The City of Peru v. French

• Citation: 55 Ill. 317,1870 WL 6420
• Parties: THE CITY OF PERUv.LAURA A. FRENCH.
• Decision Date: 30 September 1870
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

55 Ill. 317

1870 WL 6420 (Ill.)

THE CITY OF PERU

v.LAURA A. FRENCH.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1870.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. EDWIN S. LELAND, Judge, presiding.

The opinion states the case.

Mr. H. M. GALLAGHER and Mr. G. S. ELDREDGE, for the appellant.

Mr. E. S. HOLBROOK and Messrs. BLANCHARD & SILVER, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action on the case, brought by the appellee against the city of Peru, in the LaSalle circuit court, to recover damages for alleged injuries sustained by the appellee in consequence of the omission on the part of the city to keep a certain street crossing in repair.

It is averred in the declaration, that the city negligently and carelessly permitted a certain street crossing, made of plank, on Bluff street, at its intersection with Rock street, to be and continue in a defective and dangerous condition; that the plaintiff, on the first day of April, 1867, without any negligence or want of due care on her part, while passing along, stepped through a hole in said crossing, and thereby her leg was broken and her ankle greatly injured; that she has since been a cripple, and will continue to be through life; that she has suffered great pain in consequence of the injuries received, and that she has spent large sums of money in endeavoring to get cured.

A trial was had on a plea of not guilty, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the appellee, for $2000. The court overruled the motion entered for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict, to reverse which the city now prosecutes this appeal.

The points relied on by the appellant to reverse this judgment, may all be considered on three errors assigned on the record, viz:

First. That the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.

Second. That the damages are excessive.

Third. That the court erred in refusing proper evidence offered in behalf of the city.

We will consider these points without reference to the order in which they are presented.

On the trial the counsel for the appellant asked the appellee, when she was on the witness stand, if she did not send a bill for damages to the city council of the city of Peru. The counsel for the appellee objected to the question, but the witness answered, notwithstanding the objection, that she did not, but that she knew about it.

The court then ruled that if it was intended by the appellant to prove a mere proposition for a settlement or compromise, without showing an acceptance by the appellant, or any act or declaration in addition thereto, the objection was well taken. The counsel for appellant then stated in reply to the court, that they could not show a settlement or acceptance on the part of the city, or any such other act or declaration, and thereupon the objection was sustained. The appellant complains of this ruling of the court as manifest error.

No objection is perceived to the principle of law stated by the court. It is in strict accordance with the uniform rule on that question. A party has the undoubted right to make such offer as he chooses, for a settlement or compromise of his claim against his adversary, and ought not thereby to be prejudiced before the jury for so doing. An offer to so settle or compromise by no means indicates the real value the party may place on his own claim, for he may desire, and justly so, to “buy his peace,” even at a great sacrifice. The fact that a party does so offer to compromise, instead of being to the discredit, it ought rather to be to the credit of the party so making such offer.

We have no means of knowing whether the appellant was injured, in this instance, by the ruling of the court, if we should admit that the ruling was erroneous, for the only question asked by the appellant on that subject was fully and promptly answered by the witness, and the counsel for the appellant do not state what further fact in that connection they desired to prove by the witness, so that it is not possible for us to determine whether the court, by its rulings, did in fact exclude evidence material to the issue.

The counsel for the appellant also complain that the court improperly refused to allow a paper to be read to the jury, as evidence, of which the following is a copy, viz: “ To the Mayor and Common Council of the city of Peru:

"The proposition that I have heretofore made, to accept of $100 in full for damages suffered by me through defective sidewalk or street crossing, is hereby withdrawn.

AUGUSTA L. FRENCH,

By E. S. HOLBROOK, her Attorney.

It is apparent, that, at most, this was a mere proposition on the part of the appellee to take a certain sum by way of compromise, in full of her damages, by which she was in no way bound, if the city had not previously accepted it. But there is still a more substantial objection to the introduction of the paper as evidence. It does not even purport to be signed in the true name of the appellee, and there was no evidence, whatever, given, or offered to be given on the trial, to show that Mr. Holbrook had any authority from the appellee to send any such paper to the city council, for her, as her attorney, or otherwise. At least there is no such evidence preserved in the record. There was, therefore, no error in the court in excluding the paper from the consideration of the jury.

The error assigned, that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence, is the one on which the counsel for the...