The Lusitania

Decision Date23 August 1918
Citation251 F. 715
PartiesTHE LUSITANIA. Petition of CUNARD S.S. CO., Limited.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Lord Day & Lord, of New York City (J. Parker Kirlin, Lucius H Beers, and Allan B. A. Bradley, all of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.

Hunt Hill & Betts, of New York City (George Whitefield Betts, Jr. and George C. Sprague, both of New York City, of counsel), for claimants Adams and others.

A. Gordon Murray, William H. Blymyer, Griggs, Baldwin & Baldwin, Joseph F. Collins, Foley & Martin, George V. A. McCloskey, John M. Nolan, and Sol Friedland, all of New York City, R. Emmet Digney, of White Plains, N.Y., Maurice B. Gluck, of New York City, Patrick J. Dolan, of Newark, N.J., Standish Chard, James W. Prendergast, Charles O. Maas, Raymond Ballantine, and Sidney Rossman, all of New York City, Thibodeau & Ellsworth, of Boston, Mass., and Conklin & Reid and Baldwin & Curtis, of New York City (Paul C. Whipp and Frank V. Barns, both of New York City, of counsel), for various claimants.

MAYER District Judge.

On May 1, 1915, the British passenger carrying merchantman Lusitania sailed from New York, bound for Liverpool, with 1,257 passengers and a crew of 702, making a total of 1,959 souls on board, men, women, and children. At approximately 2:10 on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, weather clear and sea smooth, without warning, the vessel was torpedoed and went down by the head in about 18 minutes, with an ultimate tragic loss of life of 1,195. Numerous suits having been begun against the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited, the owner of the vessel, this proceeding was brought in familiar form, by the steamship company, as petitioner, to obtain an adjudication as to liability, and to limit petitioner's liability to its interest in the vessel and her pending freight, should the court find any liability.

The sinking of the Lusitania was inquired into before the Wreck Commissioner's Court in London, June 15, 1915, to July 1, 1915, and the testimony then adduced, together with certain depositions taken pursuant to commissions issued out of this court and the testimony of a considerable number of passengers, crew, and experts heard before this court, constitute the record of the cause. It is fortunate, for many reasons, that such a comprehensive judicial investigation has been had; for, in addition to a mass of facts which give opportunity for a clear understanding of the case in its various aspects, the evidence presented has disposed, without question and for all time, of any false claims brought forward to justify this inexpressibly cowardly attack upon an unarmed passenger liner.

So far as equipment went, the vessel was seaworthy in the highest sense. Her carrying capacity was 2,198 passengers and a crew of about 850, or about 3,000 persons in all. She had 22 open lifeboats, capable of accommodating 1,322 persons, 26 collapsible boats, with a capacity of 1,283, making a total of 48 boats, with a capacity for 2,605 in all, or substantially in excess of the requirements of her last voyage. Her total of life belts was 3,187, or 1,959 more than the total number of passengers, and, in addition, she carried 20 life buoys. She was classed 100 Al at Lloyd's, being 787 feet long over all, with a tonnage of 30,395 gross and 12,611 net. She had 4 turbine engines, 25 boilers, 4 boiler rooms, 12 transverse bulkheads, dividing her into 13 compartments, with a longitudinal bulkhead on either side of the ship for 425 feet, covering all vital parts.

The proof is absolute that she was not and never had been armed, nor did she carry any explosives. She did carry some 18 fuse cases and 125 shrapnel cases, consisting merely of empty shells, without any powder charge, 4,200 cases of safety cartridges, and 189 cases of infantry equipment, such as leather fittings, pouches, and the like. All these were for delivery abroad, but none of these munitions could be exploded by setting them on fire in mass or in bulk, nor by subjecting them to impact. She had been duly inspected on March 17, April 15, 16, and 17, all in 1915, and before she left New York the boat gear and boats were examined, overhauled, checked up, and defective articles properly replaced. There is no reason to doubt that this part of her equipment was in excellent order when she left New York.

The vessel was under the command of a long-service and experienced captain, and officered by competent and experienced men. The difficulties of the war prevented the company from gathering together a crew fully reaching a standard as high as in normal times (many of the younger British sailors having been called to the colors); but, all told, the crew was good, and, in many instances, highly intelligent and capable. Due precaution was taken in respect of boat drills while in port, and the testimony shows that those drills were both sufficient and efficient. Some passengers did not see any boat drills on the voyage, while others characterized the drills, in effect, as formally superficial. Any one familiar with ocean traveling knows that it is not strange that boat drills may take place unobserved by some of the passengers, who, though on deck, may be otherwise occupied, or who may be in another part of the ship, and such negative testimony must give way to the positive testimony that there were daily boat drills, the object of which mainly was to enable the men competently and quickly to lower the boats.

Each man had a badge showing the number of the boat to which he was assigned, and a boat list was posted in three different places in the ship. Each day of the voyage a drill was held with the emergency boat, which was a fixed boat, either No. 13 on the starboard side or No. 14 on the port side, according to the weather; the idea, doubtless, being to accustom the men quickly to reach the station on either side of the ship. The siren was blown and a picked crew from the watch assembled at the boat, put on life belts, jumped into the boat, took their places, and jumped out again.

Throughout this case it must always be remembered that the disaster occurred in May, 1915, and the whole subject must be approached with the knowledge and mental attitude of that time. It may be that more elaborate and effective methods and precautions have been adopted since then, but there is no testimony which shows that these boat drills, as practiced on the voyage, were not fully up to the then existing standards and practices. There can be no criticism of the bulkhead door drills, for there was one each day.

In November, 1914, the directors of the Cunard Company, in view of the falling off of the passenger traffic, decided to withdraw the Lusitania's sister ship, Mauretania, and to run the Lusitania at three-fourths boiler power, which involved a reduction of speed from an average of about 24 knots to an average of about 21 knots. The ship was operated under this reduced boiler power and reduced rate of speed for six round trips, until and including the fatal voyage, although at the reduced rate she was considerably faster than any passenger ship crossing the Atlantic at that time. This reduction was in part for financial reasons and in part 'a question of economy of coal and labor in time of war. ' No profit was expected, and none was made; but the company continued to operate the ship as a public service. The reduction from 24 to 21 knots is, however, quite immaterial to the controversy, as will later appear.

Having thus outlined the personnel, equipment, and cargo of the vessel, reference will now be made to a series of events preceding her sailing on May 1, 1915. On February 4, 1915, the Imperial German government issued a proclamation as follows:

'Proclamation.
'1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after the 18th of February, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account.
'2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone, as in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British government, and of the accidents of naval war, it cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships.
'3. Northward navigation around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern waters of the North Sea, and in a strip of not less than 30 miles width along the Netherlands coast is in no danger.
'Von Pohl, 'Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy.
'Berlin, February 4, 1915.'

This was accompanied by a so-called memorial, setting forth the reasons advanced by the German government in support of the issuance of this proclamation, an extract from which is as follows:

'Just as England declared the whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, so does Germany now declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, to be comprised within the seat of war, and will prevent by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters. To this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to intrust their crews, passengers or merchandise to such vessels.'

To this proclamation and memorial the government of the United States made due protest under date of February 10, 1915. On the same day protest was made to England by this...

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