The Ill. Masons' Benevolent Soc'y v. Winthrop
| Decision Date | 30 June 1877 |
| Parties | THE ILLINOIS MASONS' BENEVOLENT SOCIETYv.CHARLES E. R. WINTHROP, Admr. etc. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Perry county; the Hon. AMOS WATTS, Judge, presiding.
Mr. GEO. O. IDE, and Mr. H. M. TRIMBLE, for the appellant.
Mr. GEO. W. WALL, and Mr. E. V. PIERCE, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:
This action was based upon a breach of a covenant contained in a certificate of membership in the Illinois Masons' Benevolent Society. The certificate is in the nature of a policy of insurance on the life of Edward H. Price, issued in his lifetime. The covenant consists of a promise or agreement by the society, with the assured, to pay to Sarah A. Price, the wife of assured, within thirty days after due notice and satisfactory evidence of the death of assured, for every member of the society belonging to four classes, into which they are divided, certain amounts for each member, the sums being different for each class.
The organization is a kind of mutual benefit association, managed by a directory, and the expenses and losses of the society are paid by assessments made upon the members for such purposes.
Price made an application to become a member and answered interrogatories propounded by the company, contained in a printed form furnished for the purpose. To the question as to complexion, he answered, “florid.” To the question, “Are you in good health?” he answered, “Getting well from a slight bilious attack.” He also answered, “General appearance healthy.” The statement concluded: “It is hereby declared, that the above are true and fair answers to the foregoing questions, in which there is no misrepresentation or suppression of known facts; and I acknowledge and agree that the above statement shall form the basis of the agreement with the society.” This application and statement was filled out by Price and signed by him. The form was obtained from Alman, the agent of the company, who was present when it was made, and received and sent it to the company, indorsed “A good healthy brother,” and their medical examiner indorsed it, “approved.”
The society thereupon issued the certificate sued upon and it was delivered to Price, he having paid the advance fee of $6 for admission. The application was dated on the 24th of February, 1874. The certificate of membership was dated on the 28th of the same month, and Price died on the 6th of the ensuing April. Proof of death was properly made and furnished, with proper notice, and the society failing and refusing to pay the amount specified in the certificate of membership, this suit was brought to recover the amount.
It appears that Price was taken sick about the 25th of January, 1874, and returned from Chebanse, where he was carrying on a drug store, to Tamaroa on the 28th of the same month. He appeared to be convalescing for some days after his return, but had a relapse, and the physician pronounced it biliousness. He was out a few days and was again attacked, but he was out again in a few days, and the evidence shows he was up and seemed to be recovering when the application was made, and was talking of going back to Chebanse. In a week or ten days after making the application he was again attacked. and from that time till his death he continued to get up and to relapse, at intervals, until his last attack, about two weeks before his death. Whilst he was at Tamaroa he attended to some business, and was, until his last relapse, in bed but a small portion of the daytime, and was talking of and arranging to return to Chebanse.
The answers, of course, enter into the application, because, if for no other reason, assured expressly agreed they should be the basis of the agreement with the society; but the effect that shall be given to the representations is the principal question in dispute between the parties. Appellant claims they were intended to be, and should be, held to constitute a warranty of their truth, and if any or either of them are shown to be untrue, whether their falsity was known, or whether intentionally or unintentionally the truth was concealed, or it was only from the want of memory, or by inadvertence, there can be no recovery.
On the other hand, it is contended that the answers are not warranties, but simply representations; and that, if made in good faith, although some one or more of them may be untrue, if the misstatement was not intentional, but was made in good faith and under the belief that the statements were true, the misstatement did not operate to avoid the policy.
The clause stating that assured agreed “that the statement shall form the basis of the agreement with the society,” is different from the agreements usually contained in life policies. In such instruments it is usually expressly agreed, that the statement is a warranty, and that if any part of it should prove to be untrue, the policy should be void. With persons of ordinary intelligence, the language used in this application would not be so understood. Nor do we suppose that the promoters of this enterprise, when they adopted this form, intended that it should operate as a warranty, such as is usually inserted in life policies. Nor can we suppose for a moment that they would adopt a form of words that would be understood one way by the applicant and would be construed in another by the courts, and thus cheat, wrong or defraud a brother. Such a supposition can not be for a moment entertained. If the language employed was intended to operate as the usual warranty, we apprehend it has not been so understood by those, or any portion of them, who had applied for membership before the death of Price.
If intended as an absolute warranty that the statement and every part of it was true, why limit the previous part of the statement to “no misrepresentation or suppression of known facts?” This the company required of each applicant, and when they made that requirement, they, by implication, absolved him from any injurious consequences from misrepresentation or failure to disclose unknown facts. If a warranty was required of the answers to some of these questions, it would be useless for persons to become members of the society. Each...
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