The Navemar Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima v. the Navemar 8212 10, 1938, No. 242

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STONE
• Citation: 82 L.Ed. 667,58 S.Ct. 432,303 U.S. 68
• Parties: THE NAVEMAR. COMPANIA ESPANOLA DE NAVEGACION MARITIMA, S.A., v. THE NAVEMAR. Argued Jan. 7—10, 1938
• Docket Number: No. 242
• Decision Date: 31 January 1938

303 U.S. 68 58 S.Ct. 432 82 L.Ed. 667 THE NAVEMAR. COMPANIA ESPANOLA DE NAVEGACION MARITIMA, S.A.,

v.

THE NAVEMAR.

No. 242. Argued Jan. 7—10, 1938. Decided Jan. 31, 1938.

Page 69

Mr. T. Catesby Jones, of New York City, for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from page 69 intentionally omitted]

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Mr. Charles W. Hagen, of New York City, for respondents.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In a suit in admiralty, brought in a District Court by the alleged owner to recover possession of a Spanish merchant vessel, the Spanish Ambassador asked leave to intervene as claimant on the basis of an affidavit of the Spanish Acting Consul General suggesting that when the suit was brought the vessel was the property of the Republic of Spain, by virtue of a decree of attachment promulgated by the President of the Republic, appropriating the vessel to the public use, and that it was then in the possession of the Spanish Government. The principal question for decision is whether it was the duty of the court, upon presentation of the suggestion, to dismiss the libel for want of admiralty jurisdiction.

Petitioner, a Spanish corporation, brought the present suit in admiralty in the District Court for Eastern New York against the Spanish steamship Navemar, five members of her crew, and all persons claiming an interest in her, to recover possession of the vessel. The libel alleged that petitioner was owner of the vessel, which was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; and that while she was in petitioner's possession the individual respondents, acting as a committee of the crew, had wrongfully and forcibly seized, and had since retained possession of the vessel. After hearing evidence in support of the petition, the District Court rendered its decree upon default, directing the marshal to place libelant in possession.

Thereupon the Spanish Ambassador filed a suggestion in the cause, challenging the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the Navemar was a public vessel of the Republic of Spain, not subject to judicial process of the court, and asking that it direct delivery of the

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vessel to the Spanish Acting Consul General in New York. The suggestion alleged that when the suit was brought the Navemar was the property of the Spanish government by virtue of its decree of October 10, 1936, and was in the possession of the Republic of Spain. The District Court issued its order to show cause why the default should not be opened and the Ambassador permitted to appear specially as claimant of the vessel. After a hearing the court denied the application but with leave to the Ambassador to make further application upon fuller presentation of the facts showing the ownership and possession of the vessel by the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the Department of State had refused to act upon the Spanish government's claim of possession and ownership of the Navemar, had declined to honor the request of the Ambassador that representations be made in the pending suit by the Attorney General of the United States in behalf of the Spanish government, and had advised the Ambassador that his government was entitled 'to appear directly before the court in a case of this character.'

A second application by the Ambassador for leave to appear as a claimant upon a verified suggestion, stating additional circumstances relied upon to establish possession of the vessel by the Republic of Spain, was denied. The Navemar, D.C., 18 F.Supp. 153. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after restricting the appeal to the order of the District Court on the second application, reversed that order and directed that the libel be dismissed. 90 F.2d 673. We granted certiorari, 302 U.S. 669, 58 S.Ct. 35, 82 L.Ed. —-, because the case is of public importance and because of alleged conflict of the decision below with our decision in The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 41 S.Ct. 308, 65 L.Ed. 592, and with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in The Attualita, 238 F. 909.

Respondent's suggestion on the second application presented two contentions: One, a challenge to the jurisdic-

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tion on the ground that the Navemar was a public vessel, immune from arrest and process of the court; the other, that the Spanish government was owner of the vessel and entitled to her possession by virtue of the decree of attachment.

In addition to the general allegations of ownership and possession of the vessel by the Spanish government in the first application, the suggestion in the second set up the acquisition of possession in behalf of the Spanish government by specific acts of its consular officers in Argentina and in New York. It alleged that on October 26, 1936, the Spanish Consul at Rosario, Argentina, had indorsed on the ship's roll a statement that 'Through a cable dated 26 of the inst month from the Director General of the Merchant Marine this ship has become the property of the State through attachment according to the Decree of Oct. 10, 1936,' and that on October 28 the Spanish Acting Consul General at Buenos Aires had made a similar indorsement on the ship's register. It was also alleged that on arrival in New York in November the Spanish Acting Consul...