The People Of The State Of Ill. v. Taylor

Decision Date18 March 2010
Docket NumberNo. 107701.,107701.
Citation930 N.E.2d 959,237 Ill.2d 356,341 Ill.Dec. 445
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,v.Levell TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Def., Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Def., Emily R. Atwood, Asst. Appellate Def., Patricia Mysza, Supervisor, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, Anita Alvarez, State's Atty., Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Ashley A. Romito, Annette Collins, Ljubica D. Popovic, Asst. State's Attorneys, of counsel), for People.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Defendant, Levell Taylor, petitioned the circuit court of Cook County for postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's petition. The appellate court affirmed. No. 1-06-0938 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial

Defendant, his brother Lowell Taylor, and Duante Anderson were jointly charged with the first degree murder of the victim, Bruce Carter. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008). The events leading to the victim's death were uncontested at trial.

On the afternoon of August 11, 1996, Tyeshia Clinton's mother hosted a barbeque at her home near 52nd Street and Lowe Avenue. A south side Chicago streetgang (hereafter south side gang) claimed that area as part of its turf and referred to it colloquially as “Motown.” Approximately 13 or 14 south side gang members had gathered in the front yard. At approximately 7 p.m., six of Clinton's friends arrived for the party, including Keith Baker and the victim. Clinton's friends belonged to a rival west side Chicago streetgang. The victim drove these friends to the party in his brother's car. The victim parked the car on the side of the Clintons' house.

Upon their arrival, the six friends greeted Clinton in the front yard, and then four of them entered the house. The victim, Baker, and Clinton remained in the front yard conversing. Almost immediately, they were approached by a group of south side gang members that included Anderson, defendant, and Lowell. Anderson shouted at the three friends: “You don't know where you at. You in Motown.” Anderson then approached the victim and punched him in the face. A melee ensued wherein the south side gang members, including Anderson, defendant, and Lowell, forced Baker and the victim to the ground and kicked them. Also, the victim's car windows were smashed. Baker and the victim broke away from their attackers and, with Baker in the lead, ran toward the front door of the house. Witnesses heard two gunshots. The victim was shot once in the upper right arm. He fell into Baker, who carried him into the house. The victim died shortly thereafter in the living room. A subsequent autopsy revealed that the victim had been shot at very close range, that the bullet traversed his torso and lodged in the lower left chest cavity, and that the victim internally bled to death.

At approximately 9 p.m., Chicago Police Detective James O'Brien interviewed Baker and several other witnesses. Baker identified Anderson as the person who had punched the victim, defendant as the person who had passed a gun to Lowell, and Lowell as the person who had actually shot the victim. Detective O'Brien also interviewed Phillip Marshall, who was a 16-year-old member of the south side gang. On August 12, 1996 Marshall testified before a grand jury. Marshall testified that he had known Anderson, defendant, and Lowell all of his life. Also, Marshall testified that on the night of August 11, he was standing across the street from the Clintons' front yard. Marshall testified that he saw the melee begin, heard gunshots, and then saw everyone run. Marshall further testified that he saw Lowell holding a gun as he was running from the scene. The grand jury indicted Anderson, defendant, and Lowell for first degree murder.

Anderson, defendant, and Lowell were jointly tried. Anderson was represented by his own trial counsel, and defendant and Lowell were both represented by Raymond Prusak. Anderson and defendant waived their right to a jury and received a bench trial, while Lowell received a jury trial.

As indicated by opening statements and closing arguments, the State's theory of the case was that Lowell was guilty of first degree murder because Lowell shot the victim, and that Anderson and defendant were legally accountable for Lowell's acts. Baker testified that he saw Anderson punch the victim, that he saw defendant hand a gun to Lowell, and that he saw Lowell shoot the victim. The State called Marshall as a witness, but he recanted his grand jury testimony implicating Lowell. On cross-examination, Marshall testified that he implicated Lowell before the grand jury based on police promises of leniency and threats of charging him in the case if he failed to do so. Detective O'Brien and Chicago police officer Thomas Glynn, who picked up Marshall for questioning, each testified that he never threatened Marshall or offered Marshall any favors in exchange for implicating Lowell. Marshall's grand jury testimony was read into the trial record for purposes of impeachment. The gun was never recovered and no gunpowder residue tests were performed on Lowell or defendant.

The defense theory for each defendant was that the State failed to prove him guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Each defendant did not testify, or present any witnesses or other evidence. Anderson's trial counsel and Prusak each cross-examined the State's witnesses. In closing argument, Anderson's trial counsel and Prusak each attacked the credibility of the State's witnesses and described purported discrepancies in their testimony.

The jury convicted Lowell, and the trial court convicted defendant, of first degree murder. The court found that defendant handed the gun to Lowell, and therefore was legally accountable for the actions of Lowell, the shooter. 1 On October 28, 1998, at the close of a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Lowell to 45 years' imprisonment and sentenced defendant to 35 years' imprisonment.

Defendant and Lowell separately appealed from their respective convictions; the appellate court consolidated the two appeals. Each claimed inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of an alleged conflict of interest in trial counsel's joint representation of them. The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Taylor, Nos. 1-99-0074, 1-99-1982 cons., 322 Ill.App.3d 1047, 278 Ill.Dec. 323, 798 N.E.2d 425 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

B. Postconviction

On November 15, 2001, defendant filed a postconviction petition, again claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest arising out of Prusak's joint representation of defendant and Lowell. The petition alleged that “potential defense witnesses” were at the scene of the shooting and were willing to testify on defendant's behalf. The petition further alleged that Prusak did not call them because they would make his other client [Lowell] the shooter.”

Defendant attached affidavits from himself, codefendant Anderson, his parents Joyce and Alfonso Parker, Michael Woods, and Teddy Plummer. Defendant, Anderson, Woods, and Plummer averred that each knew the others; that each was at the party; and that each saw Lowell fire a gun at the victim. Defendant further averred that he did not hand a gun to Lowell. Anderson, Woods, and Plummer likewise stated that defendant did not hand a gun to Lowell and, further, that defendant was not even involved in the fight. Defendant, Woods, and Plummer further averred that each went to Prusak's office; that each gave Prusak this information; and that Prusak told them that their testimony would not be needed because it would hurt defendant's case, and that defendant “had nothing to worry about” or “had the case beat.” Joyce and Alfonso Parker each averred that they brought three persons, including Woods and Plummer, to Prusak's office to offer their testimony. According to the Parkers, Prusak “said he could not call them as witnesses because they would convict Lowell. He said [defendant] ‘had the case beat’ anyway.” The Parkers each further averred: “Each time we spoke to Mr. Prusak about witnesses he told us they were not necessary since there was no way [defendant] could be found guilty.”

The State moved to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and held an evidentiary hearing.

The following witnesses testified on behalf of defendant. Joyce Parker testified that she retained Prusak to represent both defendant and Lowell. Joyce had retained Prusak to represent defendant in a prior criminal prosecution.2 Joyce was satisfied with Prusak's performance in the prior case and trusted him. Joyce knew that Lowell was accused of shooting the victim and defendant was accused of handing the gun to Lowell.

Sometime in 1997, Joyce and her husband brought defendant, who was released from jail on bond, Plummer, Woods, Rufus Bingham, and Natavian Simms 3 to Prusak's office. After interviewing these persons, Prusak informed them that he would not call them as witnesses on defendant's behalf “because they would hurt Lowell's case.” Joyce met with Prusak several times, during which she raised the issue of a conflict of interest between defendant and Lowell. Prusak repeatedly assured Joyce and defendant that he did not need the witnesses because they had nothing on [defendant],” and that Joyce and defendant “had nothing to worry about.” Joyce was not happy with Prusak's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
141 cases
  • People v. Gacho
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 29, 2016
    ...amend. VI, XIV ; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343–44, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) ; People v. Taylor, 237 Ill.2d 356, 374, 341 Ill.Dec. 445, 930 N.E.2d 959 (2010). The right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation. People v. Herna......
  • People v. Kirkpatrick
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 17, 2012
    ...amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation.” People v. Taylor, 237 Ill.2d 356, 374, 341 Ill.Dec. 445, 930 N.E.2d 959 (2010). “Unless a defendant waives his or her right to conflict-free representation, a per se conflict of interest ......
  • People v. Fountain
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 6, 2012
    ...loyalty to his or her client is not diluted by conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations” ( People v. Taylor, 237 Ill.2d 356, 374, 341 Ill.Dec. 445, 930 N.E.2d 959 (2010)). ¶ 16 In determining whether a defendant received conflict-free representation, we first determine whether coun......
  • People v. Austin M.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • August 30, 2012
    ...Ill.2d 127 [7 Ill.Dec. 80, 364 N.E.2d 67];People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill.2d 109 .” ¶ 80 More recently, in People v. Taylor, 237 Ill.2d 356, 341 Ill.Dec. 445, 930 N.E.2d 959 (2010), we discussed the difference between per se conflicts and actual conflicts of interest. Citing People v. Herna......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT