The Commercial Ins. Co. v. Spankneble
| Decision Date | 30 September 1869 |
| Citation | 1869 WL 5384,52 Ill. 53,4 Am.Rep. 582 |
| Parties | THE COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANYv.ANNA SPANKNEBLE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago; the Hon. WILLIAM A PORTER, Judge, presiding.
This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the court below by Anna Spankneble against the Commercial Insurance Company, to recover upon a policy upon premises occupied as a brewery.
The following are the conditions in the policy, referred to in the opinion of the court:
“And it is further agreed that in case the above mentioned premises, at any time after the making of and during the time this policy would otherwise continue in force, shall from any cause be vacant or without occupant, unless notice of the same shall first have been given this company, and mentioned in or indorsed upon this policy, this insurance shall be void and of no effect.
And that this policy is made and accepted upon and in reference to the application, plan, description or survey filed in this office, and the terms and conditions hereunto annexed, which are to be used and resorted to in order to explain the rights and obligations of the parties hereto, in all cases not herein otherwise specially provided for.
If the premises insured are held upon lease, or upon leased ground, or the interest of the assured is not one of absolute ownership, or if it be equitable, it must be so stated to the company in writing with the true title of the assured and the extent of his interest, and so expressed in this policy in writing, otherwise the insurance shall be void.
And in case of any sale, alienation, transfer, conveyance, or change of title in the property insured by this company or of any interest therein, such insurance shall be void and cease. And an entry for foreclosure of mortgage, or the levy of an execution, or an assignment for the benefit of creditors shall be deemed an alienation of the property.” A trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The company appealed.
Mr. O. B. SANSUM, for the appellants.
Messrs. ROSENTHAL & PENCE, for the appellee.
This was an action of assumpsit, brought by appellee in the Superior Court of Chicago, against appellants, to recover on a policy of insurance for a loss of the insured property by fire. The policy covered a three story frame building, occupied as a brewery, a steam boiler and connections, vats, tubs, coolers, barrels of malt, barley and hops, all contained in the building, “loss, if any, payable to Elias Greenebaum, trustee, as interest may appear,” for the period of one year from the twenty-first of November, 1866. The policy contained a number of conditions. They provided that if after making the policy and during its continuance, the property should become vacant or ceased to be occupied, unless notice should be given the company and mentioned in or endorsed upon it, the policy should become void.
Another provided that if the premises were held by lease, or upon leased grounds, or the interest of the assured was not an absolute ownership, it should be so stated in writing, with the true title of the assured. And also, that in case of any sale, alienation, transfer, conveyance or change of title to the property insured, such insurance should be void. And an entry under a foreclosure of mortgage, or the levy of an execution, or an assignment for the benefit of creditors should be regarded an alienation of the property. It appears that a fire occurred on the twenty-seventh of July, after the policy was issued, and destroyed the property.
It is first urged that notwithstanding appellee owned the fee to the premises, before her marriage, her estate in the premises was not absolute, because by the marriage and the birth of a child the husband had become entitled at her death, to hold as a tenant by the curtesy, and entitled to a joint occupancy during their lives. We are at a loss to see how such facts could render her title or estate contingent. She held the title in fee simple absolute. And although the husband had the right during marriage to occupy the property jointly with her, that did not render her absolute estate contingent. No one would say that under such a provision in a policy issued to a married man he could not recover, because his wife had a contingent right to dower in the premises.
Again, it appears that the agents of the company were apprised of the fact that appellee was a married woman when the policy was issued. The husband of appellee went to appellants' business office with Mr. Foreman, and said to the secretary of the company that they wanted the policy changed to his wife's name, and her name was written in the policy by the agent of the company. Knowing the fact when he filled up the policy, if the company deemed it important, he should have so stated the title. To permit the company, when the omission was by their own agent, to now avoid the payment of the loss for the neglect of their agent would amount to a fraud. Those unskilled in the technical terms of the law should only be required to state facts to the agent, and if he fails to properly state them in the policy when relied upon and trusted to do so, the company should not be permitted to escape liability on that ground.
This was the rule announced in the case of Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Wright, 22 Ill. 463. It would be a fraud to permit the company to receive the premium, when they knew that the policy was not binding, and which they never intended to pay. Such bodies act through officers or agents only, and notice to the agent is the only knowledge the company could have, and his knowledge in regard to the transaction must bind the company.
As to the objection that Greenebaum held a deed of trust on the property and therefore the condition was violated, it is a sufficient answer to say...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McKinney v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.
...v. Hill, 205 Ark. 139, 167 S.W.2d 874; Germania Fire Insurance Company v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 599, 22 N.E. 489; Commercial Insurance Company v. Spankneble, 52 Ill. 53, 4 Am.Rep. 582; Dodge v. Grain Shippers' Mutual Fire Insurance Association, 176 Iowa 316, 157 N.W. 955; Williams v. The Niagara......
-
Home Insurance Company v. North Little Rock Ice & Electric Company
...28 A. 205; 73 Am. St. Rep. 533; 17 N.E. 771; 40 Am. St. Rep. 68; 8 A. 424; 11 A. 96; 52 Ill. 61; 147 N.Y. 478; 43 Am. Rep. 138; 97 Ga. 44; 52 Ill. 53; 36 Mich. 2. While, as a rule, an agent cannot act in a dual capacity, yet if he is authorized by the insurance company to write the policy, ......
-
The Philadelphia Fire Ins. Co. v. the Cent. Nat'l Bank of Chicago
...Co. 41 Ill. 296. That a clause in a policy forbidding a sale of the property is not affected by a mortgage of the same: Commercial Ins. Co. v. Spankneble, 52 Ill. 53; Smith v. Mutual F. Ins. Co. 50 Me. 96; Masters v. Madison Ins. Co. 11 Barb. 624; Rollins v. Columbia Ins. Co. 5 Foster, 204;......
-
Clem v. German Ins. Co.
... ... Law Jour. 433; Barnes v. Ins. Co., 51 Me. 110; ... Lovejoy v. Ins. Co., 45 Me. 472; Gould v. Ins ... Co., 47 Me. 403; Ins. Co. v. Spankneble, 52 ... Ill. 53; Merrill v. Ins. Co., 73 N.Y. 452; Card ... v. Ins. Co., 4 Mo.App. 424; Day v. Ins. Co., 51 ... Me. 91; Fiesmuth v. Ins. Co., 10 ... ...