The People Of The State Of Ill. v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 08 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1-06-2282.,1-06-2282.
• Citation: 926 N.E.2d 390,339 Ill.Dec. 158,398 Ill.App.3d 436
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Francisco RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

398 Ill.App.3d 436

926 N.E.2d 390

339 Ill.Dec. 158

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Francisco RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-06-2282.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Sixth Division.

July 24, 2009.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 2010.

Anita Alvarez, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL (James E. Fitzgerald, Noah Montague, and Agela Z. Ordway, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender of Cook County, Chicago, IL (Stephanie L. Horten and Robert Hirschhorn, Assistant Appellate Defender, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.

Justice McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Francisco Rodriguez was found guilty of driving a vehicle with a controlled substance in his urine in violation of section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2004)) and sentenced to 24 months' supervision. On appeal, defendant contends the State did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to introduce evidence that the controlled substance found in his urine was ingested unlawfully. We affirm.

Chicago Fire Department paramedic John Abramski testified that on November 21, 2005, at about 2:15 a.m., he went to North Milwaukee Avenue where a passenger truck had rolled on its side. Defendant was in the truck with his foot pinned under the brake pedal. Abramski observed that the truck keys were in the ignition but the engine was not running. He also noticed “numerous” alcohol containers in the truck.

Defendant was freed from the truck and taken by ambulance to Illinois Masonic Hospital for trauma treatment. Abramski treated defendant in the ambulance and noticed throughout his interaction with defendant that defendant's eyes were red and glassy, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady, he had uncoordinated movements, and he smelled strongly of alcohol.

Jacqueline Jackson, an emergency room nurse at Illinois Masonic Hospital, testified that when defendant arrived at the hospital, he was taken to a trauma room for a “head-to-toe” evaluation. Jackson testified that defendant smelled of alcohol. Defendant's blood was drawn and a urine specimen was taken. The toxicology results from the specimen were known within 30 to 60 minutes and were positive for metabolites of cocaine.

The court found defendant guilty of violating section 11-501(a)(6), based upon the report of cocaine metabolites in his urine. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2004). Section 11-501(a)(6) provides that a person may not drive a vehicle while “there is any amount of a drug, substance or compound in the person's * * * urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of * * * a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2004), citing 720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2004).

On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Although he is not challenging the presence of cocaine metabolites in his urine, he contends the State failed its burden of proof because his use was not shown to be unlawful. Defendant contends in order to meet this burden the State must show there was no accepted medical use for the cocaine in his urine. He bases this argument in part upon section 205 of the Controlled Substances Act, which provides:

“The Department shall issue a rule scheduling a substance in Schedule II if it finds that:

(1) the substance has high potential for abuse;

(2) the substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; and

(3) the abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychological or physiological dependence.” 720 ILCS 570/205 (West 2004).

In supplemental briefs ordered after oral arguments, defendant has further supported this argument with materials which indicate that cocaine has some medical use in the detection of Horner Syndrome, a degenerative eye disease, and that cocaine can be used as an anesthetic. He adds that, “[b]ecause cocaine's medical use is more confined, to certain surgeries and/or disease testing, it will not be prescribed in the same manner as codeine-instead, it will be administered by the treating doctor directly in his office or in the surgical theater.” Contrary to defendant's arguments, we find that the burden of proof in this case was met when the State established that defendant was in control of a vehicle and the hospital lab results from his urine sample were positive for cocaine metabolites.

Our reasoning begins with the statute at issue and the legislative intent behind it. Section 11-5 01 of the Vehicle Code prohibits driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2004). As pointed out above, section 11-501(a)(6) provides that a person may not drive a vehicle while “there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person's * * * urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of * * * a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2004), citing 720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2004). The other provisions of section 11-501(a) prohibit driving a vehicle either while having a blood or breath alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or greater, or while “under the influence” of drugs, alcohol, intoxicating compounds, or a combination thereof. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) to (a)(6) (West 2004). Accordingly, section 11-501(a)(6) is “one of a set of traffic regulations * * * intended to protect the public against motorists who drive under the influence of substances that may impair safe driving.” People v. Gassman, 251 Ill.App.3d 681, 690, 190 Ill.Dec. 815, 622 N.E.2d 845 (1993).

The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Fate, 159 Ill.2d 267, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549 (1994), upheld the constitutionality of section 11-501(a)(6) (then codified as section 11-501(a)(5)), finding that it properly created a per se offense without any element of impairment. Fate, 159 Ill.2d at 269, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549. The court acknowledged:

“At the lowest levels of drug ingestion, no one is impaired. At the highest levels, all are impaired. In the vast middle range, however, the tolerance for drugs varies from person to person and from drug to drug. In this range, depending on the drug and depending on the person, some will be impaired and some will not be impaired at all. The same is also true for alcohol, itself a drug.” Fate, 159 Ill.2d at 269-70, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549.

Therefore, an absolute “prohibition against driving with any amount of a controlled substance in one's system was considered necessary because ‘there is no standard that one can come up with by which, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, one can determine whether one is driving under the influence.’ ” Fate, 159 Ill.2d at 270, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549, quoting 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 25, 1989, at 23 (statement of Senator Barkhausen).

The Fate court noted that it had previously “adopted the legal fiction of ‘presumed impairment’ for persons driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.10 or above * * * in spite of the fact that certain people can operate a motor vehicle without noticeable impairment at and above that level of alcohol in their systems.” Fate, 159 Ill.2d at 270, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549, citing People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill.2d 38, 74 Ill.Dec. 40, 455 N.E.2d 70 (1983). The supreme court concluded that this “rationale * * * applies with equal force to the case at hand.” Fate, 159 Ill.2d at 270, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549.

Courts in other jurisdictions reviewing legislation similar to section 11-501(a)(6) have also noted that, while it is possible to determine the amount of alcohol that causes impairment, there is no agreement as to the quantity of a controlled substance needed to cause impairment. State v. Gardner, 2006 WI.App. 92, ¶ 20, 292 Wis.2d 682, 715 N.W.2d 720; State v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 2005); Bennett v. State, 801 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind.App.2003); State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706 (App.1994).

In Comried, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a statute similar to section 11-501(a)(6). Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 774. The Comried court stated that a statute prohibiting drivers from “operating motor vehicles with controlled substances in their bodies, whether or not they are under the influence” was proper, finding that the Iowa “legislature could reasonably have imposed such a ban because the effects of drugs, as contrasted to the effects of alcohol, can vary greatly among those who use them.” Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 776. Comried also discussed favorably a decision of Iowa's appellate court affirming a license revocation “ based on driving with controlled substances in the body.” Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 776, citing Loder v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 622 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa Ct.App.2000). That case noted the difficulty in relating the amount of drugs in the body to driving impairment:

“ ‘Unlike the blood alcohol concentration test used to measure alcohol impairment there is no similar test to measure marijuana impairment. There is, though, as was used here, a test to measure the use of marijuana, a drug illegal in the State of Iowa, in a person's body. There being no reliable indicator of impairment, the legislature could rationally decide that the public is best protected by prohibiting one from driving who has a measurable amount of marijuana metabolites.’ ” Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 776, quoting Loder, 622 N.W.2d at 516.

In Phillips, the Arizona Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to legislation similar to section 11-501(b)(6) and found that the statute created an unqualified ban on driving with any proscribed substance in the body. Phillips, 178 Ariz. at 371, 873 P.2d at 709. In finding the prohibition...