The Gum-Elastic Roofing Company v. The Mexico Publishing Company
Decision Date | 10 January 1895 |
Docket Number | 17,187 |
Parties | The Gum-Elastic Roofing Company v. The Mexico Publishing Company et al |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Marion Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
M Moores, for appellant.
J. E Florea, for appellees.
The appellant, who was the plaintiff below, instituted this action against the appellees to vacate a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace and to enjoin the collection of the same.
It is alleged in the complaint "that the Mexico Publishing Company, on November 7, 1892, recovered a pretended judgment in proceedings in attachment and garnishment against the plaintiff and against certain indebtedness due the plaintiff from the Kimberlin Manufacturing Company, before a justice of the peace, which judgment was in and for the sum of eighty-six and 70/100 dollars and cost of such proceeding and the plaintiff makes said pretended judgment a part of this complaint, and files a duly certified transcript of said judgment and of all the proceedings herewith as a part of this complaint, marking such transcript exhibit A."
The plaintiff avers that such pretended judgment was and is null and void for the following reasons:
Appellees filed separate demurrers to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which were sustained, and appellant excepted. Appellant refused to amend the complaint, and judgment was rendered in favor of the appellees.
Did the court err in sustaining the demurrers to the complaint?
This is the only question to be decided.
The certified transcript of the judgment and proceedings before the justice of the peace, which were filed with the complaint as an exhibit, did not thereby become a part of the record and can not be considered in determining the question of the sufficiency of the complaint. Conwell v. Conwell, 100 Ind. 437; Brooks v. Harris, 41 Ind. 390; Wharton v. Wilson, Admx., 60 Ind. 591; Morrison v. Fishel, 64 Ind. 177; Parsons, Admr., v. Milford, Admr., 67 Ind. 489; Lytle v. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281; Wilson v. Vance, Admr., 55 Ind. 584; Matheney v. Earl, 75 Ind. 531, on page 533; Thornton Indiana Practice Code, section 362, note 2.
When a recovery is sought on a note, mortgage or other contract in writing, our code requires that a copy of the same be filed with the pleading, but when the cancellation or legal destruction of such an instrument is demanded this rule does not apply. Johnson v. Moore, 112 Ind. 91, 13 N.E. 106; Heitman v. Schnek, 40 Ind. 93; Barkley v. Tapp, 87 Ind. 25.
Examining the complaint in this case, without reference to the transcript, we find that the first, second, third, and fourth reasons given for the judgment of the justice of the peace being void are mere conclusions and do not help the complaint in any way. Facts, not conclusions, must be averred. Kleyla v. Haskett, 112 Ind. 515, 14 N.E. 387; Guerin v. Kraner, 97 Ind. 533; Kern v. Hazlerigg, 11 Ind. 443; Clark v. Lineberger, 44 Ind. 223; McClamrock v. Flint, 101 Ind. 278.
The fifth and sixth specifications present substantially the same question.
It appears from the allegations in the fifth specification, that the appellant was a nonresident corporation and was served by publication of notice, that said corporation did not enter any appearance to said cause, and was not in court by any officer, agent or attorney, and that the justice rendered judgment against the appellant for a greater amount than the sum stated in the affidavit in attachment.
Counsel for appellant contend This, then, is a case where the justice had jurisdiction over the person of the appellant, and does not fall within the rule declared in the following cases cited by counsel for appellant: Penrose v. McKinzie, 116 Ind. 35, 18 N.E. 384; Johnson v. Ramsay, 91 Ind. 189; Brickley v. Heilbruner, 7 Ind. 488; Grass v. Hess, 37 Ind. 193; Earl v. Matheney, 60 Ind. 202; Cain v. Goda, 84 Ind. 209.
The justice also had...
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