The City of Columbia City v. Langohr
| Decision Date | 14 June 1898 |
| Docket Number | 2,553 |
| Citation | 50 N.E. 831,20 Ind.App. 395 |
| Parties | THE CITY OF COLUMBIA CITY v. LANGOHR |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From the Whitley Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
Thomas R. Marshall, Wm. F. McNagney and P. H. Clugston, for appellant.
A. A Adams and E. K. Strong, for appellee.
The appellee, Rosa Langohr, brought her action against the appellant to recover damages for a personal injury suffered by the appellee. There was a special verdict, on which the court rendered judgment for $ 1,000.00 in favor of the appellee, a motion by the appellant for judgment in its favor upon the verdict having been overruled.
In the special verdict it was, in substance, found as follows omitting many details for the sake of brevity: On the 7th of May, 1896, the appellee was walking eastward on a sidewalk which ran along the north side of Market street, in Columbia City, being a part of said street. It was a board sidewalk about four feet wide, constructed on stringers running parallel with the street, the boards, which were from culled lumber, being nailed cross-wise on the stringers. As to whether it had been built more than five years the jury said there was no evidence. The appellee was injured by falling on said sidewalk on said day. The appellee fell by being tripped by a loose board in the sidewalk, by reason of her sister's stepping upon the end of a loose board, which was loose on account of the nails holding it to the stringers having become rusted off. It had been loose continuously for five months prior to the day of the injury. There were two or more loose boards in the sidewalk at the point where she was injured, which had been loose continuously for five months. Said loose boards were dangerous to persons passing on the sidewalk. The south edge of the sidewalk at that place was lower than the north side. During four or five months prior to the injury the loose boards at that point slipped southward off the north stringer, and several times prior to the injury were placed back in position by persons walking on the sidewalk. When the loose boards were slipped to the south the defective condition of the sidewalk was plain and obvious. When they were in line and straight in their place on the walk no defect therein by reason of loose boards could be detected by simply looking at the walk nor could such defect be detected by persons using the sidewalk except by stepping upon the loose boards. These loose boards were straight and in line, and in their place on the sidewalk at the point where the appellee was injured at the time of the injury. They had at one time been fastened to the stringers with nails or spikes. The jury stated that there was no evidence as to the time prior to the injury during which the nails or spikes had been rusted off. For five months prior to the injury the appellant permitted and suffered the walk at the point where the appellee was injured to be and become out of repair and dangerous to persons carefully using it. The appellant, by its officers or agents, inspected the sidewalk in October, 1895, but did not inspect it after that time until after the day on which the appellee was injured. The appellant could have discovered loose boards in the sidewalk at the point where the appellee was injured, if by its officers or agents it had inspected the sidewalk at any time during five months prior to the injury to the appellee. The appellee was accompanied by her sister, the appellee walking upon the south side of the sidewalk by the side of her sister, who was walking on the north side. The appellee was carrying in her arms a child about two months old. She was walking slowly, carefully, and cautiously, and was looking at and observing the sidewalk as she proceeded. She did not know before the injury that the sidewalk was out of repair at the point where the accident occurred, or that there were loose boards in the sidewalk at that point. The jury answered that the appellee by the use of ordinary care, prudence and observation, could not have discovered that there were loose boards in the sidewalk at the place where she was injured, before stepping upon them. She received injuries by tripping and falling upon the sidewalk, her injuries embracing a dislocated left thumb, a dislocated right elbow, a dislocated right shoulder. Her back also was injured. Her right arm was bruised, torn and lacerated. She fell upon her right side and shoulder. In consequence of the accident she suffered great pain, and was not able to lie down in bed for about six weeks after the accident. At the time of the trial she still suffered pain from the injury. She had recovered the full use of her thumb and elbow, but not of her shoulder. The jury found that the injury to her shoulder was permanent, and that she would never recover the full use thereof. She had become nervous in consequence of the injury, and her general health had been impaired by the injury. She could not raise her right arm higher than her shoulder. It was found that by reason of the injuries complained of in the complaint she had been damaged in the sum of $ 1,000.00; that her condition of health at the time of the trial was occasioned solely by the accident described in the complaint; that she had not contributed to that condition of her health by the improper use of her arm; that the dislocation of her shoulder was properly reduced in the first instance by Dr. Williams; that the shoulder subsequently became again dislocated; that if the dislocation of the shoulder had been properly reduced and placed in an immovable position it could not have become redislocated without the interference with the bandages upon the part of the appellee or her attendants; that if the dislocation of her shoulder, as described in the complaint, had been properly reduced and bandaged shortly after the accident and subsequently received proper treatment, the appellee probably would have recovered the full use of her arm; that the second dislocation of her shoulder retarded her recovery and aggravated the injury received by her from the accident, and contributed to her condition at the time of the trial; that it did not account for the sore, inflamed, and thickened condition of the muscles and tendons...
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