The Court of Industrial Relations v. The Charles Wolff Packing Company

• Decision Date: 08 October 1921
• Docket Number: 23,702
• Parties: THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Plaintiff, v. THE CHARLES WOLFF PACKING COMPANY, Defendant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

201 P. 418

109 Kan. 629

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Plaintiff, v. THE CHARLES WOLFF PACKING COMPANY, Defendant

No. 23,702

Supreme Court of Kansas

October 8, 1921

Decided July, 1921

Original proceeding in mandamus.

Demurrer sustained.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. INDUSTRIAL COURT--May Maintain Action to Compel Obedience to Its Orders. Under chapter 29 of the Laws of 1920, an action may be brought in the supreme court by the court of industrial relations to compel obedience to an order made by it.

2. SAME. Obedience to an order made by the industrial court fixing a schedule of wages and hours of labor may be compelled by an action in mandamus.

3. SAME. An action in the supreme court to compel obedience to an order made by the court of industrial relations does not call for the exercise of legislative powers.

4. SAME--No Approval of Supreme Court Required to Make Its Orders Effective. An order made by the court of industrial relations does not require the approval of the supreme court before becoming effective and binding.

5. SAME--Petition Sufficient to Authorize Investigation of Wages Paid Employees. The petition filed in this action alleged that such an emergency existed as justified the court of industrial relations in making an investigation.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--Chapter 29, Laws of 1920, Is Constitutional. Chapter 29 of the Laws of 1920, the court of industrial relations act, does not violate the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States; those affected by the orders made under that law are not deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, and are not denied the equal protection of the law. Employees in the kinds of business named in the law are governed by the orders of the court of industrial relations; the wages paid such employees are affected with a public interest so as to subject such wages to regulation by the court; orders made under the law do not deprive employers nor employees of the freedom of contract concerning wages in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States; and classification of the businesses to which the law applies is not arbitrary nor unjust.

Baxter D. McClain, attorney of the court of industrial relations, for the plaintiff.

D. R. Hite, of Topeka, for the defendant.

John S. Dean, of Topeka, as amicus curiae.

OPINION

MARSHALL, J.:

This is an original proceeding in mandamus to compel the Wolff Packing Company, hereinafter named the defendant, to put in effect a scale of wages to be paid by it to its employees and to establish hours of labor as ordered by the court of industrial relations, hereinafter named the plaintiff. The defendant answers, and presents a number of questions of law in addition to those of fact. The plaintiff requests that the questions of law be disposed of in advance of the final hearing.

The defendant is operating a packing house in the city of Topeka. On March 21 and May 2, 1921, the plaintiff made orders and afterward served them on the defendant fixing wages to be paid and hours of labor to be observed by it in operating its business. The defendant refused to obey those orders. The questions of law, at the direction of the court, have been briefed and argued, and will be disposed of at this time. This is authorized by section 278 of the code of civil procedure. It may be considered that the plaintiff has demurred to that part of the defendant's answer which presents questions of law.

1. The defendant contends that the court of industrial relations "cannot sue in its own name," and argues that the statute creating the court does not authorize it to so prosecute actions in this court. Section 12 of the industrial court act in part reads:

" In case of the failure or refusal of either party to said controversy to obey and be governed by the order of said Court of Industrial Relations, then and in that event said court is hereby authorized to bring proper proceedings in the supreme court of the state of Kansas to compel compliance with said order."

Section 27 of the code of civil procedure in part reads:

" A person expressly authorized by statute, may bring an action without joining with him the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted."

Section 265 of the code of civil procedure provides that:

" An injunction may be granted to enjoin the illegal levy of any tax, . . . and any number of persons whose property is or may be affected by a tax or assessment so levied . . . may unite in the petition filed to obtain such injunction."

Under the last statute the parties named may not only file the petition but may prosecute the action to final completion. Section 419 of the code of civil procedure provides for an action by the personal representative of a deceased person for his wrongful death, and section 420 provides that if the party whose death has been caused is a resident of this state, and no personal representative has been appointed, the action may be brought by the widow, or, where there is no widow, by the next of kin of such deceased. Under this section actions for wrongful death are constantly commenced and prosecuted to final judgment by the widows or the children of the deceased persons.

Section 8446 of the General Statutes of 1915, a part of the law establishing the board of railroad commissioners, in part reads:

" In case any railroad company, or any such officer, agent, employee, or person, shall violate or shall refuse or fail to obey any such order lawfully made by said board of railroad commissioners, any person aggrieved thereby may institute and prosecute mandamus proceedings in the supreme court, in the name of the state on the relation of such person, to compel compliance with and obedience to such order; and in any case where in the opinion of the board of railroad commissioners the interest of the public requires it, such board shall require such proceeding to be brought, and such proceeding shall then be brought by the attorney-general in the name of the state." (Laws 1901, ch. 286, § 38.)

Section 8447 in part reads:

" Whenever a proceeding brought in the supreme court under section 38 of this act by the attorney for the board, or the attorney-general, upon the direction of the board of railroad commissioners," etc. (Laws 1901, ch. 286, § 39, as amended by Laws 1907, ch. 268, § 8.)

Under these statutes it was held that:

" The attorney for the board of railroad commissioners is the proper officer to bring an action in the name of the state to compel compliance with an order of the board." (The State, ex rel, v. Railroad Companies, 85 Kan. 649, syl. P 1, 118 P. 872.)

Section 8367 of the General Statutes of 1915 reads:

" The commission may compel compliance with the provisions of this act and compel compliance with the orders of the commission by proceeding in mandamus, injunction or other appropriate civil remedies, or by appropriate criminal proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction." (Laws 1911, ch. 238, § 39.)

In City of Emporia v. Telephone Co., 90 Kan. 118, 133 P. 858, this court said:

" Section 39 empowers the utilities commission to compel compliance with its orders by proceedings in mandamus, injunction or other appropriate civil or criminal remedies." (p. 127.)

The State, ex rel., v. Gas Co., 88 Kan. 165, 127 P. 639, was an action brought under the public utilities law by the state on the relation of the attorney for the public utilities commission, and no question was raised about the authority of the attorney to so prosecute the action.

The industrial court law is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed to promote its object. (Gen. Stat. 1915, § 11829; Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 89 Kan. 308, 316, 131 P. 563.) A liberal construction is that the statute gives to the court authority to prosecute in its own name actions of this character. The statute expressly authorizes the court of industrial relations to bring proper proceedings to compel compliance with its orders. Mandamus is a proper proceeding, and the court can bring it. The industrial court is not directly interested in the result of this action; the state is the party that is interested, but the state has authorized the court to bring the action. This is at least one of the ways in which it may be brought.

2. The defendant contends that the purpose of this action cannot be accomplished by proceedings in mandamus, as the action is brought to compel the payment of definite wages to certain employees, and those employees have a right to bring actions against the defendant to recover judgments for wages legally due them. The argument is unsound for the reason that the action is not brought for the purpose named. It is brought to compel the defendant to obey an order of the court of industrial relations fixing a scale of wages and establishing hours of labor to be observed by the defendant in its business. Under the law directing that actions shall be brought by the real party in interest, unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute, the plaintiff cannot by an action in mandamus compel the defendant to pay any wages that may be due under the schedule ordered to be put in effect; such an action must be prosecuted by the workman to whom the wages are due. The present action is analogous to one brought by competent authority to compel a public service corporation to put in effect rates ordered by a proper, controlling body. The public service corporation can be compelled, in an action in mandamus, to put into effect such rates. Damages sustained by reason of the refusal of the public service corporation to obey the order of the controlling body can be recovered only in an action brought by the party injured.

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