The Pennsylvania Company v. Sears
Decision Date | 10 May 1893 |
Docket Number | 14,971 |
Parties | The Pennsylvania Company v. Sears |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Reported at: 136 Ind. 460 at 476.
From the Allen Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
L. M Ninde and H. W. Ninde, for appellee.
McCabe, J.
Appellee sued appellant, a railway company, for a personal injury resulting from the alleged negligence of the appellant.
Trial by jury, verdict for appellee, upon which judgment was rendered over a motion for a new trial.
The errors assigned here and not waived by failure to argue the same are, the overruling of appellant's demurrer to the appellee's complaint, and the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial.
The material allegations of the complaint are as follows:
The first objection urged against this complaint is that it does not state what part of the train appellee was on when he was injured, and that it is not averred that he was standing on any one of the cars when his head came in contact with the overhead bridge.
If it was material or important to appellant to have a more specific statement as to the particular place in the train appellee occupied when the alleged injury occurred, the appropriate remedy was a motion to require greater certainty in that respect and not a demurrer for want of sufficient facts.
As to the other point, the complaint shows that on the 8th day of May he was engaged as brakeman for appellant on train No. 76 going east from Chicago, and after the same passed the town of Wheeler he was diligently engaged in his duties as such brakeman, and said train ran past and under said bridge, whereby his head was brought in collision with said bridge above said train. From this language we think it appears that the only place appellant could have occupied at the time the bridge came in contact with his head was on top of some one of the cars in that train. Whether it was a refrigerator or other highest car was not essential to the sufficiency of the complaint. It is fairly inferable from the complaint that it was only refrigerator cars and other highest cars that would not admit a brakeman to stand erect thereon and pass under said bridge in safety, and that all other cars would admit such passage.
Much useless verbiage in the complaint has obscured the statement of these facts to some extent, but not to the extent of destroying them.
The unavoidable conclusion to which the language employed leads, is that the ordinary cars in use on said road would admit such passage.
It is also claimed that the complaint is bad for the reason that it appears therefrom that appellee was not free from contributory negligence. The contention is, that as it appears from its averments that appellee was engaged for appellant as brakeman, from the 16th day of November, 1887, until the 8th day of May, 1888, he had ample opportunity of knowing all about the dangerous character of the bridge; and that, therefore, he assumed the risks of such employment.
The complaint "avers that from the 16th of November, 1887, to the 8th of May, 1888, inclusive, he was employed by defendant as brakeman on the division of its said road between Ft. Wayne and Chicago." What train he had been braking on during that time, whether freight or passenger, is not stated. If it was either material or useful to appellant's rights to have the complaint specify the particular train, the only remedy was a motion asking the trial court to require such specification, and not a demurrer for want of facts sufficient. No such motion was made.
It is afterwards averred in the complaint, that appellee had not, at or before he was injured, any knowledge or notice whatever that said bridge was so low that it would come in collision with his head or any part of his body, or that it was low enough to touch him as he passed under the same.
From this language, it clearly enough appears that he in fact did not know of the dangerous character of the bridge, and the demurrer admits that fact. Nor does it appear from the facts stated, that he might have known of such danger, because it does not appear that he was ever braking on a freight train for appellant prior to the occasion on which the alleged injury was received. And if that did appear, still there is nothing in the complaint to indicate that he had ever known of, or seen, "refrigerator or other highest cars" pass under said bridge, either with or without a brakeman standing thereon, or that any other facts existed within his knowledge to warn him of the dangerous character of the bridge. This analysis...
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...servant as to the master, and is understood by him, the servant enters or continues in the employment at his own risk. Pennsylvania Co. v. Sears, 136 Ind. 460, 34 N. E. 15, 36 N. E. 353; Railroad Co. v. Kemper, 147 Ind. 561, 47 N. E. 214;Whitcomb v. Oil Co., 153 Ind. 513, 55 N. E. 440;Railw......
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Monteith v. Kokomo Wood Enameling Co.
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