The Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cragin
| Decision Date | 30 September 1873 |
| Citation | 71 Ill. 177,1873 WL 8710 |
| Parties | THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANYv.ALONZO CRAGIN, Admr. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of JoDaviess county; the Hon. WILLIAM BROWN, Judge, presiding.
This was an action on the case, by Alonzo Cragin, administrator of the estate of Martin Standwich, deceased, to recover damages for the alleged killing of the deceased by the defendant, the Illinois Central Railroad Company, at Dunleith, Ill., on September 26, 1869.
Martin Standwich, at the time of his death, was a resident of Dunleith, JoDaviess county, Illinois, and had no property in Dubuque county, Iowa, to be administered upon. The pleadings put in issue the representative capacity of the plaintiff. His letters were granted in Dubuque county, in the State of Iowa. A trial was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment of $1150 in favor of the plaintiff.
Mr. R. H. MCCLELLAN, for the appellant.
Mr. AUSTIN ADAMS, Mr. WILLIAM MILLS, and Mr. DAVID SHEEAN, for the appellee.
It is first objected to the validity of this judgment, that the circuit court of Dubuque county, Iowa, did not have jurisdiction to grant letters of administration on the estate of Standwich. A plea was filed, denying that plaintiff had legal and valid letters.
The Iowa statute, read in evidence, is as follows:
“The county court has the power to take the probate of wills, to grant administration of the estates of all deceased persons who, at the time of their death, were residents of the county, or who died non-residents of the State, leaving property to be administered upon within the county, or where such property is afterwards brought into the county, and it has jurisdiction in all matters relative to the settlement of such estates.”
This jurisdiction was transferred from the county to the circuit courts, by an act of the Iowa legislature, adopted in 1868.
The petition addressed to the court granting the letters, stated that deceased had no property in Dubuque county at the time of his death, unless this claim be regarded as such, nor was such property afterwards taken in the county; and there was also a stipulation to the same effect, and that intestate died in Illinois. It thus appears, that the Iowa court regarded this claim as property, and on that claim granted the letters. Now, was this property, and if it may be so regarded can it be so held in Iowa, as the intestate was killed in Illinois and the railroad is located alone in this State? The cause of action in such cases depends alone on statutory provisions, and must be limited to the State creating the right, as against its corporations. At any rate, the suit must be confined to the territorial jurisdiction in which the railroad is situated. Appellant's road not being located or extending into Iowa, we fail to perceive in what manner deceased, had he not died, or his administrator since, could have any right of recovery in Iowa. Appellant not being in that State, no suit could, as we suppose, have been maintained there; nor has any law been shown by which the courts of that State could enforce or recognize any such claim. If they have a similar law to ours, giving damages to the next of kin of persons killed by their railroads, we are not prepared to hold that such a claim could be enforced beyond their territorial limits. The law creating such a right is purely local to the State in which the right is created when applied to corporations, although it may be otherwise in cases of actions under the statute against individuals. But corporations being local to the State which creates them, the right of action against them must be local to the same State. It then follows, that as appellant had no residence in Iowa, there was no cause of action in that State, and if so, there was in no sense property in Dubuque county which could authorize the court in that county to grant these letters.
The transcript of that court fails to show that the application for letters was adjudicated upon and the letters issued under any order thereof. They appear to have been issued by the clerk of the court, on his own authority. This being true, the act was ministerial and not judicial. Had the application appeared to have been made to and entertained by the court, and the letters have been issued on its order after having adjudicated on the application, then it may be that determination would have been res adjudicata, and beyond the inquiry of any court in a collateral proceeding; but, the act being ministerial, the authority to inquire into the question whether the officer had legal authority to perform the act, or whether, in performing it, even if he had the power, he has pursued it. The appellee, then, had no power to obtain letters in Iowa, and the act of granting them being purely ministerial and unauthorized, the right to maintain the suit in this State does not exist under such letters. He should have applied to a court in Iowa which had jurisdiction, or to the proper court in this State.
Inasmuch as various questions have been discussed, and a decision sought on them, we shall proceed to determine them.
It is urged that there was error in excluding a portion of the deposition of Dr. Campbell, the surgeon who was called to deceased upon the occurrence of the accident. The portion excluded is this: “He was already so under the influence of liquor that I gave him no stimulants.” This was, under the facts of the case, proper and pertinent evidence, and should have been admitted. Plaintiff had averred in his declaration that deceased was in the exercise of due care, and on the trial it was essential that it should appear that he was exercising such care, or, if not, that his negligence, when compared with that of the company, was slight. Here no one saw deceased until the accident had occurred, and it was material that, as far as possible, the jury should have been informed of his...
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