The Ohio v. Weber

Decision Date30 November 1880
Citation96 Ill. 443,1880 WL 10130
PartiesTHE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANYv.HERMAN G. WEBER.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Clay county; the Hon. JAMES C. ALLEN, Judge, presiding.

This was a suit instituted by the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company, to restrain the collection of the taxes extended on the capital stock of said company, in 1875. This company was organized under the laws of Illinois, and was consolidated with two other corporations of the same name, organized, respectively, under the laws of Indiana and Ohio, to operate a line of railroad from East St. Louis, in Illinois, to Cincinnati, Ohio, with a branch road from North Vernon, Indiana, to Louisville, Kentucky. In January, 1875, the company also became the owner of the Springfield and Illinois Southeastern Railroad, extending from Beardstown to Shawneetown, in this State.

The value of capital stock of the consolidated company was $24,030,000, and the value of its indebtedness (exclusive of that incurred for current expenses) was $13,863,000. The total value of the tangible property of the company was assessed at $1,929,411, and there was also assessed against the company, in Illinois, under the designation “capital stock,” the sum of $4,012,173, which was distributed to the several counties, as directed by the statute, and upon which taxes were extended. The length of the Ohio and Mississippi Railway, in Illinois, was 146 miles and 1678 feet; the length of the Springfield and Illinois Southeastern Railroad, was 220 miles; and the length of the Ohio and Mississippi Railway, outside of Illinois, was 244 1/2 miles, making a total mileage of a fraction over 610 miles, of which 366 were in Illinois.

The complainant's bill questions the validity of this assessment of capital stock, for the reason, as it alleges, that the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company was not a corporation created under the laws of this State, within the meaning of section 3, of the revenue law. (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 858.) It is also claimed that the Board of Equalization arrived at this assessment by apportioning the whole amount of the consolidated stock ($24,030,000), and the whole amount of the consolidated debt ($13,863,000), according to the mileage of the road operated by the company, that is, it divided those respective amounts by 610, and multiplied the quotients by 366, and the amounts of capital stock and debt thus apportioned to Illinois, were then assessed and equalized with the other State assessments, by deducting fifty per cent, and the value fixed at $5,942,244, from which was deducted $1,929,711, as the assessed value of the tangible property of the company, leaving $4,012,533, and by reason of this manner of making the assessment, complainant contends it is void.

Upon the filing of the bill, the court below granted a temporary injunction, but, upon final hearing, entered a decree, dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill, from which the complainant has prosecuted this appeal to this court.

Mr. CHARLES A. BEECHER, and Mr. GARLAND POLLARD, for the appellant.

Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DICKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

Where a corporation is formed under our laws by consolidation of other corporations, (which are merged into the new corporation thus formed,) and where one of the constituent companies was incorporated under the laws of this State, the new corporation thus formed is to be considered as one of the “companies incorporated under the laws of this State,” within the terms and meaning of the last clause of the first section of the Revenue act of March 30, 1872; and the capital stock (located or used in this State) of such corporation is subject to be assessed and taxed as such. There can be no distinction in principle between the status of such corporation and that of a corporation operating its business in two adjoining States, having a charter for such purpose from each of such States, and that has been decided to be the law applicable to the latter class of companies. Quincy Bridge Co. v. County of Adams, 88 Ill. 615.

The corporation in the case at bar owns and operates a railroad extending from East St. Louis through Illinois, Indiana, to Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, with a branch from a point in Indiana extending to Louisville, in the State of Kentucky; and also owns and operates a connecting road lying entirely in the State of Illinois, and extending from Beardstown, on the Illinois river, to Shawneetown, on the Ohio river.

This corporation was formed by the consolidation of a corporation of the same name (created under a statute of this State) with other railroad companies of other States. This consolidation was accomplished by virtue and authority of a statute of this State providing that this might be done. It is not perceived that this corporation thus formed is any the less, in substance and effect, a corporation “created under the laws of this State” than would have been the constituent company of this State in case that corporation, under powers granted by this State, had purchased the lines of railroad outside of this State, by permission of the States in which they lie, and was operating the same. In our view, this consolidated corporation is one corporation, having franchises from several States, and in its relation to Illinois, must be considered as having a franchise from the State of Illinois, enabling it to transact business in Illinois, and elsewhere by permission of the governing power where it so does.

It is charged by appellants that the assessment of the capital stock of this corporation is not a valid assessment, and was made by the Board of Equalization illegally and fraudulently.

The mode of finding the value of the capital stock to be taxed in Illinois, was to take the value of the entire capital stock of this corporation, and adopting that amount thereof which should bear to the value of the entire capital stock the same proportion as the length of that part of the line lying in Illinois bears to the entire length of the whole line of railroad owned and operated by this corporation.

It is also claimed that the mode of ascertaining the value of that part of the “rolling stock” subject to taxation in Illinois was illegal and void. The mode adopted in that regard was to take the value of all the “rolling stock” of this corporation, and set apart, as a proper value of that part thereof to be taxed in Illinois, so much of the value of all the rolling stock as should bear the same proportion to the value of all the rolling stock as the length of that part of the main lines located in the State of Illinois bore to the entire length of the entire lines belonging to this company.

Under our laws, for the purpose of assessment as a basis for taxation, the property of railroad companies is classified by the statute, and specific names are adopted to designate in a word all the property embraced in each class.

To avoid confusion, it is important to keep in mind the exact meaning of each of these names.

The term “capital stock” means all the property and rights of the corporation of every kind and nature wherever located.

The term “railroad track” embraces property held for right of way, including superstructures thereon, and this is declared to be “real estate for purposes of taxation.”

“Rolling stock” embraces the movable property belonging to the corporation, and is declared personal property, for the purposes of taxation. By movable property is plainly meant such property as in its ordinary use is taken from one part of the line to another, such as cars,...

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23 cases
  • People v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1916
    ...which said rolling stock is used elsewhere.’ Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 2033. In construingthis statute this court held in Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 443, on page 450, that the plain object of this statute-- ‘is to subject each railroad company in this state to taxation in......
  • State v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 28, 1910
    ...606;Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439, 14 Sup. Ct. 1122, 38 L. Ed. 1041;Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 443;State v. P., W. & B. R. R. Co., 45 Md. 361, 24 Am. Rep. 511. The courts and other public authorities have been called u......
  • Bacon v. Boston & M. R. R.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1910
    ...etc., Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 152 Ill. 153, 38 N. E. 623, 625; Quincy, etc., Ry. Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 437, 41 N. E. 162; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 443, 448; Huck v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Ill. 352, 358. The phrase "railroad track" often means the same as the word "roadway" as u......
  • J. L. Bacon v. Boston & Maine Railroad Et Al Central Vermont Railway Company v. Town of Hartford
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1910
    ... ... Ry. Co. v. Mathews , 152 ... Ill. 153, 38 N.E. 623, 625; Quincy &c. Ry ... Co. v. People , 156 Ill. 437, 41 N.E. 162; ... Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Weber , 96 Ill ... 443, 448; Huck v. Chicago &c. R ... Co. , 86 Ill. 352, 358 ...          The ... phrase ... ...
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