The Louisville, Evansville And St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 08 May 1889
• Docket Number: 14,584
• Citation: The Louisville, Evansville And St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 21 N.E. 341, 119 Ind. 352 (Ind. 1889)
• Parties: The Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Wilson et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

21 N.E. 341

119 Ind. 352

The Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Wilson et al

No. 14,584

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 8, 1889

Petition for a Rehearing June 19, 1889.

From the Vanderburgh Superior Court.

The judgment is reversed, with costs, with directions to sustain the motion for a new trial.

A. P Humphrey, A. Gilchrist and C. A. DeBruler, for appellant.

J. S Buchanan, C. Buchanan and W. Hamill, for appellees.

OPINION

Mitchell, J.

Wilson & Chambers, partners, engaged in purchasing and shipping cross-ties used in the construction and maintenance of railroads, sued the appellant railroad company to recover for alleged excessive freight charges paid upon three hundred and fifty-four car-loads of ties shipped over the defendant company's railroad. The plaintiffs allege that the railroad company entered into an agreement with them whereby it became bound to receive and transport to points named cross-ties at the rate of $ 14 per car-load; that in pursuance of the agreement so entered into, the defendant company received and transported the number of carloads above mentioned, but that, in disregard of the contract, it collected $ 2,700 in excess of the amount agreed upon from the consignees, and that the latter deducted that sum from the price paid the plaintiffs.

This appeal is from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for the full amount claimed in their complaint. The questions for decision arise upon the ruling of the court in overruling the appellant's motion for a new trial.

The evidence tends to show that the plaintiffs were engaged in transporting ties over the defendant's road during the year 1886, and that during that year the rate charged for freight was seven cents a tie, or $ 14 per car-load. In the month of December, 1886, the company issued a circular notifying all persons engaged in shipping cross-ties over its line that the rate on freight of that description would be the same as for soft lumber, after January 1st, 1887. It had formerly been less than the soft lumber rate. The plaintiffs received this notice, but they gave evidence tending to prove that after receiving the notice one of the plaintiffs had an interview with the general freight agent of the defendant's road, and that upon inquiry the agent said the notice was not intended to apply to the plaintiffs, but only to some other shippers of like freight, whose patronage was not desired, and that the cross-ties of the plaintiffs would be shipped at the old rate of $ 14 a car, notwithstanding the notice. It appeared that, under the arrangement thus claimed to have been made, three hundred and fifty-four car-loads of cross-ties were shipped to various points, and that the company collected freight from the consignees at rates ranging from $ 17.50 to $ 24.50 per car-load. The soft lumber rate over the defendant's road during the same period was about $ 23 per car. It appears further that as each lot was shipped bills of lading were delivered to the shipper by the company. The bills of lading for one hundred and sixty-eight cars contained an acknowledgment of the receipt of the number of ties on each car, and specified the weight, and stipulated that the ties were to be transported over the defendant's line of road to the company's freight station at Evansville, and there delivered to connecting lines on payment of freight and charges in par funds. The cars were consigned to the C. B. & Q. R. W. Co., Aurora, Illinois. The column in which the amount to be charged for freight might have been indicated was left blank. The bills of lading for one hundred and eighty-six cars were in all respects similar to those above described, except that they contained a statement of the amount to be paid for freight, the amount inserted being that actually charged. These bills were received, as they were issued, by the plaintiffs without objection.

It is to be observed that the complaint was framed and that the action proceeded to judgment upon the theory that the ties were shipped under an oral agreement, by the terms of which the railroad company bound itself to carry the plaintiff's freight at the rate of $ 14 per car-load. The action is to recover for overcharges made in disregard of this agreement. The proof, however, shows, without any contradiction whatever, that the shipments were made--with possibly some exceptions, in which cases bills were delivered after the shipments had been made--pursuant to written and printed bills of lading, signed by the company's agent and delivered to the shipper before the transportation began, in each instance.

The question presented at the threshold, therefore, is, was it competent for the plaintiffs, without alleging any fraud, concealment or mistake, to recover upon an oral contract made prior to the issuing of the bills of lading, which are supposed to set forth the terms and conditions upon which the goods were to be transported, or must the rights of the parties be determined by the express terms and legal import of these instruments? A bill of lading is twofold in its character. It is a receipt, specifying the quantity, character and condition of the goods received; and it is also a contract, by which the carrier agrees to transport the goods therein described to a place named, and there deliver them to a designated consignee upon the terms and conditions specified in the instrument. The Delaware, 81 U.S. 579, 14 Wall. 579, 20 L.Ed. 779; O'Brien v. Gilchrist, 34 Me. 554; 2 Am. and Eng. Encycl. Law, 228; Chandler v. Sprague, 38 Am. Dec. 404, and note; Friedlander v. Texas & Pac. R. W. Co., 9 S.Ct. 570.

So far as a bill of lading is in the nature of a receipt, or an acknowledgment of the quantity and condition of the goods delivered, it may, like any other receipt, be explained, varied, or even contradicted; but as a contract, expressing the terms and conditions upon which the property is to be transported, it is to be regarded as merging all prior and contemporaneous agreements of the parties, and, in the absence of fraud, concealment or mistake, its terms or legal import, when free from ambiguity, can not be explained nor added to by parol. Snow v. Indiana, etc., R. W. Co., 109 Ind. 422, 9 N.E. 702, and cases cited.

"Such a contract is to be construed, like all other written contracts, according to the legal import of its terms." It becomes the sole evidence of the undertaking, and all antecedent agreements are extinguished by the writing. Lawson Contracts of Carriers, section 113; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N.Y. 200; Southern Ex. Co. v. Dickson, 94 U.S. 549 24 L.Ed. 285; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U.S. 174, 23 L.Ed. 872; Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N.Y. 171. Thus, in Snow v. Indiana, etc., R. W. Co., supra, the shipper of a car-load of horses, who had received a bill of lading in which no route was designated by which the car was to be forwarded after leaving the initial carrier's line, offered to prove that a particular line had been agreed upon. It was held that the silence of the bill of lading in the respect mentioned was the same in legal effect...