The Mineral Point R.R. Co. v. Barron

• Decision Date: 30 September 1876
• Citation: 1876 WL 10349,83 Ill. 365
• Parties: THE MINERAL POINT RAILROAD COMPANYv.JAMES BARRON, for use, etc.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

83 Ill. 365

1876 WL 10349 (Ill.)

THE MINERAL POINT RAILROAD COMPANY

v.JAMES BARRON, for use, etc.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1876.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Jo Daviess county; the Hon. WILLIAM BROWN, Judge, presiding.

This was a garnishee proceeding, commenced by E. G. Barlow against The Mineral Point Railroad Company, to recover wages due from the company to James Barron, based upon a judgment against Barron, and the return of an execution “no property found.”

The company answered, admitting that it was indebted at the time of the service of the writ, to Barron, in the sum of $40, but set up in defense that Barron was a resident of the State of Wisconsin, and the head of a family, residing with the same, and that, by the laws of that State, such wages were exempt from garnishment.

Mr. M. Y. JOHNSON, and Mr. M. M. COTHREN, for the appellant.

Mr. E. L. BEDFORD, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

Under the laws of Wisconsin, had the proceedings been instituted in that State, the wages of the defendant in the original action were exempt from garnishment, and it is urged by appellant, that, as the parties resided in that State and the debt was there incurred, the exemption laws of Wisconsin must control, although the proceedings for the collection of the debt were commenced in this State.

It is true, the validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the place where it is made, but the law of the remedy is no part of the contract, as is well said by Parsons on Contracts, vol. 2, page 588: “But on the trial, and in respect to all questions as to the forms or methods, or conduct of process or remedy, the law of the place of the forum is applied.”

In Sherman v. Gassett, 4 Gilman, 521, after referring to a number of cases in illustration of the rule, it is said: “The cases above referred to, although not precisely analogous, yet settle the principle that the lex loci only governs in ascertaining whether the contract is valid, and what the words of the contract mean. When the question is settled that the contract of the parties is legal, and what is the true interpretation of the language employed by the parties in framing it, the lex loci ceases, and the lex fori steps in and determines the time, the mode and the extent of the remedy.”

Statutes of limitations fixing the time within which an action may be brought, laws providing for a set-off in certain actions, and statutes providing that certain articles of personal property, wearing apparel, farming implements, and the tools of a mechanic shall be exempt from levy and sale upon execution, have always, so far as our observation goes, been regarded by courts as regulations affecting the remedy which might be enacted by each State, as the judgment of the legislature might think for the best interests of the people thereof. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Howard, 311.

The statute of Wisconsin, under which appellant was not liable to be garnisheed, was a law affecting merely the remedy where an action should be brought in the courts of that State. That law, however, can not be invoked where the remedy is sought to be enforced in the courts of this...