The Cuneo Law Group, P.C. v. Joseph

• Decision Date: 19 November 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 08-00253 (RBW).
• Citation: 669 F.Supp.2d 99
• Parties: THE CUNEO LAW GROUP, P.C., and Jonathan W. Cuneo, Plaintiffs, v. Joel D. JOSEPH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

669 F.Supp.2d 99

THE CUNEO LAW GROUP, P.C., and Jonathan W. Cuneo, Plaintiffs, v. Joel D. JOSEPH, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 08-00253 (RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

November 19, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Wallace Stanley, Jonathan Watson Cuneo, William H. Anderson, Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca, LLP, Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Joel David Joseph, Law Offices of Joel D. Joseph, Santa Monica, CA, for Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

The Cuneo Law Group and Jonathan Cuneo ("the plaintiffs") initiated this action for a declaratory judgment against Joel Joseph ("the defendant") for the alleged material breach of parties' settlement agreement. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 43-45. The defendant denies breaching the settlement agreement and has filed a counterclaim seeking, inter alia, a declaration from the Court that it was in fact the plaintiffs who breached the settlement agreement. First Amended Counterclaim; Jury Trial Demanded ("Am. Countercl.") ¶¶ 37-42. Currently before the Court is the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the defendant's cross-motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), and the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, and VII of the defendant's counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon careful review of the pleadings filed by the parties, their motions, and all memoranda and exhibits submitted in support of those motions, for the reasons that follow, the Court will grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs and deny the defendant's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The Court will also grant the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, and VII of the defendant's counterclaim.

I. Factual Background¹

A. The Relationship Between the Parties

The parties' underlying relationship began in 2001 when the plaintiffs, a law firm and Mr. Cuneo, who "holds an interest in [the firm,]" initially employed the defendant as one of the firm's staff attorneys, Am. Compl. ¶ 12; Verified Answer to the First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim² ("Verified Answer") ¶ 12; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to their Action for Declaratory Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Joseph's Counterclaims ("Pls.' Mem. I") ¶ 2,³ and later as an independent contractor, Pl.'s Mem. I, Affidavit of Jonathan W. Cuneo ("Cuneo Aff.") ¶ 2. While employed by the plaintiffs, the defendant worked on "the preliminary stages" of three contingency fee cases, the Gold Train, Leatherman, and Kwikset cases. "Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff." ¶ 2; Am. Compl. ¶ 20; Pls.' Mem. I at 1. The relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant began to deteriorate for a variety of reasons and was ultimately terminated when the defendant filed a lawsuit against the plaintiffs on August 20, 2001 (the "2001 Lawsuit"). Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 3 & Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Complaint, Joseph v. Cuneo Law Group, P.C., No. 1:01CV01755, Oct. 3, 2001) ("2001 Compl."). In the 2001 Lawsuit, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiffs: (1) were liable for breach of the employment contract between him and the law firm, and (2) that the plaintiffs were guilty of unjust enrichment and conversion. Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 3 & Ex. A, ("2001 Compl."). Furthermore, the defendant demanded payment of any money that the plaintiffs owed him. Am. Compl. ¶ 15; Verified Answer ¶ 15. The plaintiffs refused to pay the funds being requested by the defendant because they had received a garnishment notice from the District of Columbia, which required that any payment owed to the defendant be delayed.⁴ Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; Verified Answer ¶¶ 13-14. While the 2001 Lawsuit was in litigation, the defendant filed liens in the plaintiffs' pending cases and contacted the plaintiffs' various co-counsel in those cases. Am. Compl. ¶ 16; Verified Answer ¶ 16. Ultimately, the parties entered into a settlement agreement on March 15, 2002, resolving the defendant's 2001 Lawsuit. Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 4 & Ex. B (Agreement of Release) (the "2002 Settlement Agreement").

B. The 2002 Settlement Agreement

The 2002 Settlement Agreement "provided that [the defendant] was to receive 20 percent (20%) of Cuneo's net fees, if any, in three (3) then-pending plaintiffs' contingency fee cases, referred to as the Gold Train Case, the Leatherman Case, and the Kwikset Case." Am. Compl. ¶ 20; Verified Answer ¶ 20. The parties included a non-interference clause in the 2002 Settlement Agreement, which states that "[the defendant] shall make no attempt to interfere with the pending cases or cases that follow, nor shall he attempt to file liens or notices of claims, or correspond with the litigants. If [the defendant] does he has breached the agreement and waives his percentages." Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 5 & Ex. B (2002 Settlement Agreement). The defendant "also agreed in writing to `release all liens' and `not file any independent fee applications' and to `cooperate' with [the plaintiffs] `reasonably in the prosecution of [the three pending contingency fee] cases.'" Am. Compl. ¶ 22; Verified Answer ¶ 22.

C. The Defendant's Alleged Breach of the 2002 Settlement Agreement

The plaintiffs allege that in January 2006, payment was received for the Gold Train case,⁵ Am. Compl. ¶ 23, and from those funds the plaintiffs paid and the defendant accepted $240,895 in accordance with the 2002 Settlement Agreement.⁶ Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 7; Am. Compl. ¶ 24; Verified Answer ¶ 24. However, despite accepting this payment and in disregard of the 2002 Settlement Agreement, the defendant contacted the plaintiffs' co-counsel in the Gold Train case, demanding an additional 20% "finders fee" for his work on that case. Am. Compl. ¶ 26; Verified Answer ¶ 26, 31; Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 8.⁷ Upon receipt of the defendant's demand letter, the plaintiffs' co-counsel in the Gold Train case notified the plaintiffs of the defendant's demand, Pls.' Mem. I at 2; Cuneo Aff. ¶ 8 & Ex. E (Letter to the defendant from the plaintiffs' counsel, Jan. 19, 2006.), and the plaintiffs informed the defendant that his conduct constituted a material breach of the 2002 Settlement Agreement, id. Then, on February 24, 2006, the defendant filed a complaint against the plaintiffs' co-counsel seeking one-third of their fees from the Gold Train case. Pl.'s Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 9 & Ex. F (Complaint, Joseph v. Dubbin, No. 06-20464, Feb. 24, 2006). On December 22, 2006, the case against the plaintiffs' co-counsel was dismissed with prejudice, which Joseph appealed. Id., Cuneo Aff. ¶ 9 & Ex. H (Docket, Joseph v. Dubbin, No. 06-20464). The parties to that lawsuit then engaged in negotiations, which resulted in a settlement, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on March 15, 2007. Id.

On February 12, 2008, the plaintiffs "received payment in the Leatherman Case." Am. Compl. ¶ 41. The plaintiffs promptly filed the present lawsuit claiming that the defendant had "lost ... entitlement to any share [of] the fee in the Leatherman Case" due to his prior interference in the Gold Train case. Id. ¶ 42. Consequently, pursuant to the terms of the 2002 Settlement Agreement, the plaintiffs refused to release any of the proceeds from the Leatherman case to the defendant on the ground that he "waived his entitlement to a percentage of the Leatherman fee ...." Pls.' Mem. I, Cuneo Aff. ¶ 13.

D. The Current Dispute

On February 15, 2008, the plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in this case, and on February 26, 2008, they filed their amended complaint. After filing an initial answer and counterclaim on March 5, 2008, on May 22, 2008, the defendant filed an amended counterclaim and answer asserting claims of legal malpractice; breach of the settlement agreement; quantum meruit; unjust enrichment; unfair trade practices under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and conversion. Am. Countercl. On June 11, 2008, the plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment as to their request for declaratory judgement and their motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for motion for summary judgment on the defendant's counterclaim. The defendant then filed a memorandum on June 23, 2008, in opposition to the plaintiffs' motions and also a separate cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

II. Legal Analysis

A. The Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion

To grant a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), this Court must find that "the pleadings, the discovery, and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must also view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bayer v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C.Cir.1992). However, the nonmoving party cannot rely on "mere allegations or denials ... but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] genuine issue[s] for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted) (some alterations in original). Therefore, under Rule 56(c), if a party fails to "establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial," summary judgment is warranted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that there is insufficient evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct....