The Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jaynes

• Decision Date: 30 September 1877
• Citation: 1877 WL 9838,87 Ill. 199
• Parties: THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANYv.DANIEL W. JAYNES et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

87 Ill. 199

1877 WL 9838 (Ill.)

THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY

v.DANIEL W. JAYNES et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1877.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. S. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. MCCOY & PRATT, for the appellant.

Mr. G. A. FOLLANSBEE, for the appellees.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill in equity, exhibited by appellees against appellant, in the court below, to correct a mistake in a policy of insurance on a stock of staves, headings, hoops and barrels in appellees' cooper shop, in the city of St. Louis, and to enforce payment for a loss by fire of the insured property.

It is alleged, that appellees applied to Stewart & Co., the St. Louis agents of appellant, for a policy of insurance, to run from May 22, 1874, to April 3, 1875, and paid to such agents the price charged therefor--$36.63; that in issuing the policy it was, by mistake, made to run from the 22d of May, 1874, at 12 o'clock, noon, to the second day of April, 1874, at 12 o'clock, noon, instead of to the 2d day of April, 1875, at 12 o'clock, noon; that on the 11th of November, 1874, the property insured was destroyed by fire; that proofs of loss were duly furnished appellant; that more than sixty days have elapsed since the same were furnished; that appellant has neglected and refused to correct the mistake in the policy, and has not paid the loss or replaced the property destroyed.

Appellant demurred to the bill for want of equity, but the court overruled the demurrer, and the appellant thereafter answered, denying each material allegation of the bill.

The decree was in substantial conformity with the prayer of the bill.

The first objection urged to the decree is, that a court of equity can not entertain jurisdiction of the case. It is argued, that the mistake in the policy was merely clerical, and the intention of the parties obvious, so that the correction could have been made by a court of law, and in support of this the following quotation is made from Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (Bump's ed.), p. 417: “The rule at law is, that an agreement can not be varied by external evidence, and that the parties are bound by the document which they have signed and accepted as their agreement, unless there be error on the face of it so obvious as to leave no doubt of the intention of the parties, without the assistance of external evidence. If there be mistake or error on the face of an instrument, a court of law can correct it.” This last sentence is, of course, to be understood as qualified by that immediately preceding it. A mistake on the face of the instrument, however obvious, can not be corrected at law, or rather disregarded by a court of law, unless, from other parts of the instrument, there can be no doubt of the intention of the parties.

It is not, strictly speaking, accurate to say, that courts of law, where, as in this State, the distinction between the jurisdiction and powers of courts of law and courts of equity is rigidly adhered to, will correct mistakes in written instruments. Courts of law possess no power to order changes made in the phraseology of written instruments offered in evidence. They simply adjudicate the rights of the parties upon the instruments as they are; but, in construing them, they seek for the intention of the parties, and if this can be discovered, from all the language employed, clearly and satisfactorily, effect will be given to it, notwithstanding there may be some language used which, taken by itself, would not authorize the construction adopted.

A court of law, moreover, will not receive parol evidence to contradict or enlarge the terms of a written agreement. 2 Phillips on Evidence, (Cowen, Hill & Edwards' notes,) 665; 1 Greenleaf's Evidence, § 297. But the written instrument must be considered as containing the true agreement between the parties, and as furnishing better evidence than any which can be supplied by parol. 2 Phillips on Evidence, supra. But, in a court of equity, parol evidence is admissible of the real agreement between the parties in variation of the terms of the written agreement; and upon this, when sufficient, the mistake of the parties will be rectified, and the contract enforced as corrected. 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 153; 2 Chitty on Conts. (11 Am. ed.) p. 1022; 1 Greenleaf's Ev. § 296 a.

The American Express Co. v. Pinckney, 29 Ill. 392, Burr v. Broadway Ins. Co. 16 N. Y. 274, and Bernard et al. v. Cushing et al. 4 Metcalf, 233, cited by counsel for appellant, only assert the general and familiar rules of construction that the whole contract is to be considered in giving construction to its terms, and that, although there may have been a mistake in the use of language, yet if, notwithstanding the mistake, the intent remains clear, the mistake may be disregarded in an action at law.

The terms of a contract may or may not all appear upon one page of paper--they may be on several pages, on different sheets, or on different parts of the same sheet. In every case it must be determined by the court, from the evidence offered, whether that claimed to be the entire evidence of a written contract is so in fact, or whether there is also...