The New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company v. The Grand Rapids And Indiana Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 12 October 1888
• Docket Number: 13,360
• Citation: 18 N.E. 182,116 Ind. 60
• Parties: The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. The Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

18 N.E. 182

116 Ind. 60

The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. The Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company

No. 13,360

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 12, 1888

From the Allen Superior Court.

Judgment affirmed.

R. C Bell and S. L. Morris, for appellant.

A. A Chapin and W. S. O'Rourke, for appellee.

Elliott J. Zollars, J., did not take any part in the decision of this case.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

The complaint of the appellee sets forth a written agreement in which, among other things, the appellant promised to put in, at the place where it was agreed that its road should cross that of the appellee, "a semaphore, or such other signals or signal as may be now or hereafter be prescribed by law, and supply and keep and maintain good, sufficient and acceptable watchman to take charge of and operate the same forever."

It is averred that the contracting parties had agreed upon a code of signals to be used at the crossing, and that it was the duty of the watchman to operate the signal target and give the proper signals; that each of the parties had agreed to obey these signals; that the proper signal was given which gave the appellee the exclusive right to the crossing; that while moving a train upon said crossing in obedience to the proper signal, the appellant's engineer drove the engine of which he was in charge against the appellee's cars, and that the injury to the appellee's property was caused by the appellant's reckless and wilful negligence.

The contract between the parties must be construed with reference to the surrounding circumstances and the object the parties intended to accomplish. Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Adamson, 114 Ind. 282, 15 N.E. 5.

It is obvious that what the parties intended was that the appellant should secure a way across the track of the appellee, and should provide means of making and keeping the crossing safe for the use of both parties. Whatever was reasonably necessary to carry into execution this object was implied, and it was, therefore, entirely competent for the parties to give effect to the contract by establishing a code of signals. As they did establish such a code under the contract, and the appellant failed or refused to obey it, there was a breach of contract, and hence a clear right of action. This right of action came into existence the moment the contract was violated and loss resulted. It is not material whether the breach was reckless or not; if there was a breach the appellant became a wrong-doer, and as such liable to an action.

Counsel for appellant argue that "There is no right of recovery on the contract, because there is nothing in it by which the appellant obligates itself to indemnify appellee against the acts of the target-man--no negligence is charged against the target-man; there is no agreement in it to pay for the negligence of appellant's employees in disobeying the targetman's signals." This argument is entirely destitute of strength. The law awards damages where there is a breach of contract or of duty. It is not essential that parties should incorporate the law in their contract.

The answers to the special interrogatories addressed to the jury do not overthrow the general verdict. We agree with appellant's counsel that if the appellee had been guilty of negligence contributing to the injury no action would lie. Gavett v. Manchester, etc., R. R. Co., ...