The First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Coleman
| Citation | 11 Bradw. 508,11 Ill.App. 508 |
| Parties | THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SPRINGFIELDv.AMANDA F. COLEMAN. |
| Decision Date | 31 May 1882 |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. C. S. ZANE, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed October 28, 1882.
Messrs. HAY, GREENE & LITTLER, for appellant; that whatever is sufficient to put one upon inquiry must be regarded as notice of all that an inquiry would have disclosed, cited Russel v. Ransom, 76 Ill. 167; C. & R. I. R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Ill. 350; Harper v. Ely, 56 Ill. 179; Henneberry v. Morse, 56 Ill. 394; Babcock v. Lisk, 57 Ill. 327; Flint v. Lewis, 61 Ill. 299.
The court should not assume facts in an instruction nor tell the jury what weight to give any part of the evidence: Richmond v. Roberts, 98 Ill. 472; Elston Road Co. v. The People, 96 Ill. 584; Calef v. Thomas, 81 Ill. 487; Evans v. George, 80 Ill. 51; Pro. Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91 Ill. 174.
Messrs. PALMERS, ROBINSON & SHUTT, for appellee.
The statement of this case as made by counsel for appellant in their brief is concurred in by counsel for appellee. It is as follows:
In the month of September, 1870, the plaintiff below, a married woman, sold to the Springfield and Illinois S. E. R. R. Co. lots 1 and 2 in block 5 in the old town plat of Springfield. The price agreed upon was $9,000. In September, 1870, she joined with her husband in executing a deed for the property, but it was not then delivered.
About the 3d day of October, 1870, an arrangement was made by which two certificates were issued by the defendant bank in the following form:
“Deposited with First National Bank, by Mrs. A. F. Coleman, October 3, '70, forty-five hundred; payable March 1, '71.” Memorandum on corner, “Note.”
What transpired on that day is a matter of dispute, but it will not be denied that in a few days thereafter, A. W. Coleman drew $4,500 of the amount deposited, on a check, which he drew in the name of his wife, he signing as her agent. Of the amount so drawn he applied the sum of $3,640.73 to the satisfaction of two mortgages or deeds of trust on the property sold, and received $859.27 in cash. After the 1st of March, 1871, Coleman commenced to draw checks against the second certificate of deposit of $4,500, and by the 21st of November, 1871, he had drawn the whole amount. Thus the entire $9,000 was exhausted. Coleman drew all the money on checks, to which he signed his wife's name, and himself as agent. After the money was drawn out the account was balanced, and the checks returned to Coleman.
About the year 1878 the Coleman family moved to St. Louis.
On the 25th day of April, 1879, this suit was commenced by Mrs. Coleman for the recovery of the money. Just before the commencement of the suit, Mr. Hamilton, one of the attorneys of plaintiff, demanded the money from the bank in her behalf. This was the first time the officers of the bank ever heard that the authority of the husband to represent the wife was questioned. No complaint or demand had ever been made, or notice given, till after the lapse of nearly nine years, when Coleman had ceased to be a resident of the State.
The case was tried upon appellant's plea of payment, in support of which it assumed the affirmative of the case. The main questions in the case were whether or not appellee's husband had authority in the first instance to draw the money, or not having such authority, did appellee afterward ratify what he had done? We express no opinion as to the weight of evidence upon these points.
The jury returned a verdict and the court rendered judgment for $6,889.65, which, after deducting the amount paid upon the mortgages from the said $9,000, is greatly in excess of the sum due appellee, unless she is entitled to interest.
The court at the instance of appellee instructed the jury that the measure of damages would be the amount of the certificates with interest at six per cent. per annum from the time the money specified became due, allowing appellant such credits as they might...
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