The Coalfield Coal Co. v. Peck

• Decision Date: 31 March 1883
• Parties: THE COALFIELD COAL COMPANY, for use, etc.v.FERDINAND W. PECK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

105 Ill. 529

1882 WL 14353 (Ill.)

THE COALFIELD COAL COMPANY, for use, etc.

v.FERDINAND W. PECK.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa Nov. 20, 1882.Rehearing denied March Term, 1883.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Second District;--heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. F. GOODSPEED, Judge, presiding. Mr. H. L. THAYER, for the appellant:

It is, in this State, a well settled rule of law that the finding and judgment of a court of last resort are res judicata as to all questions in controversy, including not only such questions as were considered, but also those which might have been presented, considered and determined. Clayes v. White, 83 Ill. 540; Reed v. West et al. 70 Id. 479; Ogden v. Larabee, Id. 510; Rising v. Carr, Id. 596; Kingsbury v. Buckner et al. Id. 514; Cook v. Norton, 61 Id. 286; Rogers v. Higgins, 57 Id. 247; Hollowbush v. McConnell, 12 Id. 204; Semple v. Anderson, 4 Gilm. 561; Diversy v. Johnson, 93 Ill. 547; Chicago and St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Holbrook, 92 Id. 297; Hough v. Harvey et al. 84 Id. 308.

Mr. S. W. PACKARD, and Mr. GEORGE S. HOUSE, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE MULKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

At the October term, 1877, of the circuit court of Will county, H. Leroy Thayer recovered a judgment against the Coalfield Coal Company, for $5963.21, and costs of suit. Subsequently, on the 25th of November, 1878, the company, in a garnishee proceeding under the 8th section of chapter 32, of the Revised Statutes, entitled “Corporations,” recovered a judgment, for the use of Thayer, against Ferdinand W. Peck, as garnishee, on account of an alleged indebtedness to the company for unpaid subscriptions to its capital stock, for the sum of $6087.87. On appeal by Peck to the Appellate Court for the Second District this judgment was reversed. The company thereupon appealed from the judgment of the Appellate Court to this court, where the latter judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded without special directions to that court. (See Coalfield Coal Co. v. Peck, 98 Ill. 139.) Peck filed a petition for a rehearing, which was considered at the March term, 1881, and this court, in denying the rehearing, then said, in a per curiam opinion:

“This is an application by Peck for a rehearing. The application must be denied. When the case was considered, we found that the circuit court had found the issues of fact against Peck, and rendered judgment thereon. The Appellate Court reversed this judgment, making no remanding order. On examination of the record of the Appellate Court we found that court did not ‘recite in its final order or judgment the facts found’ by that court. The statute provides, that “if any such final judgment of the Appellate Court shall be made as the result, wholly or in part, of a finding of facts * * * different from the finding of the court from which the cause is brought, * * * it shall be the duty of such Appellate Court to recite, in its final order, judgment or decree, the facts as found.' In the absence of such recital this court could not properly decide the case upon the hypothesis suggested,--that the judgment of the Appellate Court was founded, in any respect, upon a finding of facts different from the finding in the court below. We therefore examined the questions of law found in the record of the circuit court, and found no error therein. Finding no error of law in the record of the circuit court, and no error of fact being shown in the only manner provided by law for showing the same, the judgment of the Appellate Court was necessarily reversed. * * * We therefore remand the cause to the Appellate Court, without specific directions. If, when the case comes before that court, the facts are held by the Appellate Court to be different from the finding in the circuit court, that court may, of course, found its judgment upon such different finding, and the facts so found in such case must be recited in the judgment. If the facts be found by the Appellate Court in accord with the finding in the circuit court, in such case the judgment of the circuit court should, of course, be affirmed by the Appellate Court.” The cause having been thus remanded, the Appellate Court, upon a reconsideration of it, again reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and the company has prosecuted a second appeal to this court.

Upon an examination of the Appellate Court record it now appears, from the recitals in the judgment of that court, that...