The Nw. Univ. v. People Ex Rel. Henry B. Miller.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1875
• Citation: The Nw. Univ. v. People Ex Rel. Henry B. Miller., 80 Ill. 333, 1875 WL 8758, 22 Am.Rep. 187 (Ill. 1875)
• Parties: THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITYv.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Henry B. Miller.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

80 Ill. 333

1875 WL 8758 (Ill.)

22 Am.Rep. 187

THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

v.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Henry B. Miller.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1875.

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. R. M. WALLACE, Judge, presiding.

Mr. SIDNEY SMITH, and Messrs. GOODRICH & PATTERSON, for the appellant.

Mr. JAMES P. ROOT, and Mr. GEORGE O. IDE, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELDdelivered the opinion of the Court:

This appeal is from a judgment rendered by the Cook countycourt against certain lands and town lots in the towns of Evanston and Willmette, in Cook county, for delinquent taxes.

Appellant's claim is, that the lands and town lots are exempt from all taxation, which claim is based on the fourth section of an amendment to its charter, approved Feb. 14, 1855, in these words: “That all property, of whatever kind or description, belonging to or owned by said corporation, shall be forever free from taxation for any and all purposes.”

It is conceded by a stipulation read in evidence on the trial in the court below, and made part of the record, that the lands and town lots, the taxation on which is in controversy, “are leased by appellant to different parties on leases for a longer or a shorter time, and that none of them are used or occupied for buildings or other direct appliances for education.”

The question we propose to consider is, conceding that the clause we have quoted from appellant's charter is, as it seems to be, broad enough to comprehend these lands and town lots, was it competent for the General Assembly, under the constitution of 1848, which was in force at the date of that enactment, to grant an exemption so broad and sweeping in its character?

It was provided by section three, article nine, of that instrument: “The property of the State and counties, both real and personal, and such other property as the General Assembly may deem necessary for schools, religious and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation.”

It is not claimed that appellant is, in any sense, a public corporation, but it is claimed that the purpose for which it is created is so far beneficial to the public, that it affords a sufficient consideration for the grant of exemption from taxation in the amendment, and that when the amendment was accepted and acted upon by the corporators it must be held a vested right, which can not be withdrawn by subsequent legislation, because of the provision in the constitution of the United States which prohibits a State from passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract.

If it was competent for the General Assembly to make the exemption, we are not disposed to contest the correctness of this position; but if it was not competent to make the exemption, the attempt was a nullity, and the case is not affected by the constitution of the United States.

The corporation being private, the tax-payer, in general, is relieved of no obligation in consequence of the exemption which he would otherwise have to discharge by the payment of taxes, and in proportion as appellant becomes the owner of property which is thereby withdrawn from taxation, the burden of taxation is increased upon him.

The equality between burden and benefit, in such cases, is presumptive only, and can, if at all, only be true in fact in reference to the public as an aggregate.In the very nature of things, such exemptions must, proportionally, increase the burdens upon individual tax-payers, in many cases, where there can be no corresponding actual benefits.It is true, it is impracticable that there can, in any instance of the levy and collection of public taxes, be an actual equivalent received by every tax-payer for the full amount he pays, or that there can be any system of taxation devised so perfect in its practical operation, that there shall be no inequality in the distribution of the burden; but it has always been recognized that laws imposing taxes are just and equitable in proportion as they approximate such principles, and unjust and inequitable as they depart from them.The general principle upon which taxation was required to be levied by the constitution of 1848, was that of uniformity, and exemptions were exceptional, and, therefore, to be construed strictly; and such is the general rule of construction in regard to exemptions from taxation.Cooley on Taxation, 146; Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 632.As is said in a recent case by the Supreme Court of the United States, Tucker v. Ferguson,22 Wallace, 575: “The taxing power is vital to the functions of government.It helps to support the social compact, and give it efficacy.It reaches the interests of every member of the community.It may be restrained by contract in special case...