The Florida Bar v. Thomson
| Citation | 310 So.2d 300 |
| Decision Date | 29 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | 42477,Nos. 42286,s. 42286 |
| Parties | THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner, v. Charles E. THOMSON, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel, Wilson J. Foster, Jr., Asst. Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Joe M. Mitchell, Jr., for respondent.
By petition for clarification of an order of this Court, we are asked to determine whether an attorney suspended from the practice of law may be permitted to work for a law firm as a law clerk or investigator during his suspension. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, he may.
The order sought to be clarified was rendered in The Florida Bar v. Thomson (Fla.1972) 271 So.2d 758, in which we held in two separate grievance proceedings that Thomson should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years, with credit for the period of over one year during which he was improperly suspended by The Florida Bar for nonpayment of dues, and thereafter until such time as he demonstrated that his conduct would warrant removal of the suspension. In those proceedings, Thomson was found guilty of (1) conviction in Palm Beach County on two counts of obtaining property in return for worthless checks; (2) conviction in Polk County on three counts of issuing worthless checks; (3) conviction in Polk County on the charge of beating a board bill in the amount of $750.00; (4) actively practicing law during the years 1970 and 1971 while under suspension for failure to pay his Bar dues; (5) making false affidavits concerning his date of birth and his proper name; and (6) entering into a contract of employment with a client for professional services and failing to carry out that contract after being paid his fee. With regard to the latter offense, the prior decision of this Court directed that Thomson immediately pay $200.00 to the client in restitution for the fee received for the unsatisfied contract for professional services.
Following his suspension, Thomson obtained employment as a law clerk with a firm in Vero Beach, Florida. While there, in his words, he 'performed services for other attorneys'. In this regard, Thomson alleges that he has 'limited his functions exclusively to work of a preparatory nature such as research, taking statements of witnesses consistent with initial investigation of a case, assembling information for review, and like work that would enable the attorney-employer to carry a given matter to a conclusion through his own examination, approval, or additional effort'. He adds that all of his activities have been performed under the direct supervision of the attorney-employer, and that he 'has not held himself out to be an attorney, has not signed any pleadings or letters in behalf of any attorney, has made no court appearances, had had no direct contact with any client or given any legal advice to any client and has conducted himself in the sole role of research investigator for his employer'.
Upon learning of Thomson's employment, the staff counsel of The Florida Bar contacted one of his attorney-employers and expressed the opinion that the stated arrangement with a suspended attorney was unethical. The Bar then advised Thomson's attorney-employer that it intended to file a grievance against him unless he ceased Thomson's employment or submitted the matter for a ruling by the Bar's Professional Ethics Committee. Thomson then filed the instant petition for clarification.
The Bar urges us to adopt and apply in the instant case its Ethics Committee's Opinion 65--69 (December 7, 1965). Without passing upon the propriety of that opinion, we think it is easily distinguished on the facts and not persuasive under the circumstances herein. There the issue was whether members of The Florida Bar might employ to do legal research on a 'free lance' basis, without client contact, an attorney not admitted to practice in Florida and suspended from practice in another state for misappropriation of funds. The Committee recommended against such employment. Two critical differences with the instant case are readily apparent. First, in Opinion 65--69, the suspended attorney was not a salaried full-time employee of another attorney who was responsible for the suspended attorney but was presumably employed on a 'free lance' or piecemeal basis with minimal, if any, supervision by those for whom he performed research services; in the instant case, Thomson is employed under the direct supervision of his attorney-employers who are responsible for his work. Second, in that case, the suspended attorney had not been admitted to practice in Florida and hence was not subject to the Code of Ethics then governing the conduct of attorneys in this state while he was so employed; here Thomson is a member of The Florida Bar, and, even while under suspension, remains subject to the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar. See Rule 11.10(3), Integration Rule. As such, Thomson may be disciplined by the Bar if he exceeds or abuses his employment.
The Bar contends that to permit Thomson's employment as a law clerk or investigator would be detrimental to the integrity and reputation of the Bar by inviting the public's misunderstanding of the disciplinary action taken against him. The Bar also submits that to allow such employment leaves too much room for abuse of this Court's previous order herein. In support thereof, the Bar cites Crawford v. State Bar of California (1960), 54 Cal.2d 659, 7 Cal.Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d 490, which is patently inapplicable to the instant case inasmuch as the facts therein were grossly at variance with those Sub judice. In Crawford, an attorney sought the annulment of a resolution of the California Bar's Board of Governors to publicly reprove him for aiding and abetting his disbarred father in the unauthorized practice of law. There, after the Board of Governors recommended the father's disbarment, the father and son formed a partnership from which the profits were to be divided equally. After the father was disbarred, he kept the same office and secretary and continued his practice as a tax consultant,...
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Mitchell, In re
...permit suspended attorneys to act as law clerks, on condition that they have no contact with clients or courts. 9 In The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300 (Fla.1975), the Supreme Court of Florida permitted a suspended attorney to work as "a law clerk or investigator for members in good ......
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In re Blake
...has also been considered improper. Matter of Frabizzio, 508 A.2d 468, 469 (Del.1986) ; see also The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300, 303 (Fla.1975) (Overton, J. dissenting).11 The drafting and execution of legal documents, such as a will or deed, has been deemed the unauthorized pract......
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The Florida Bar v. Forrester
...referee found Forrester guilty of intentionally and willfully violating the May 16, 2002, suspension order. Relying upon Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300 (Fla.1975), the referee reasoned that while a suspended attorney may work as a law clerk, investigator, or paralegal, employment in ......
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Wilkinson, Matter of
...witnesses, or prospective witnesses." The Delaware court adopted Justice Overton's reasoning in his dissent in The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300 (Fla.1975), to bar direct " 'To the layman, the difference between mere clerking and the unrestrained practice of law is not readily appar......