The Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 30 September 1875
• Parties: THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANYv.EBENEZER F. CURTIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

80 Ill. 324

1875 WL 8756 (Ill.)

THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

v.EBENEZER F. CURTIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1875.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. WALKER, DEXTER & SMITH, for the appellants.

Mr. F. W. S. BRAWLEY, and Mr. D. W. JACKSON, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

It appears, from this record, that this was an action brought against appellants, as common carriers from Detroit, Michigan, to Chicago, in this State, to recover the value of a quantity of fruit trees and shrubbery, shipped from Rochester, New York, to various points in this State. Appellee claims that the trees were destroyed by freezing whilst en route. The shipment was made at Rochester on the 28th day of October, 1871, by the Blue Line Transportation Company, and receipts given by the New York Central railroad.

The trees arrived at Detroit and were delivered to appellants on the the 3d day of November, 1871, with the exception of two boxes consigned to Lena, in this State, which arrived at Detroit on the 8th day of that month. All of the trees except those shipped to Lena reached Marshall, a station on appellants' road, on the 4th of November, and remained there until the 14th of that month, when they were started for Chicago, and arrived at that point at 4 o'clock on the evening of the 16th.

Appellants claim that the trees were delivered on the same day to the Illinois Central railroad, for further transportation to the places of their destination. But this is denied by appellee, who insists that the trees were not delivered to that company until the 22d of the month. This delivery did not embrace the trees shipped to Lena, but they were delivered to the Northwestern Railroad Company, for transportation to their destination. The trees delivered to the Illinois Central railroad arrived at Freeport, to which place they were shipped, on the 27th day of November, and those shipped to Lena arrived there, one box on the 21st and the other on the 22d.

It is admitted that the ordinary time for transportation from Detroit to Chicago was three days, and the ordinary time from Chicago to Freeport and other points on the Illinois Central railroad to which this freight was consigned, was from eighteen to twenty-four hours. The trees were frozen when they reached the various places to which they were shipped, but appellant insists they did not freeze whilst they were in their hands, and that they can not be held liable for any damage to the trees after they had passed from their possession to that of others.

“Appellants claim that they did not undertake to deliver the trees within any given time, and that the delay at Marshall, between Detroit and Chicago, was caused by the great fire of October 8th and 9th, A. D. 1871, which burned all appellants' freight houses in the city of Chicago, and destroyed all its facilities for handling and delivering freight.”

The jury found a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $1950.50, and, after overruling a motion for a new trial, the court rendered judgment on the verdict, and defendants appeal.

The question is, whether appellants were guilty of negligence which caused the loss sustained by appellee. If it was remote, and only a link in the chain of causes which ultimately produced the injury, then they are not liable, even if there was negligence; but if they failed to exercise due diligence commensurate with the duty of the undertaking, and the negligence was a proximate cause of the loss, they must be held liable. Had the trees come to Chicago in the usual time, from Detroit, the loss would not have occurred. Appellants were the last carriers having the custody of the trees, before they passed to the railroads that made the ultimate delivery to the consignee. They were, therefore, proximate in the chain of agents that held the trees in custody, and if the trees were not destroyed in their hands, they were, in the hands of the next carriers to whom they made delivery. If the trees were destroyed in their hands by reason of negligence or unreasonable delay, or if such delay held the trees back until the next carrier could not, by reasonable efforts, prevent the destruction of the trees, then appellants are liable for the loss. They did not have the right to delay, unreasonably, the delivery of the trees until they would inevitably be destroyed in the hands of the next carrier, and then be heard to say that they were destroyed in the hands of the company into whose hands they passed them for ultimate delivery. If they were guilty of such negligence, they thus rendered themselves liable, no matter in whose hands the trees were overtaken and destroyed by the frost, if the injury was the natural and proximate result of their acts.

Suppose they had held the trees thirty days, instead of the time it is claimed they did hold them, and then delivered them to the connecting carrier in the line, and the next day, as a consequence of such delay, the trees had been frozen, before it was possible for the last line to make delivery, would any one claim appellants were free from liability? Whether justifiable or not, they, in such a case, would be the cause of the loss. We think, if appellants withheld these trees until the 22d day of November, that such action caused the destruction of the property, as the evidence fully satisfies our minds that the cold was sufficiently intense, on the 22d and 23d, to destroy the trees, if it was not so for...