The City of Decatur v. The Grand Rapids And Indiana Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 14 January 1897
• Docket Number: 17,896
• Citation: 45 N.E. 793,146 Ind. 577
• Parties: The City of Decatur v. The Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

45 N.E. 793

146 Ind. 577

The City of Decatur v. The Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company et al

No. 17,896

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 14, 1897

From the Adams Circuit Court.

Affirmed.

Mann & Beatty, for appellant

Zollars & Worden, for appellees.

OPINION

Hackney, J.

The appellees, The Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad Company and The Cincinnati, Richmond & Ft. Wayne Railroad Company, appealed to the lower court from an assessment of $ 500.00 damages, by the authorities of the appellant, occasioned by the extension of Madison street in said city across the yards and right-of-way of the latter company, whose line was operated by the former. In the lower court a trial resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of the appellees for $ 5,100.00, and from that judgment said city prosecutes this appeal.

The action of the circuit court in overruling the appellant's demurrers to the first, second, and fourth answers of the appellees, and in overruling a motion by the appellant for a new trial are assigned as error.

The first answer described the land, alleged its ownership by the appellees, and that damages had been assessed in the sum of $ 500.00, when in fact said land and the appellees would be damaged in the sum of $ 5,000.00. The second answer pleaded the occupancy, by the appellees, of the land in question for twenty-five years, the construction thereon of one main line and three side tracks and switches and the building of a structure from which to load and unload freight, all occupying the land to be crossed by said street.

The fourth answer alleged the vacation, by the city, of said street, at the point of crossing, to induce the location of the railway and the establishment of said yards; that the road and yards were located at the point in question by reason of the vacation of the street; that no necessity existed for the extension of the street, but that it was urged for the advancement of the values of private property and that the damage which would accrue to the companies could not be adequately compensated.

The second and fourth answers were drawn upon the theory that the appellant should be barred of any right to condemn the land or to enforce an easement across it for street purposes. The finding and judgment of the court were in favor of the appellant as to the opening of the street, and the correctness of that holding is in no manner involved in this appeal. As to the appellees, in addition to the appropriation of the way, it was adjudged that they "have and recover of and from the plaintiff the sum of $ 5,100.00, as hereinafter provided, as damages for and on account of the loss of storage room for cars on the strip of ground hereinbefore described, in the sum of $ 5,000.00, and on account of the destruction of one loading dock, in the sum of $ 100.00, and the aggregate sum of $ 5,100.00."

If the rulings upon said two answers were erroneous we are unable to observe any harm resulting to the appellant therefrom. It is the settled practice that an erroneous ruling in sustaining an answer against a demurrer will not constitute reversible error if the judgment upon the merits is in favor of the plaintiff upon the issue tendered by such answer. McComas v. Haas, 93 Ind. 276; State, etc., v. Julian, 93 Ind. 292; Foster v. Bringham, 99 Ind. 505; Butt v. Butt, 118 Ind. 31, 20 N.E. 538; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Center Tp., 143 Ind. 63, 40 N.E. 134; Miller v. McDonald, 139 Ind. 465, 39 N.E. 159; Miller v. Rapp, 135 Ind. 614, 34 N.E. 981; Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Maddux, 134 Ind. 571, 33 N.E. 345.

As to the first paragraph of answer, it is insisted that, under section 3643, Burns' R. S. 1894 (R. S. 1881, 3180), the appellees were required to "state specifically the grounds" of their "objection to the proceedings of the common council and commissioners;" and that as this was a special proceeding, where the ordinary rules of practice do not obtain, a general claim for damages was insufficient.

The statute referred to further provides that "The transcript of the proceedings of the common council and commissioners shall be considered as the complaint; and the written statement, to be filed by the appellant as aforesaid shall be in the nature of an answer or demurrer. Issues of law and of fact may be formed, tried and determined as in other actions at law." The latter provision determines very clearly that an answer sufficient to present an issue in other actions at law would be sufficient in proceedings of this character, unless it may be said that under the former provision any answer objecting to the damages assessed must be so specific as to point out the particular injuries sustained and the elements of damages claimed. We do not think that this provision of the statute makes such requirement. In the appeal to the circuit court "the regularity of the proceedings of the commissioners, and the questions as to the amount of benefits or damages assessed may be tried," and the answer shall "state specifically the grounds...