Legislative Enactment

{¶ 15} Under the first prong of the Canton test, we must examine whether R.C. 9.68 is part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment. The court of appeals held that Sub.H.B. No. 347 pertains to a matter of statewide concern but that it is not comprehensive, because it leaves a “great deal of firearm activity unregulated.” Cleveland v. State, 185 Ohio App.3d 59, 2009-Ohio-5968, 923 N.E.2d 183, ¶ 19. Specifically, the court held that Sub.H.B. No. 347 did not address discharge of firearms,...