The Mason v. Steudle

Decision Date13 January 2011
Docket NumberCase No. 10–12285.
Citation761 F.Supp.2d 611
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
PartiesThe MASON AND DIXON LINES, INC., Universal Am–Can, Ltd., and Mason Dixon Intermodal, Inc., Plaintiffs,v.Kirk T. STEUDLE and Ted B. Wahby, Defendants.andE.L. Hollingsworth & Co., doing business as Chieftain Contract Services, Churchill Transportation Inc., Superior Global, Inc., and Rush Trucking Company, Intervenor Plaintiffs,v.Kirk T. Steudle, Ted B. Wahby, and Detroit International Bridge Co., Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Daniel C. Sullivan, John J. Conway, Sullivan Hincks & Conway, Oak Brook, IL, John W. Bryant, Dean & Fulkerson, Troy, MI, for Plaintiffs.Mary M. Mullin, Phillip C. Korovesis, Butzel Long, Detroit, MI, Martin J. Leavitt, Michael J. Leavitt, Sullivan & Leavitt, Northville, MI, Kevin J. Plagens, Kopka, Pinkus, Dolin & Eads, Farmington Hills, MI, Aaron D. Wiseley, Matthew J. Malleis, Holmes & Wiseley, P.C., Grand Rapids, MI, for Intervenor Plaintiffs.Luann C. Frost, MI Department of Attorney General, Robert L. Mol, Michigan Department of Transportation, Lansing, MI, Craig L. John, Plymouth, MI, Michael A. Nedelman, Nedelman Gloetzner, Farmington Hills, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTIONS AND EMERGENCY MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, DISMISSING AMENDED AND INTERVENOR COMPLAINTS, AND DENYING OTHER MOTIONS AS MOOT

DAVID M. LAWSON, District Judge.

The plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs are all common carrier companies operating tractor trailers transporting goods domestically and internationally. They allege that they regularly use the Ambassador Bridge (the Bridge) to make the passage from the United States to Canada. They have filed a complaint against officials of the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) in their official capacities alleging that MDOT has denied them access to the Bridge via recently constructed but not yet opened access ramps that would provide a convenient route to the Bridge from certain interstate highways. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' actions (or, more accurately, inaction) violate several federal statutes and the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution. The complaint also contains a nuisance count under state law. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the federal statutes on which the plaintiffs rely do not provide a private right of action; the complaint fails to state valid claims; the action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and the Court should abstain from hearing this case in deference to a pending state court action between MDOT and the private owner of the Bridge. The Court heard oral argument from the parties in open court on November 29, 2010. The Court finds that at least one of the federal claims asserted by the plaintiffs may be asserted as a private right of action, but the state has made no order, regulation, or action that has the force of law that is preempted by the Constitution or federal law; therefore the plaintiffs claims over which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction are meritless. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Facts

At the root of the present controversy is a dispute between MDOT and the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC) over the construction of access facilities from Interstate I–75 and I–96 highways to the Bridge, which is located in southwest Detroit, Michigan. The construction project is known as the Gateway Project. MDOT and DIBC entered into a contract in 2004 to divide the responsibilities for constructing various parts of the project. MDOT filed a lawsuit in state court alleging that it completed its part of the project, but DIBC has failed to perform its part of the construction, and in some cases has built permanent structures in the way of easements to landlocked parcels belonging to third parties. According to the state court's opinion ordering specific performance, DIBC has yet to construct a dedicated ramp to 23rd Street, a local thoroughfare; it built toll booths in the way of the easement, and other facilities in the way of a proposed four-lane access road; and it has not built a proper access road to a welcome center on 21st Street. In addition, DIBC “failed to construct a two lane truck road, an access easement, safeguard gate system, and access drive and gate as required by the agreement.” Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1, MDOT v. DIBC, No. 09–015581–CK, Opinion and Order at 6 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct., Feb. 1, 2010) at 6. The state court found that these facts were not in dispute.

Apparently, MDOT has completed its part of the project, including access ramps from the interstate highways to the Bridge property, but it has refused to open the ramps until DIBC finishes its work. Although the Bridge is a major route of international travel, it is privately owned. See Act of Mar. 4, 1921, Ch. 167, 41 Stat. 1439 (1921). This Act of Congress required DIBC to comply with the Bridge Act of 1906, 33 U.S.C. § 491 et seq., which mandates that bridge operators obtain the approval of the United States Secretary of Transportation for “plans and specifications and the location of such bridge and accessory works” before commencing a construction project. 33 U.S.C. § 491. The statute also states that “it shall not be lawful to deviate from such plans, either before or after completion of the structure, unless the modification of such plans has previously been submitted to and received the approval of the Secretary.” Ibid. When the Bridge was initially built, motor vehicles seeking to access the Bridge were required to exit the highway system and travel through city streets in Detroit. In 1998, Congress passed legislation authorizing funds for the Gateway Project, which consists of “improvements to access roads and construction of access roads, approaches, and related facilities (such as signs, lights, and signals) necessary to connect the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan, to the Interstate [Highway] System.” Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty–First Century, Pub.L. No. 105–178, § 1217, 112 Stat. 107, 214 (1998). Michigan obtained federal funds to help with this project, and it states that completing the project according to plans and specifications is a requirement of retaining the funding.

The plaintiffs have characterized MDOT's refusal to open the ramps as a “Closure Order.” That denomination is a misnomer at best and perhaps a deliberate mischaracterization at worst. There is no “order” as such closing the ramps. In fact, they never have been opened. While the ramps remain closed, the plaintiffs contend that they must resort to existing surface roads through Detroit to gain access to the Bridge. The plaintiffs' description of the State's maintenance of the status quo likely is an effort to frame the inertia as state action. The defendants acknowledge that MDOT has finished its part of the project, but they insist that they cannot open the ramps until DIBC has completed its construction, lest federal funding be jeopardized.

The plaintiffs' filed a complaint, followed by an amended complaint three weeks later, which contains five counts. Count I seeks a mandatory injunction compelling the defendants to open the ramps to vehicle traffic; it is based on 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106, which include the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act (MCSIA). Count II is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause, and prays for injunctive and declaratory relief. It is not clear whether damages are sought under this count. Count III alleges a violation of 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501 and 10501, which prohibit states from enacting laws and regulations “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier.” Count IV pleads common law nuisance under state law. Count V alleges a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 31114 (part of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act) and an implementing regulation, 23 C.F.R. § 658.19, which prohibit states from enacting laws and regulations restricting access to the interstate highway system, except in cases of safety considerations. The common thread among these counts is that the plaintiffs presently are required to drive on city streets to gain access to the Bridge; if the ramps were open, they could save considerable time and money by driving directly from the highway onto the Bridge.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, on which the Court held a hearing. The motion remains pending. The plaintiffs also filed a motion to strike an affidavit filed by an MDOT official and a motion for discovery. In addition, three other trucking companies, E.L. Hollingsworth & Co., Churchill Transportation Inc., Superior Global, Inc., and Rush Trucking Company, moved to intervene as plaintiffs. On December 1, 2010, the Court granted the motions and allowed Superior Global, Inc. to file an intervenor's complaint. The intervening plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 6, 2010 alleging substantially the same federal claims as the original plaintiffs, but they added DIBC as a defendant, and they make specific reference to state highway M–85 as a point of access to the Bridge. They also avoid the nomenclature “Closure Order,” and instead characterize the contract between MDOT and DIBC establishing the Gateway Project as a “regulation.”

Since oral argument of the motion to dismiss in this case, the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs filed emergency motions for preliminary injunctions seeking access to the Bridge via the closed ramps when weather conditions closed the Blue Water Bridge connecting Port Huron, Michigan to Sarnia, Canada, resulting in lengthy traffic delays crossing the...

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