The Crowned King Min. Co. v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District

• Decision Date: 21 March 1901
• Docket Number: Civil 695
• Citation: The Crowned King Min. Co. v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District, 64 P. 439, 7 Ariz. 263 (Ariz. 1901)
• Parties: THE CROWNED KING MINING COMPANY, a Corporation et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, and ORRIN F. PLACE, Defendants
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

64 P. 439

7 Ariz. 263

THE CROWNED KING MINING COMPANY, a Corporation et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, and ORRIN F. PLACE, Defendants

Civil No. 695

Supreme Court of Arizona

March 21, 1901

ORIGINAL APPLICATION for Writ of Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

E. M Sanford, and Herndon & Norris, for Plaintiffs.

That the supreme court has power to issue an original writ of prohibition, see Organic Act, sec. 1868; Arnold v Shields, 5 Dana, 18, 30 Am. Dec. 670; Clough v Curtis, 134 U.S. 361, 10 S.Ct. 573; Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall. 375; Yearian v. Spiers, 4 Utah, 369, 11 P. 618; United States v. Peters, 3 Dall. 123; Kerr v. Wooley, 3 Utah, 456, 24 P. 831; Ex parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 12 S.Ct. 453; Kendall v. Raybould, 13 Utah 226, 44 P. 1034; People v. Works, 7 Wend. 486.

Robert E. Morrison, and Kretzinger, Gallagher & Rooney, for Defendants.

If the court has jurisdiction over any part of the subject-matter of a suit, it is no case for a prohibition. Queen v. Twiss, 4 L.R. 2 H.L. 413; State v. District Court, 22 Mont. 220, 56 P. 219; State v. Benton, 12 Mont. 66, 29 P. 425.

When a foreign corporation enters a state to transact business and establishes an agency there, the local courts have the same jurisdiction over it as over domestic corporations. La Fayette v. French, 18 How. 404; Libby v. Hodgdon, 9 N.H. 396.

The territory of Arizona has the right to make complete submission to the jurisdiction of its courts a condition to the transaction of business within its limits. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 19 S.Ct. 281; Macke v. Valley Town Min. Co., 89 F. 114; Ernst v. Rutherford, 38 A.D. 388, 56 N.Y.S. 403.

Any court will entertain a suit to afford redress against frauds such as are alleged in this case if it can obtain personal jurisdiction over the perpetrators thereof by the legal service of process. March v. Railway Co., 40 N.H. 548, 77 Am. Dec. 732; Railway Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss. 244.

On the general question of the suability of foreign corporations, see St Clair v. Cox, 103 U.S. 330; Railway Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Hayden v. Androscoggin Mills, 1 F. 92; Young v. Providence, 150 Mass. 550, 23 N.E. 579; Shields v. Union etc. Ins. Co., 119 N.C. 380, 25 S.E. 951; Telephone Co. v. Turner, 88 Tenn. 265, 12 S.W. 544.

OPINION

STREET, C.J.

The plaintiffs applied for a writ of prohibition in the supreme court, to be directed to the district court of the fourth judicial district of the territory of Arizona, in and for the county of Yavapai, and to Orrin F. Place, to prohibit said court and party from proceeding further in a suit brought in said district court by said Orrin F. Place against these plaintiffs. The defendants make answer to a rule to show cause why such writ of prohibition should not be issued, and plead: First, want of jurisdiction in the supreme court of the territory of Arizona to issue any writ of prohibition, for the reason that neither the laws of the United States nor the laws of the territory of Arizona authorize the supreme court of the territory of Arizona to issue writs of prohibition in any case whatsoever; and second, that the petition filed as an application for the writ fails to show any reason for the issuance of a writ of prohibition, but affirmatively shows that the district court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the complaint, which was the reason alleged in the application for a right of the plaintiffs to such a writ.

First as to the power of the supreme court of Arizona to issue writs of prohibition. The supreme court of Arizona gets its jurisdiction and grant of power direct from the Congress of the United States -- First, in the provisions of its Organic Act; and second, in other statutes passed by Congress. Section 1908 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides: "The judicial power in Arizona shall be vested in a supreme court and such inferior courts as the legislative council may by laws prescribe." Section 1866 provides: "The jurisdiction, both appellate and original, of the courts provided for in section 1908 shall be limited by law." Section 1868 provides: "The supreme court and the district courts, respectively, of every territory shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction." It is argued by the defendants that the supreme court of Arizona is a creature of special and limited jurisdiction, and in this particular is analogous to the supreme court of the United States, and cite many cases from the decisions of the supreme court of the United States to the effect that no power is given by the constitution or by statute to the supreme court of the United States to issue such writs; that the only instance in which the supreme court of the United States shall have power to issue writs of prohibition is granted by section 688 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides: "The supreme court shall have power to issue writs of prohibition in the district courts when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." We take it to be well settled that the supreme court of the United States obtains all its jurisdiction from the constitution and the statutes of the United States, and that, unless a power is therein specially granted, the supreme court has not common law and chancery jurisdiction. The Revised Statutes of Arizona provide (par. 591): "The supreme court of this territory shall consist of the judges appointed for the territory by the president of the United States, and in addition to the powers conferred upon them by the constitution and laws of the United States they are hereby invested with full powers to discharge all the duties required of them by the laws of this territory." The two following paragraphs (592 and 593) provide for the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, and paragraph 594 provides: "This court, and each of the justices thereof, shall have power to issue all writs necessary or proper to a complete exercise of the powers conferred by law and by this and other statutes." It is argued by the defendants that the grant of power conferred by section 594, following immediately after paragraphs 592 and 593, which provide for their appellate jurisdiction, relates to such writs as would be necessary for them to issue in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, and can only be exercised in a particular case where the appellate power of the court has already been invoked, and a writ is necessary or proper to aid or effectuate the exercise of said appellate powers. We think that this court is not a court of limited and special jurisdiction, but that, in addition to its appellate jurisdiction, it has common-law and chancery powers conferred upon it by the statutes of the United States (sec. 1868) as effectually as if the court had been created by a state and was regulated in its jurisdiction by a state constitution; and it seems to us that, if the same provisions were contained in a state constitution governing the powers of a court erected by a state, there could be but little doubt about such a court being a court possessing chancery as well as common-law...