The Madrid

• Citation: 40 F. 677
• Parties: THE MADRID. [1] v. THE MADRID. MENGE et al. AHERN v. SAME.
• Decision Date: 23 December 1889
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

40 F. 677

THE MADRID. ^[1]

MENGE et al. v. THE MADRID.

AHERN v. SAME.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

December 23, 1889

O. B Sansome, F. M. Butler, and Rice & Armstrong, for appellant.

R. H Browne, for appellee.

Before LAMAR, Justice, and PARDEE, J.

LAMAR Justice.

There is no controversy but that the claims of the material-men intervenors in this case, are valid, and that, under the local law of Louisiana, they are entitled to a lien upon the steam-ship Madrid for the amount of those claims, which is enforceable by process in rem. The contracts under which the materials, repairs, and other necessaries were furnished are maritime, within the rule laid down by the supreme court of the United States in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the admiralty.

The question in this case, upon the foregoing facts, is, does this lien given by the local law stand on an equal footing with the lien given by the general maritime law to material-men who furnish supplies and other necessaries to a ship in other than her home port, and therefore take precedence over the claim of the mortgagees? The general question here involved has never been directly before the supreme court of the United States for consideration. It has arisen, however, in nearly all of the circuits, and the decisions upon it have not been uniform. In this circuit the rule, as announced by the late Mr. Justice WOODS in The John t. Moore, and Baldwin v. The Bradish Johnson, 3 Woods, 61, 582, respectively, has been, that a mortgage on a vessel, duly recorded according to section,192, Rev St., is inferior to all strictly maritime liens, but is superior to any subsequent lien given by the state law for supplies furnished in the home port. Other cases holding the same doctrine are: The De Smet, 10 F. 483, in this circuit; and The Grace Greenwood, 2 Biss. 131, and The Kate Hinchman, 7 Biss.239, in the seventh circuit. A leading case holding the reverse of this rule, namely, that liens given to material-men by the state statutes, for supplies furnished a vessel in her home port, are of equal rank with strictly maritime liens, and therefore take precedence over mortgages of the vessel, is The Guiding Star, decided by the late Mr. Justice MATTHEWS in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. 18 Fed.Rep.263. To the same effect, see The J. W. Tucker, 20 F. 129; The Arctic, 22 F. 126; The Amos D. Carver, 35 F. 665, in the second circuit; The Venture, 26 F. 285, in the third circuit; The Wyoming, 35 F. 548, and The Menominie, 36 F. 197, in the eighth circuit; Clyde v. Transportation Co., Id. 501, in the fourth circuit; The General Burnside, 3 F. 228, and The Rapid Transit, 11 F. 322, in the sixth circuit.

Counsel for the mortgagees rely mainly upon the doctrine of stare decisis to support the claim of their clients. Their contention is, that the rule of law heretofore announced in this circuit should stand, because, as they assert, rights of property have been acquired under it, and vested rights will be disturbed by any change. On the other hand, it is strenuously insisted by counsel for the material-men that the decisions of this circuit upon the general question under consideration are erroneous, and should not be followed. It is claimed that the lien given by the state statutes for supplies, etc., furnished a domestic vessel stands on an equality with those liens arising under the general maritime law for supplies, etc., furnished a foreign vessel. The rule of stare decisis means, in general, that when a point has been once settled by judicial decision it forms a precedent for the guidance of courts in similar cases. It expresses 'the principle upon which rests the authority of judicial decision as precedents in subsequent litigations. ' Abb. Law Dict. 497; Gee's Adm'r v. Williamson, 27 Amer.Dec. 631, note. This rule should, in the main, be strictly adhered to. An adherence to it is necessary to preserve the certainty, the stability and the symmetry of our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, there are occasions when a departure from it is rendered necessary in order to vindicate plain and obvious principles of law, and to remedy a continued injustice. These are the two grounds of justification in departing from a decision which has become a precedent. Wells, Res Adj. Sec. 598. The decisions of the circuit courts of the United States not being uniform upon the general question at issue in this case, it can hardly be said that any of them has become a rule of property, within the principle of the doctrine of stare decisis. The learned justice who preceded me upon this circuit, were he alive and holding court here, could certainly exercise the right to change his mind upon the question, and make his opinion accord with that of some of the other courts of equal authority, which, in the light of later discussions, have adopted a different view. Nothing short of a conviction which would induce him to do so could constrain me to depart from a ruling made by a predecessor whose high character as a jurist receives from me a deference fully equal in force to that which the principle of stare decisis exacts. I act the more readily upon the conclusion reached by me, after a careful examination of the adjudged cases, because of the vital importance of uniformity in the administration of admiralty law by the courts of the United States, which uniformity can itself be permanently assured only by settling the rule on correct principles of law.

Under the general maritime law, necessary supplies furnished a vessel in other than her home port constitute a maritime lien, the presumption being that such supplies are furnished upon the credit of the vessel itself. No lien, however, is given by the general maritime law to material-men for supplies furnished a vessel in her home port, because, in that case, according to the generally accepted theory, the presumption is, that credit is given to the owner or master, and not to the ship itself. This rule of the admiralty law induced many of the states bordering upon the sea or the navigable inland waters to pass statutes giving to material-men a lien upon a vessel for necessary supplies furnished in her home port. All contracts of this kind, being maritime in their nature, are within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and therefore, under the constitution of the United States, these statutory liens can be enforced by proceedings in rem only in the federal courts.

In pursuance of the acts of congress which authorized it to adopt rules of practice in the courts of the United States in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the supreme court of the United States, in 1844, adopted the following rule of practice:

Rule 12. 'In all suits by material-men for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem, or against the master or the owner alone in personam. And the like proceeding in rem shall apply to cases of domestic ships, where, by the local law, a lien is given to material-men for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries.'

The various...