The Erie Ry. Co. v. Wilcox

• Citation: 1876 WL 10483,25 Am.Rep. 451,84 Ill. 239
• Parties: THE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANYv.ADALBERT J. WILCOX.
• Decision Date: 30 September 1876
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

84 Ill. 239

1876 WL 10483 (Ill.)

25 Am.Rep. 451

THE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY

v.ADALBERT J. WILCOX.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1876.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. GEO. WILLARD, and Mr. JOHN N. JEWETT, for the appellant.

Mr. ADOLPH MOSES, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

Whatever contrariety there may be in the decisions of co??ts in respect to the duties and obligations of common carriers, it is settled, as firmly as any legal proposition can be, such carrier is not bound to assume responsibility for the transportation of goods beyond the terminal points reached by its own conveyances. It is optional whether the carrier will take upon itself the enlarged responsibility of making the connecting carriers its own agents for the transportation of goods, rather than the agents of the shipper.

Although the cases elsewhere are not harmonious, the rule adopted and uniformly adhered to in this State is, the acceptance of goods delivered for carriage, marked to a point beyond the terminus of the carrier's lines, will be construed, prima facie, as a contract for through transportation. Notwithstanding the goods may be thus marked, the carrier, by express contract, may limit its obligation to carry safely over its own lines, or only to points reached by its own carriages, and for safe storage and delivery to the next carrier in the route beyond. A clause in the receipt given to the owner for the goods, restricting the carrier's obligations in this respect, if understandingly assented to by the shipper, will as effectually bind him as though he had signed it. What the contract between the shipper and the carrier is, is a matter of evidence. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 34 Id. 389; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Id. 88; The People ex rel. v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. 55 Id. 95; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. The People, 56 Id. 365; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Montfort, 60 Id. 176; United States Express Co. v. Haines, 67 Id. 137.

But where a carrier seeks exemption from any common law liabilities incident to its general employment, the contract must be assented to with a view to release the restrictions imposed, and when the exemption is established, the carrier, in case of loss, will only be responsible on account of negligence or willful misconduct. The correctness of this proposition is not questioned; but, as we understand the argument, it is, that it should not be rigidly applied in cases like the one in hand, for the reason the carrier was under no obligation to contract to carry the goods beyond points reached by its own lines, and the assent of the shipper is not essential, as no restrictions which the law has annexed to the employment are being released, and notice of a refusal to contract for through transportation, whether assented to or not, will be sufficient. No distinction has been taken in our former decisions between contracts for through transportation and for shipment over the carrier's own lines. In either case, the exemption from the duties and liabilities springing out of the employment must be assented to by the shipper. The only distinction is that indicated in Oppenheimer v. United States Express Co. 69 Ill. 62: Where the carrier seeks to be discharged from duties which the law has annexed to his employment, a notice, alone, will not be effectual, without the assent of the shipper to the attempted restriction, but it is otherwise in respect to those duties designed simply to insure good faith and fair dealing; a notice, alone, if brought home to the knowledge of the owner of the property delivered for carriage, will be sufficient. Without some modification of our former decisions, which counsel virtually concede, we can not distinguish between contracts for through transportation to distant points and more limited ones over the carrier's own lines; and as we have seen, the rule adopted requires the attempted restrictions in regard to the property delivered for carriage shall be assented to by the shipper. Whether the rule adopted by other courts, that holds the carrier only liable to the extent of his own route, and for safe storage, and delivery to the next carrier, is, in itself, more just and reasonable, or better sustained by authority elsewhere, we need not inquire, nor need we concern ourselves as to the reasons that led to the adoption of the rule declared in our former decisions on this branch of the law. It has been so repeatedly declared, and so uniformly adhered to, that the rule ought not to be departed from except for the weightiest considerations affecting the general public welfare.

In this case, the goods to be shipped were delivered to defendant marked for carriage to a point beyond the terminal points of defendant's lines. Nothing was said to the contrary, and as defendant contracted for exemption from loss or damage for itself and other carriers into whose hands the goods might be placed before reaching the destination indicated, it may have induced the belief defendant was contracting for through transportation. It is true, the receipt given limited defendant's duty to safely carry the goods to Cleveland-- a point reached by its own conveyances--and for safe storage, and delivery to the next carrier, but the restrictions it contained were not assented to by the shipper. All the evidence this record contains on that question is, the admission the goods were shipped under the receipt, but it does not appear the shipper knew its contents, or assented to any restrictions it may have contained. Whether the contract was in fact one for through transportation or not, was a question of fact to be found from the evidence, and, treating the finding of the court as we would the verdict of a jury, we may regard it as well found under the evidence.

But there is one question of fact...