The Erisa Indus. Comm. v. Asaro-Angelo
| Decision Date | 16 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-10094 (ZNQ)(TJB) |
| Parties | THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT ASARO-ANGELO, in his official capacity as THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff The ERISA Industry Committee (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Motion”, ECF No. 16). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion (“Moving Br.”, ECF No. 16-2) and a Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Plf's SMFNID”, ECF No. 16-1). Defendant Robert Asaro-Angelo filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion (“Opp'n Br.”, ECF No. 26), along with a Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute and a Supplemental Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 26-1). Defendant additionally filed a Rule 56(d) Declaration. (“56(d) Decl.”, ECF No. 26-2.) Plaintiff filed a Reply. (“Reply Br.”, ECF No 27.)
The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff is a Washington, D.C. nonprofit trade association that “represents the interest[s] of employers with 10,000 or more employees that sponsor health, retirement, and other benefit plans governed by” the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”). Plaintiff advocates and lobbies for its employer-members “to preserve ERISA's national uniformity, which protects employers and employees from disparate state and local regulations of health and retirement plans.” (Id. ¶ 10.)
Defendant is the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development. (See generally Id.)
Plaintiff brings this action seeking a declaration that Senate Bill 3170 (“S3170”) is preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. (Id. ¶ 1.)
The Court finds the following facts undisputed:
On January 21, 2020, Governor Philip Murphy (“Governor Murphy”) signed into law S3170, amending the New Jersey WARN Act, codified as N.J.S.A. § 34:21-1 et seq (“the N.J. WARN Act”). (Plf's SMFNID ¶ 1.)
Prior to the amendments, the N.J. WARN act required employers with 100 or more full time employees to provide 60 days' notice to affected full-time employees in the event of a “mass layoff” or “transfer or termination of operations,” and imposed certain penalties for failure to comply. (Id. ¶ 2.) Previously, employers covered under the N.J. WARN Act were only required to make payments to certain employees as a penalty if they failed to provide the required amount of notice of termination or layoff. (Id. ¶ 3.) Under the amended law, S3170, an employer conducting a “mass layoff”' or a “transfer” or “termination” of operations must pay each affected employee one week of severance for each full year of his/her employment, even if the employer provides sufficient and timely notice. (Id.) Also under S3170, if the affected employee is entitled to severance under a collective bargaining agreement or for any other reason, the employer is required to pay either the statutorily mandated severance or the severance provided for such “other reason,” whichever is greater. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Prior to the amendments, the term “mass layoff' was defined as the termination of employment within any 30-day period (or 90-day period within which two or more group terminations can potentially be aggregated) or either (1) 500 or more full-time employees at an establishment, or (2) 50 or more full-time employees comprising at least 33% of the full-time employees at an establishment. (Id. ¶ 5.) S3170, however, removes the 500-employee and 33% requirements and counts both employees “at” an establishment and employees “reporting to” an establishment. (Id. ¶ 6.) Thus, 50 or more qualifying terminations will trigger the notice and severance requirements regardless of what percentage of the workforce that may constitute. (Id.)
Further, prior to S3170, the term “establishment” was defined as either a single location operated for longer than three years or a group of contiguous such locations. (Id. ¶ 7.) S3170 removes “contiguous” from this definition, and considers all of an employer's facilities within New Jersey as one aggregate establishment. (Id.)
Additionally, prior to S3170, part-time employees were not counted when calculating whether a New Jersey WARN event had occurred. (Id. ¶ 8.) S3170 removes the distinction between full-time and part-time employees. (Id. ¶ 9.) All employees, regardless of their hours or length of employment, now count toward N.J. WARN trigger thresholds. (Id.)
S3170 furthermore covers all employers with 100 or more employees, regardless of how many are full-time or part-time. (Id. ¶ 10.)
S3170 additionally requires a 90-day notice requirement, rather than the previously required 60 days. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) If the increased notice requirement is not met, employers must add four weeks' severance pay for each affected employee. (Id. ¶ 12.)
On March 9, 2020, Governor Murphy issued Executive Order 103, declaring a Public Health Emergency and a State of Emergency in response to the COVID-19 virus. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On April 14, 2020, Governor Murphy signed Senate Bill 2353, amending the definition of “mass layoff' under S3170 to exclude, among others, “a mass layoff made necessary because of a . . . national emergency.” (Id. ¶ 16.)
On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. (See generally, Compl.) On October 26, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 10.) Before the Court rendered a decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, on May 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 16.) On May 20, 2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.)
On June 4, 2021, Governor Murphy signed Executive Order 244 terminating the public health emergency from the COVID-19 pandemic. Executive Order 244, however, did not terminate the State of Emergency declared in Executive Order 103. As of the date Plaintiff filed the instant Motion, the 90-day period for the effective date of S3170 had not been triggered.[1]
The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983) ().
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact raises a “genuine” dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 459 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“In evaluating the evidence, the Court must consider all facts and their logical inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rhodes v. Marix Servicing, LLC, 302 F.Supp.3d 656, 661 (D.N.J. 2018) (citing Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002)). “While the moving party bears the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving party to ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.'” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).
“Unsupported allegations, subjective beliefs, or argument alone. . . cannot forestall summary judgment.” Read v. Profeta, 397 F.Supp.3d 597, 625 (D.N.J. 2019). “Thus, if the nonmoving party fails ‘to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, . . . there can be no genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. (quoting Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted)). “In considering the motion, the Court ‘does not resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations.'” Rhodes, 302 F.Supp.3d at 661 (quoting Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1995)).
“It is well established that a court is obliged to give a party opposing summary judgment an adequate opportunity to obtain discovery.” Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rule 56(d) allows a nonmoving party to oppose a premature motion in situations where the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery. Levine v. Bank Alt LLC, No. 18-6400, 2018 WL 6573477, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2018); see also Celotex Corp. v....
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