The Egyptian Monarch

• Decision Date: 17 November 1888
• Citation: 36 F. 773
• Parties: THE EGYPTIAN MONARCH. v. THE EGYPTIAN MONARCH. ROBERTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

36 F. 773

THE EGYPTIAN MONARCH.

ROBERTS v. THE EGYPTIAN MONARCH.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

November 17, 1888

A. B Caldwell and Chas. Blandy, for libelant.

E. B Convers, for claimant.

WALES J.

This is a proceeding in rem to recover damages for injuries sustained by the libelant, a seaman on board the Egyptian Monarch, on her voyage from England to the United States, in the month of July, 1886. The libelant, a naturalized citizen of the United States, had shipped as an able-bodied seaman. The vessel left the Milward docks, in the port of London, on July 14th, being towed out into the river Thames by a tug-boat attached to a two-and-a-half inch wire hawser, which was a part of the tackle of the steam-ship, and fastened at the other end to the aft-deck of the Monarch. At the time of the accident the vessel was going down the river, but was still within the limits of the port of London. The libelant, with another member of the crew, was reeling in the hawser, which had been cast off by the tug, and triced up along-side of the Monarch. One end of the hawser was fast to the reel, a horizontal drum between two uprights, passing thence out through the after-quarter chock, and along the ship's side forward to her waist, where the other end was made fast by a hempen line to the midship davit, so that the bight of the hawser just touched the water. The second mate superintended the work of reeling. Under his direction the boatswain's mate paid out the hawser from the davit by means of the line, and the men at the reel wound it up. During this operation the hawser was paid out more rapidly than it was taken up on the drum in consequence of which the bight sank into the water at the vessel's stern and was caught by the propeller, which reversed the motion of the drum, causing the handle at which the libelant was working to fly back, and inflict on him serious bodily injuries. The libelant alleges that the accident occurred through the negligence of the second mate and seeks to hold the owners of the ship liable. There is not much dispute over the facts. The ship was well equipped. There was no defect in her machinery, or in the appliances or means by which the hawser was being taken in. The second mate and the boatswain's mate were competent and experienced men, and the work in which they and the libelant were engaged, at the time of the accident, was being done in the regular course of the navigation of the ship. There was nothing unusual in the character of the work, which belonged and was incident to the ordinary duties of the officers and crew. The defenses are (1) that the accident having occurred on board of an English ship while in the territorial waters and within the body of a county of England, the law of England must govern the case, and that by that law the libelant has no lien enforceable in admiralty; (2) that both the officers who were engaged in the work with the libelant were fellow-servants of the latter, and neither the ship nor her owners are liable.

The law of the ship's home is applied by comity to regulate the mutual relations of the ship, her owner, master, and crew, as among themselves; their liens for wages, and modes of discipline. The Brantford City, 29 F. 373. And this rule will not be affected by the fact that one or more of the crew are citizens or subjects of different countries. In The M. Moxham, 1 Prob.Div. 107, 114, it was held (citing Reg. v. Anderson, 1 L.R.Cas. 161) that a seaman, having entered into articles to serve on board an English ship, so long as he remained on board that ship was in the same position an English subject would have been. In the celebrated case of Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 238, which was an action for assault and false imprisonment on the island of Jamaica, Lord COCKBURN, in delivering the judgment of the court on a demurrer to the plea, said:

'The rule which obtains in respect of property and civil contracts, namely, that an act, unless intended to take effect elsewhere, shall, as regards its effect and incidents, if a conflict arises between the lex loci and the lex fori, be governed by the former, appears to us to be applicable to the case of an act occasioning personal injury. To hold the contrary would be attended with the most inconvenient and startling consequences, and would be altogether contrary to that comity of nations in matters of law to which effect, if possible, should be given.'

In The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29, the supreme court of the United States held the same doctrine. Speaking through Mr. Justice BRADLEY, it said:

'In administering justice between parties it is essential to know by what law, or code, or system of laws, their mutual rights are to be determined. When they arise in a particular country or state, they are generally to be determined by the laws of that state. These laws pervade all transactions which take place where they prevail, and given them their color and legal effect. Hence, if a collision should occur in British waters, at least between British ships, and the injured party should seek relief in our courts, we would administer justice according to the british law, so far as the rights and liabilities of the parties were concerned, provided it was shown what that law was.'

See, also, The Olga, 32 F. 329, and Whart. Confl. Law, Sec. 475. The lex loci, it is generally admitted, governs the duties, rights, and remedies of seamen, unless modified by treaty stipulations. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364, 5 S.Ct. 860; The John Ritson, 35 F. 663. In The Maud Carter, 29 F. 156, the rule of comity, as thus defined, was applied in the most liberal manner. There the libelants claimed a maritime lien against a British vessel for advances and supplies while in a British port. Under the maritime law of the United States advances and supplies of like character would not create any lien, 'but,' says Judge NELSON, 'this vessel is a British vessel, and subject to British law. Under the circumstances it is the duty of the court to administer and apply the British law exactly as it would be applied if the vessel were in an English court. * * * As the lien would be enforced against this vessel in an English court, it can, as between the parties here, be enforced in this court.'

It is clear, therefore, in the light of the authorities just cited,...