The Milton P. Demetre Family Ltd. Partnership v. Harry Beckmann III Patricia P. Beckmann Annie Ruth Hilton Crowley Raymond Moody Crowley Donald William Crowley Harris L. Crowley and Annie Ruth Crowley Atkinson Defendants. The Milton P. Demetre Family Ltd. Partnership v. City of Folly Beach Defendant and Emily S. Brown Annie Ruth Hilton Crowley Harry Beckmann III and Patricia P. Beckmann Intervenors of whom The Milton P. Demetre Family Ltd. Partnership is the and City of Folly Beach Emily S. Brown Harry Beckmann III Patricia P. Beckmann Annie Ruth Hilton Crowley Raymond Moody Crowley Donald William Crowley Harris L. Crowley and Annie Ruth Crowley Atkinson are the .

Decision Date14 January 2009
Docket NumberOpinion No. 2009-UP-029.
PartiesThe Milton P. Demetre Family Limited Partnership, Plaintiff, v. Harry Beckmann, III, Patricia P. Beckmann, Annie Ruth Hilton Crowley, Raymond Moody Crowley, Donald William Crowley, Harris L. Crowley, Jr., and Annie Ruth Crowley Atkinson, Defendants. The Milton P. Demetre Family Limited Partnership, Plaintiff, v. City of Folly Beach, Defendant, and Emily S. Brown, Annie Ruth Hilton Crowley, Harry Beckmann, III, and Patricia P. Beckmann, Intervenors, of whom The Milton P. Demetre Family Limited Partnership is the Appellant, and City of Folly Beach, Emily S. Brown, Harry Beckmann, III, Patricia P. Beckmann, Annie Ruth Hilton Crowley, Raymond Moody Crowley, Donald William Crowley, Harris L. Crowley, Jr., and Annie Ruth Crowley Atkinson are the Respondents.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

PER CURIAM:

FACTS

Most of the Island of Folly Beach, South Carolina was platted and subdivided by the Jefferson Construction Company in 1920, and recorded in the Charleston County Register of Mesne Conveyance (RMC) Office. Subsequently, in 1965 the 1920 plat was redrawn because of deterioration and in 1968 it was traced. The redraw added parcels to the 1920 plat; however, the tracing appears to be identical to the 1920 plat. All three plats share the same book and page number at the RMC Office.

Between 1921 and 1925, the Folly Beach Improvement Company (FBIC) acquired the entire island of Folly Beach and mortgaged its complete interest to C & S Bank. In 1937, the FBIC sold "all the streets, avenues and/or lanes in and upon Folly Island" to the Board of Township Commission of Folly Island for the use of the public. In 1942, C & S Bank foreclosed on the mortgage and the land was bought by Edward Seabrook, Sr., at a public auction. The deed conveyed the island to Seabrook "[s]aving and excepting therefrom such lots and portions of land as have from time to time been conveyed to sundry parties by [FBIC] by deeds recorded in the RMC Office for Charleston County."[1]

On May 30, 2002, Demetre purchased from Seabrook, Jr., a "portion of [East Indian Avenue] that is undeveloped and unpaved" bordering lots 201 to 205 for $10,000 by quitclaim deed (the Road).[2] Both the 1920 plat and the 1968 redraw show a portion of East Indian Avenue extending from lot 201 to the northwest corner of lot 205. Prior to purchasing the Road, Demetre's realtor stated he had a conversation with the Folly Beach mayor and city administrator in which they told him Folly Beach did not own the Road and suggested Demetre talk to Seabrook Jr.[3] Subsequently, Folly Beach asserted ownership of the Road. As a result, on December 6, 2002 Demetre brought an action against Folly Beach to quiet title in Road, which borders other property Demetre owns (the Road case). Emily Brown, who was allowed to intervene in the case owns lot 204 on East Huron Avenue and has used the Road daily to access her property since January 30, 1986.

On January 23, 2004, Demetre bought two riverfront lots, 209 and 210, on East Indian Avenue from Seabrook, Jr., for $23,700 by quitclaim deed. The deed references the 1920 plat. Demetre's lots are shown on the 1965 redraw, but they do not appear on the 1920 plat or the Charleston County tax map. When Demetre purchased East Indian Avenue lots 209 and 210, two existing docks from East Huron Avenue lots 209 and 210 crossed over a portion of Demetre's lots to reach the water. As a result, on October 7, 2005, Demetre brought an action against Annie Crowley, Raymond Crowley, Donald Crowley, Harris Crowley Jr., and Annie Atkinson (the Crowleys),[4] and Harry and Patricia Beckmann (the Beckmanns) for declaratory judgment and to quiet title to lots East Indian Avenue 209 and 210 where the Crowleys' and Beckmanns' docks cross over the property (the Dock case).[5]

The Crowleys purchased lot 210, East Huron Avenue, on September 1, 1964, and the Beckmanns purchased lot 209, East Huron Avenue, on April 27, 1972. Both of their deeds referenced the 1920 plat, which shows no lots between their lots and the marsh abutting the river. The Crowleys and Beckmanns both believed they owned all the property behind their homes down to the marsh. Beckmann testified he believed everything from his property line to the Folly River was owned by the State.[6] In 1988, both the Crowleys and the Beckmanns applied for permits from the South Carolina Coastal Council (Council) to construct docks from their lots north to the Folly River across East Indian Avenue lots 209 and 210. Both permits were granted by the Council and the docks were constructed; however, they were destroyed by Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and rebuilt in 1990.

On the motion of the parties, these two cases were referred to a master-in-equity and consolidated on August 21, 2006. The cases were tried on December 12, 2006. On March 2, 2007, the master issued the Road Order, finding the Road was dedicated to the public and Folly Beach owned the Road. On March 26, 2007, the master issued the Dock Order, ruling in favor of the Crowleys and the Beckmanns on all grounds. Demetre timely filed Rule 59(e) motions in both cases, which were denied. Demetre then timely appealed both orders to this court and we consolidated the appeals on September 13, 2007.

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. The Road Case
a. Standard of Review

"The determination of whether a roadway has been dedicated to the public is an action in equity." Mack v. Edens, 320 S.C 236, 239, 464 S.E.2d 124, 126 (Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, we may find the facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence; however, we are not required to disregard the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility. Cody Discount, Inc. v Merritt, 368 S.C. 570, 574-75, 629 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ct. App. 2006).

b. Dedication

Demetre argues the master erred by finding Folly Beach accepted the dedication by recording the deed. We disagree.

Dedication requires two elements: (1) intent to dedicate and (2) acceptance of the dedication. Mack, 320 S.C. at 239, 464 S.E.2d at 126. The intention of an owner to dedicate his property to public use must be expressed in a positive and unmistakable manner. Horry County v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 368, 434 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1993). "It is generally held that when the owner of land has it subdivided and platted into lots and streets and sells and conveys the lots with reference to the plat, he thereby dedicates the streets to the use of such lot owners, their successors in title, and the public." Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 118, 145 S.E.2d 922, 924-25 (1965). "A recorded plat may be sufficient to disclose a landowner's intent to dedicate property to public use." Van Blarcum v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 337 S.C. 446, 450, 523 S.E.2d 486, 488 (Ct. App. 1999). The burden of proving intent to dedicate is on the party asserting dedication. Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 349, 72 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1952); Vick v. SCDOT, 347 S.C. 470, 477 n. 2, 556 S.E.2d 693, 697 n. 2 (Ct. App. 2001).

Evidence of acceptance of a dedication must be by clear, convincing, and unequivocal proof. Vick, 347 S.C. at 477 n. 2, 556 S.E.2d at 697 n. 2. An express or implied public acceptance of the property offered for dedication must occur within a reasonable time. Helsel v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 307 S.C. 24, 27, 413 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1992). An acceptance of an offer of dedication may be implied by the public or the public authority's continuous use or maintenance of the property in some fashion. Boyd v. Hyatt, 294 S.C. 360, 365-66, 364 S.E.2d 478, 481 (Ct. App. 1988). "Acceptance of dedication may be shown by use by a comparatively small number of persons, as in the case of a short street to the seashore." 23 Am. Jur. 2d Dedication § 50 (2002). "The public use need not be constant, but merely continuous in light of the particular nature of the land." Id. Also, the non-assessment of taxes is a factor in the determination of dedication and acceptance. Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 327, 487 S.E.2d 187, 192 (1997).

The 1937 deed from the FBIC to the Board of Township Commission of Folly Island stated it was dedicating "all the streets, avenues, and/or lanes in and upon Folly Island" for the use of the public, which was properly recorded. The foreclosure deed to Seabrook stated it was conveying to him the land "saving and excepting . . . such lots and portions of land as have from time to time been conveyed to sundry parties by Folly Beach Corporation and [FBIC] by deeds recorded in the RMC Office for Charleston County." Also, the 1920 plat, which was referenced in Seabrook's deed, shows East Indian Avenue extending from lot 201 to the northwest corner of lot 205; and the Road is not included on the tax map. Furthermore, Seabrook's quitclaim deed to Demetre references the 1920 plat.

Additionally, evidence was presented at trial that Folly Beach regularly filled in pot holes on the Road, sprayed the Road for mosquitoes, removed trees from the Road after Hurricane Hugo, and some governmental agency paved the Road at one time. Brown also testified she and her family have used the Road daily for twenty years to access her property and the public regularly uses the Road to park cars, jog, bike, and walk dogs. Therefore, we find the master correctly held the Road was dedicated to Folly Beach by deed and plat, and Folly Beach accepted the dedication by recording the deed and by using and maintaining the Road.

c. Equitable Estoppel

Demetre also argues the master erred by finding he did not satisfy the elements of equitable estoppel. We disagree.

"Government agents, acting within the scope of their authority, can by their acts give rise to estoppel against a municipality." Landing Dev. Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 285 S.C. 216, 221, 329 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1985). Equitable estoppel is found to exist when the following elements are present:

(1) [C]onduct by the party estopped which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts or which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than and inconsistent with those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention or at least expectation that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the true facts; (4) lack of knowledge or the means of knowledge of the facts by the other party; (5) reliance upon the conduct by the other party; and (6) a detrimental change of position
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