The City of Ottawa v. Gilliland

• Decision Date: 08 June 1901
• Docket Number: 12,318
• Citation: 65 P. 252,63 Kan. 165
• Parties: THE CITY OF OTTAWA v. ROZETTA GILLILAND
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

65 P. 252

63 Kan. 165

THE CITY OF OTTAWA v. ROZETTA GILLILAND

No. 12,318

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 8, 1901

Decided January, 1901.

Error from Franklin district court; A. W. BENSON, judge.

Judgment reversed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. JURY AND JURORS--Erroneous Practice. Where a jury agree that each member shall submit a sum which he thinks one of the parties ought to receive, that the sum of these shall be divided by the number of jurors, the quotient to be their verdict, and this is done and a nominal sum added for the purpose of making the amount an even number, without further deliberation or consideration, the verdict should be set aside.

2. PERSONAL INJURIES--Physical Examination. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the trial court may require the injured party to submit the unexposed portion of his person to a private examination by physicians or surgeons appointed by the court, when, in the exercise of a sound judgment, it appears to the court that the necessity of the case demands such an examination.

A. A Howell, C. A. Smart, and H. W. Page, for plaintiff in error.

William A. Deford, and F. A. Waddle, for defendant in error.

GREENE, J. JOHNSTON, CUNNINGHAM, ELLISS, JJ., concurring.

OPINION

GREENE, J.:

The defendant in error commenced this action against the city of Ottawa to recover damages for personal injuries which she claims she sustained by reason of having been tripped or thrown on a defective sidewalk. In the court below she recovered judgment. The plaintiff in error, the defendant below, filed its motion for a new trial, alleging all the grounds mentioned in the statute. In support of the charge of misconduct on the part of the jury, it filed the following affidavit of one of the jurors:

"M. L. Waldo, being duly sworn, on his oath says: I was a juror in the above-entitled cause tried at the September term of Franklin district court, 1895. In determining the amount of the verdict rendered therein, it was agreed that each juror should give the sum to which he thought the plaintiff was entitled under the evidence, and that the sum of these amounts so given should be divided by twelve, or the number of the jurors, and that the amount, or average resulting therefrom, should be the amount of the verdict, which was accordingly done. I further state that the sum of $ 300, the amount of the verdict, was the average found, substantially, being a few dollars in excess of the actual average, which, to make the amount an even sum, was increased to $ 300."

It appears from this affidavit that it was agreed by the jury that each juror should give the sum to which he thought the plaintiff below was entitled and that the sum of these amounts should be divided by the number of jurors; the quotient to be the amount of plaintiff's verdict. This was done. The amount so found was nearly $ 300, but for the purpose of making the amount an even sum it was increased to $ 300. This verdict cannot be sustained. (Johnson v. Husband, 22 Kan. 277; Werner v. Edmiston, 24 id. 147.) After the amount was found by marking, aggregating and dividing there was no reconsideration. The addition to that amount was not made after a further consideration and decision of the cause upon its merits, but was for the one purpose of making an even amount. The law demands of each juror an honest consideration of the rights of the parties litigant and the exercise of his best judgment, guided by the law and evidence of the case. A verdict reached in any other way should be set aside. We think the court erred in not granting the defendant below a new trial.

Counsel for plaintiff in error present another question which will likely arise in a new trial of this cause, and for this reason it demands the attention of this court at this time. Upon the trial, defendant requested the court to appoint two reputable physicians and make an order that the plaintiff below submit to an examination by them, for the purpose of ascertaining the location and extent of her physical injuries. To this the plaintiff below objected, which objection was sustained by the court, and the defendant below alleges this as error.

In the case of A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Thul, 29 Kan. 466, 44 Am. Rep. 659, it was held by this court that it was reversible error for the court to refuse to make an order for the examination of the eyes of the plaintiff," and the correctness of that decision has never been questioned. The application in this case was that the plaintiff below submit the unexposed portion of her person to the examination of a committee of physicians selected by the court. Upon this question there has been considerable diversity of opinion. In New York it was held that a court had no power to make such an order. Afterward it was held that such power was inherent in the court; but in the decision of McQuigan v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 129 N.Y. 50, 29 N.E. 235, 14 L. R. A. 466, it was finally settled as the law of that state that the court possessed no such power. Following this decision, and in 1893, the legislature of that state amended its code of civil procedure, conferring upon the courts authority, in actions for personal injuries, and upon proper application and showing of necessity, the power to make an order that the injured party submit to a medical examination.

In Missouri, in Loyd et al. v. H. & St. Joe R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 509, it was proposed to call in two surgeons to make a physical examination during the progress of the trial. This was refused, on the ground, as stated by the court, "that it was unknown to our practice and to the law." But in Shepard v. The Mo. P. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 629, 55 Am. Rep. 390, the court modified its previous holdings, saying:

"There are respectable authorities which hold that the court may order such personal examination. There are others to the contrary. We are inclined to hold with the former, but not that a party has an absolute right to have such a personal examination. It is a matter in which the court has a discretion, which will not be interfered with unless manifestly abused."

In Parker v. Enslow, 102 Ill. 272, 40 Am. Rep. 588, in an action on a promissory note given in settlement of a threatened action for damages which it was claimed the plaintiff had suffered to his eyes by reason of the negligent acts of defendant, on the trial the defendant asked an order requiring the plaintiff to submit to the examination of his eyes by medical experts. The trial court refused, and the supreme court, in passing upon the question, dismissed the subject in the following language:

"Complaint is also made that the court refused to compel appellee to submit his eyes to the examination of a physician in the presence of the jury. There was no error in this. The court had no power to make or enforce such an order."

In The Pennsylvania Company v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401, 28 N.E. 860, in an action for personal injuries, the court said:

"In the absence of a statute authorizing it, and none exists in this state, a party to an action is not required to submit his person to an examination of his injuries by surgeons appointed by the court for that purpose."

In the case of Botsford v. U. P. Rld. Co., 141 U.S. 250, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734, the supreme court of the United States expresses its dissent in the following language:

"The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass; and no order or process commanding such an exposure or submission was ever known to the common law in the administration of justice between individuals, except in a very small number of cases, based upon special reasons, and upon ancient practice, coming down from ruder ages, now mostly obsolete in England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced into this country."

This decision was followed in Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Griffin, 80 F. 278, 25 C. C. A. 413.

These are the principal authorities against the proposition which in our research we have been able to discover. In several of the states this question has been presented and a decision avoided, as appears in the cases of S. C. & P. R. R Co. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578, 20 N.W. 860; Ellsworth v. City of Fairbury, 41 id. 881, 60 N.W. 336; City of Chadron v. Glover, 43 id. 732, 62 N.W. 62; I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Underwood, 64 Tex. 463; G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Norfleet, 78 id. 321, 14 S.W. 703. We think, however, that the great weight of authority, as well as reason, is against the decisions of the courts above cited, and in favor of the opinion that, when a proper case presents itself, the court not only has the power to require a plaintiff in an action to recover damages for personal injuries to submit to a physical examination, but that it ought to exercise it. The opinion in the case of Botsford v. U. P. Rld. Co., supra, is greatly weakened by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer, concurred in by Mr. Justice Brown, and we think the latter the better reasoning. While we have the greatest respect for the decision of that court, the...