The Eclipse

Decision Date14 December 1892
Docket Number10,465.
Citation53 F. 273
PartiesTHE ECLIPSE. v. THE ECLIPSE et al. MARTIAL et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

S Bloom, for claimants.

MORROW District Judge.

This is an action for balance of seamen's wages. The libelants shipped on board the ship Eclipse, at the port of San Francisco, on the 7th day of September, 1892, for a voyage to Port Angeles, in the state of Washington, thence to Nanaimo or Departure bay, in British Columbia, and return; wages, $25 per month. The voyage was completed, and libelants discharged in the port of San Francisco, November 1, 1892. The wages of each seaman for the voyage amounted to $45.83. During the voyage, some of them received small sums of money and a few articles from the slop chest, but the present controversy is with respect to deductions made from the wages on account of certain advance notes or orders given by the libelants before the commencement of the voyage.

It appears that one John Savory, acting for certain boarding-house masters, made an agreement with Andrew Anderson, the managing owner of the vessel, to furnish him with a crew of 12 men for the voyage, for $175. This agreement Savory failed to keep but another agreement was made, under which Savory furnished Anderson a crew of 12 men for $200. For the payment of this sum of $200, Savory took from the seamen advance notes or orders upon the captain of the vessel, in favor of the boarding-house masters, payable 24 hours after the sailing of the vessel. Eight of the men shipped gave advance orders in the sum of $15 each, and four gave orders in the sum of $20 each, making the full sum of $200. These advance orders were paid to Savory the day after the vessel sailed, by Anderson the managing owner, and Savory paid this money to the boarding-house masters, receiving from them $2.50 on each $15 order, and $3 on each $20 order, the boarding-house master retaining the balance. It appears that the boarding-house masters had small bills against the seamen for board, and that they furnished a small outfit at an expense of from $1 to $3 in each case, but in no case did the board and outfit amount to more than $9, and in one case it was less than $3. The ostensible purpose of the advance orders was, therefore, to pay these bills due to the boarding-house masters, but in every instance the sum mentioned in the order exceeded the indebtedness of the seaman giving the order. When Anderson, the managing owner of the vessel, paid the crew in San Francisco at the end of the voyage, he deducted the amount of the advance order, and took a receipt in full in each case, without any objection being made on the part of the seaman. As before stated, Anderson paid the orders the day after the vessel sailed, and of course before the wages to the amount of the order had been earned.

It is now claimed on the part of the libelants-- First, that the whole transaction relating to the advance orders was in fraud of their rights, in wrongfully deducting from their wages sums of money in excess of what they should have been required to pay under any circumstances; and, second, that the payment of the orders was the payment of advance wages, and was contrary to the provisions of section 10 of the act of June 26, 1884, (23 St.at Large, 55,) as amended by section 3 of the act of June 19, 1886, (24 St.at Large, 80.) The managing owner of the vessel meets the first claim by saying that he paid the advance orders in full; that it was not for him to inquire whether the seamen who gave them were in debt in the amount stated in the orders; that when he paid the crew their wages they receipted in full, and made no complaint, and did not object to the deductions. The answer to this defense is that the managing owner made a bargain with Savory for a crew of 12 men for $200 after a previous agreement for the same number of men for $175 had failed; in other words, he fixed the advance wages himself, and left it to those who should furnish the men to make whatever they could out of the transaction. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that the amounts received by some of them in board and outfit were very small. The terms of the agreement would naturally lead to that result. The fact that the men receipted in full for their wages after the voyage was over is no answer to such a transaction in a court of admiralty. As was well said in Rosenthal v. The Die Gartenlaube, 5 Fed.Rep. 827, 830: 'A party colluding with a master to cheat the seamen out of a part of their wages, or to induce them to apply their wages in anticipation of payment to any purpose not shown to be for their own good, will receive no relief in a court of admiralty. Of course, after they are paid their wages they can expend the money as they like; but payment in anything else than money, though with their consent, will be most rigidly scrutinized, and must be clearly shown to be proper and equivalent to the payment of the money itself to them.'

Courts of admiralty do not 'give any effect to the receipt of a sailor for his wages, whether sealed or parol, unless there was an actual payment. ' See 2 Pars.Shipp.& Adm. 41, and cases cited. There is no difficulty, therefore, in arriving at the conclusion that the libelants are entitled to be paid their full wages, less deductions for actual sums due for board, outfit, and cash received. This right they have without regard to congressional legislation upon the subject of seamen's wages.

But the next question requires an examination of such legislation. The libelants claim that the payment of advance wages is in violation of section 10 of the act of June 26, 1884, as amended by the act of June 19, 1886, which provides that such payments shall be no defense to an action for the full amount of wages. That section provides as follows:

'That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages before leaving the port at which such seaman may be engaged, in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person, or to pay any person, other than an officer authorized by act of congress to collect fees for such service, any remuneration for the shipment of seamen. Any person paying such advance wages or such remuneration shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not less than four times the amount of the wages so advanced or remuneration so paid, and may be also imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or remuneration shall in no case, except as herein provided, absolve the vessel, or the master or owner thereof, from full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel, suit, or action for the recovery of such wages: provided, that this section shall not apply to whaling vessels: and provided, further, that it shall be lawful for any seaman to stipulate in his shipping agreement for an allotment of any portion of the wages which he may earn to his wife, mother, or other relative, or to an original creditor in liquidation of any just debt for board or clothing which he may have contracted prior to engagement, not exceeding ten dollars per month for each month of the time usually required for the voyage for which the seaman has shipped, under such regulations as the secretary of the treasury may prescribe, but no allotment to any other person or corporation shall be lawful; and any person who shall falsely claim such relationship to any seaman in order to obtain wages so allotted shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court; and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated this section shall be liable to the
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6 cases
  • Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • November 6, 2008
    ...J.). The connection of ship and wages due was such that it could be said that a seaman's wages "are nailed to the ship." The Eclipse, 53 F. 273, 277 (N.D.Cal.1892). This extraordinary solicitude for seamen—this linkage of seamen and ship and federal supervision—was not the product of a roma......
  • The Kestor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • August 7, 1901
    ...to seamen and detrimental to the merchant service. These were the evils the legislation in question was intended to correct. In The Eclipse (D.C.) 53 F. 273, Judge Morrow well 'The payment of advance wages to seamen has been one of the great evils of the merchant marine service. It has been......
  • THE SONDERBORG.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • February 12, 1931
    ...46 USCA. While this statute is an unusually stringent one, it was passed to strike at a great evil, and as was said by Judge Morrow in The Eclipse (D. C.) 53 F. 273, 276: "* * * The payment of advance wages to seamen has been one of the great evils of the merchant marine service. It has bee......
  • The J.D. Peters
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • December 18, 1896
    ...376. See, also, Railway Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528-536, 11 Sup.Ct. 168; Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U.S. 542-552, 11 Sup.Ct. 174; The Eclipse, 53 F. 273-279; Id., 8 C.C.A. 60 F. 105. But this rule does not render the ruling of an official absolutely conclusive of the question, and prevent its ......
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