The Nellie and Annie

• Decision Date: 07 January 1889
• Citation: 37 F. 217
• Parties: PETERSON v. THE NELLIE AND ANNIE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

37 F. 217

PETERSON v. THE NELLIE AND ANNIE.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

January 7, 1889

O. T Williams, for libelant.

Mr Krause and Mr. Wildish, for claimants, etc.

JENKINS J.

This case comes now before the court upon the objections to the payment of libelant's claim out of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, covered into the registry of the court. The facts upon which opposition to the claim is based are disclosed by the evidence of the libelant. In April, 1888, F C. Seefluth was master of the vessel, and employed libelant as seaman, at $50 a month. He continued in the service under the agreement one month, when the master reduced the pay to $1.50 per day. He served as seaman under the changed agreement until the 8th day of June, when he left the service because of threatened further reduction of wages. He remained idle until the 6th of July, when he was re-engaged by the master at $1.50 per day. At this time the master informed him of his intention to stop ashore for two or three trips, and suggested that the libelant had better go on the papers as master. He accompanied the master to the custom-house, took the oath of citizenship, and was then rated on the vessel's enrollment as master. He made one trip of six days as master; then Seefluth again took command in fact of the vessel, and remained in command until her seizure. The libelant's name continued on the enrollment as master and he reported and cleared that at the custom-house; but Seefluth was in fact master, purchased cargoes, collected freight, and in all other respects commanded the vessel; the libelant performing seaman's services.

It is objected that the services were rendered as master, and no lien therefor exists upon the vessel or the proceeds in court. Without respect to the registry laws, he would be master to whom the owner actually intrusted the navigation and discipline of the vessel. The inquiry in such case is what is the fact? As Judge NIXON observes in The Imogene M. Terry, 19 F. 463, 'Courts of admiralty deal with things, not words. ' It cannot be questioned upon the evidence that the libelant, with the exception of the one trip, was in fact a seaman, and not the master. Seefluth was in every respect the master, charged by the owner with all the duties and responsibilities of master. What effect did the transaction, with respect to the change upon the enrollment of the vessel, have upon the rights of the libelant? This change was made at the request of the master because he desired to stop ashore for a time. It does not appear to have been done by or with the knowledge or authority of the owner. It may be, as determined in The Dubuque, 2 Abb. (U.S.) 21, that, where there is a master de jure by virtue of the registry, there cannot be in contemplation of law another master de facto. It is there held that the registry conclusively determines the relations of owner, master, and crew. The case of Draper v. Insurance...