The Estate Of Nick Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 21 June 2010 |
Citation | 997 A.2d 954,202 N.J. 369 |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Parties | The ESTATE OF Nick HANGES, Plaintiff-Respondent,v.METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. |
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Jerald J. Howarth, Parsippany and Purnima D. Ramlakhan, argued the cause for appellant (Howarth & Associates, attorneys).
Demetrios K. Stratis, argued the cause for respondent.
N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) codifies an exception to the hearsay rule. It allows, in civil proceedings only, the admission of “a statement made by a person unavailable as a witness because of death if the statement was made in good faith upon declarant's personal knowledge in circumstances indicating that it is trustworthy.” Ibid.
In the context of a summary judgment motion, the trial court disallowed the admission of several hearsay statements made by a decedent concerning the cause of an automobile accident, ruling that, because it was in the decedent's self-interest to color the version of the events he gave to the police in the light most favorable to him, that self-interest automatically rendered that hearsay statement not in good faith and untrustworthy, thus inadmissible. The Appellate Division, although sustaining several of the evidentiary determinations made by the trial court concerning the decedent's later hearsay statements, disagreed with the trial court's rejection of the statements made by the decedent to a police officer shortly after the accident. It concluded that there was no factual basis in the record to support the trial court's determination that such statement was not made in good faith or was not trustworthy.
We agree. As a threshold matter, we observe that, ordinarily, an evidentiary determination made during trial is entitled to deference and is to be reversed only on a finding of an abuse of discretion; we see no reason to impose a different standard of review on an evidentiary determination made, as here, in the context of a summary judgment application. Applying that standard of review, the record discloses that the sole reason proffered by the trial court in determining that the hearsay statement was not trustworthy-that it was in the declarant's self-interest to make the statement-lacked an evidential foundation. In those circumstances, the trial court's determination constituted an abuse of discretion and cannot be sustained.
Because this appeal arises in the context of a summary judgment application, we are obliged to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Guido v. Duane Morris, LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 82, 995 A.2d 844 (2010) (citing Roa v. LAFE, 200 N.J. 555, 562, 985 A.2d 1225 (2010); Lee v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 254, 971 A.2d 1054 (2009); Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 567-68, 969 A.2d 1097 (2009)).
In the mid-afternoon hours of Sunday, October 31, 2004, decedent Nick J. Hanges was involved in a one-car accident in Clifton, when he crashed his vintage 1974 Triumph TR-6 sports car into an underpass wall. The police responded to the accident scene. Answering questions posed by a police officer, decedent attributed the cause of the accident to a “phantom vehicle.” Decedent explained that he “was traveling South on the Route 20 ramp from Rt. 20 South when a blue [C]orvette ([C]hev[rolet]) traveling in the same direction cut him off.” He added that, as a result, “he lost control of his vehicle and struck the Rt. 46 underpass wall.” Decedent 1
Once at the hospital, medical personnel inquired of decedent as to the cause of his injuries. The medical chart reflects that decedent stated that he was “driv[ing a] sports car, was cut off[, was] forced to make a left turn [and] crashed into [a] bridge [abutment].” The next day, while still hospitalized, decedent contacted his psychologist, cancelled the therapy session they previously scheduled for that day, and informed her that “he was in an auto accident yesterday[ and] stated he was ‘cut off’ by another car and has multiple injuries[.]” Because decedent was “fearful ... he did not know what kind of treatment he would be receiving at the hospital and [was] feeling isolated and vulnerable[,]” his psychologist “suggested he contact his sister [in Florida] and her husband, who is a physician, so that they might intervene in getting him some answers.” Decedent agreed.
Decedent contacted his family in Florida and, upon his discharge from the hospital, was transported there. He received additional medical treatment in Florida where, in a report to a physician, decedent explained that he had been Decedent was treated in Florida until he returned to New Jersey in late November/early December.
In the interim, an uninsured motorist claim was made under the automobile insurance covering the car decedent drove into the underpass wall. According to an automobile loss notice form dated November 4, 2004-four days after the accident-the accident occurred because the “[a]ccelerator stuck and insured hit the divider.” That form makes no mention of a “phantom vehicle,” of decedent being “cut-off,” or of those events having been the cause of the accident and decedent's resulting injuries.
Decedent returned to see his psychologist in New Jersey on December 6, 2004. She described decedent as “looking tired with some weight loss.” Decedent stated “he was taking pain medications as directed” but that his “[m]ood [was] depressed with some hopelessness about being able to function adequately at work in [the] future due to [the] nature of [his] leg injury.” He rejected-seemingly not for the first time-using anti-depressants. He nevertheless expressed some hope for the future. As noted by the psychologist,
As the trial court found, “[s]ometime that evening or during the next morning the decedent committed suicide.”
Approximately eighteen months later, on May 8, 2006, the Estate of Nick Hanges, as the named plaintiff,2 filed suit in the Law Division against defendant Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that decedent had purchased uninsured motorist coverage from defendant and that such insurance should have covered the damages arising from the October 31, 2004 accident. After filing its answer, which included several affirmative defenses and additional demands for relief, defendant moved for summary judgment; plaintiff opposed that application and cross-moved for partial summary judgment.
In short, defendant asserted that it was not liable under the uninsured motorist portion of plaintiff's automobile insurance policy because “[t]here exists no competent proof that a ‘phantom vehicle’ was involved in the October 31, 2004 accident.” Plaintiff opposed that application, submitting copies of (1) the police report of the accident, which sets forth decedent's explanation of the accident; (2) the trauma chart from St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center, which also includes decedent's explanation of the accident, one consistent with the explanation he gave to the police earlier that day; (3) the report of his treating physician in Florida, to whom decedent also claimed he had been injured when he was “cut-off;” and (4) the notes of his treating psychologist, which also are consistent with decedent's description of this car accident.
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