The People v. Moore

Decision Date01 January 1873
Citation1 Idaho 504
PartiesThe People, Plaintiffs, In Error, v. C. W. Moore, Defendant In Error.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

NATIONAL BANK ACT - STATE - TERRITORY. - The word "state," wherever used by Congress in the currency act of 1864, or in the amendments thereto, should be construed to mean "territory" as well, wherever the same is applicable.

NATIONAL BANK SHARES-TAXATION.-When Congress enacted the currency act of 1864, it intended to permit the shares in national banks in the hands of individuals, or corporations, to be taxed wherever such associations might be organized, whether in states or territories.

IDEM.-Congress did not intend, by the first proviso of the forty-first section of the national currency act of 1864, to require uniform taxation in all the different municipalities of a state or territory, but only that the same should be uniform in the municipality or subdivision in which the bank is located, or in which the shareholder resides.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY-TAXATION.-Congress has sufficiently authorized the legislature of this territory to pass a law requiring the taxation of national bank shares in the hands of individuals or corporations.

CONSTRUCTION-PLACE OF TAXATION.-The limitation as to the place of taxation of bank shares, contained in the national currency act of 1864 and in the act of 1868, amendatory thereof, requiring the assessment to be made "at the place where the bank is located, and not elsewhere," must be construed to mean the state within which the bank is located.

REVENUE LAW-TAXATION-BANK SHARES.-The revenue law in force in 1871 did not authorize the assessment or taxation of shares of national bank stock in the hands of individuals or corporations.

ERROR to the District Court of the Second Judicial District of Ada County, to review a judgment rendered against the plaintiffs upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground that said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

F. E. Ensign and A. Heed, for the Plaintiffs in Error.

Has the territory a right to levy taxes upon the shares of stock of national banks owned and held within its limits? Such shares are personal property belonging to the individual. (People v. The Commissioners, 4 Wall. 256.) The shares of stock are taxable, not the capital. (Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 468.) Without any

special grant of power the states or territories have a right to tax all property within their jurisdiction belonging to the citizens. (Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co., 1 Dill. C. C. 314, Fed. Cas. No. 14,378; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 423; Thomson v. Pacific R. R. Co., 9 Wall. 587; McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 437.) The statute of the territory is in strict conformity to the act of Congress. (Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 470.) Under our statute all property, whether real or personal, is taxed at a uniform rate. (Providence Institution for Savings v. Boston, 101 Mass. 575, 3 Am. Rep. 407.) A party cannot complain of his assessment, if his property is taxable, on the grounds that others are not assessed, or that their property is exempt. (Muscatine v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill. C. C. 539, Fed. Cas. No. 9971; Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 470.) R. Z. Johnson, for the Defendant in Error.

The judgment of the court below should be affirmed, for that: 1. A territory has no authority to impose taxation upon national bank shares.

And, first, these banks are, as constitutional agencies of the federal government, exempt from such taxation. (Pittsburg v. First National Bank, 55 Pa. St. 48; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 589; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 548; McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 429; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Bl. 634; Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 863; Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; 12 Stats. at Large, p. 710, sec. 1; 13 Id., p. 425, sec. 2; 12 Id., p. 346, sec. 2; Id., p. 546; 13 Id., p. 218, sec. 1; Id., p. 306, sec. 18; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Bl. 628; Bank Tax Cases, 2 Wall. 200; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 448; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 48; Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 447; Currency Act of June 3, 1864.) If the territories may impose this tax it must be by virtue of an express grant of the power from Congress. (City of Pittsburg v. First National Bank, 55 Pa. St. 50; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 595; National State Bank of Oskaloosa v. Young, 25 Iowa, 313.) The provisos of the forty-first section of the national bank act are not a grant of any power to tax these national bank shares. First office

of proviso. (United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 165; Minds v. United States. 15 Pet. 445; Voorhees v. Bank of United States, 10 Pet. 471; Sedgwick on Stat. & Con. Law, 62, note; Rice v. Keokuk, 15 Iowa, 583; Matter v. Webb, 24 How. Pr. 247.)

And second, Congress cannot confer the right of taxation upon the states of the Union. (McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 425; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 198; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 448; Dobbins v. Com. of Erie County, 16 Pet. 447; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. S.) 82; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 77; The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 123; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 428; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 585; State v. First Nat. Bk., 4 Nev. 355; Benner v. Porter, 9 How. (U. S.) 242. The provisos of the forty-first section are to be strictly construed, and they do not extend to the territories. (1 Kent's Com. 385; United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 165; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 587; Nat. Bk. Act, secs. 6, 9, 30, 40, etc., throughout the act; Allen v. Pegram, 16 Iowa, 167; 4 Whart. 422; Ang. & Ames on Corp., sec. 15; Bouv. Law Dict., title Municipal Corporations; Queen v. Com. of Poor Laws, 6 Ad. & El. 68; Smith's Com. Stat. Law, sec. 489; Brown's Lessee v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 198; Amendments of Bk. Act, 1; Act March 3, 1865; 13 Stat. 498; Act February 10, 1868; Act July 12, 1870; 1 Kent Com. 348; Hepburn v. Elbz'y, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91; Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 287; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. (U. S.) 377; Messenger v. Mason, 10 Wall. 507.)

2. The legislature of this territory had not attempted, at the time of this assessment, to exercise this authority; and the imposition of the taxes in question here was not authorized by law. (County Treasurer v. Webb, 11 Minn. 503; Ang. & Ames on Corp., sec. 458, 560, 561; 23 Iowa, 149, 450; Bradley v. People, 4 Wall. 459; Hubbard v. Supervisors, 23 Iowa, 147; People v. Assessors of Boston, 44 Barb. 148, 158; National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 359; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 581.)

NOGGLE, C. J.,

delivered the opinion.

WHITSON and HOLLISTER, JJ., concurred.

This action is brought by the district attorney against the defendant, to collect taxes on personal property. The defendant appeared and filed a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint; that demurrer was sustained by the district court; from that decision, sustaining the defendant's demurrer, the plaintiff has appealed to this court. The proceedings in this court seem to be for the purpose of determining the question, whether the shares of stock in the National Bank, in the hands of the defendant were properly assessed in 1871; whether such assessment was authorized by the laws of Congress and of this territory. The court will dispose of the three questions argued:

1. Does the law of Congress, known as the national currency act of 1864, and its amendments, give the power of taxation to the territories? or has Congress by any law prior to the date of the assessment in 1871, extended to Idaho territory the power of taxation? By section 6 of the organic act for this territory it is among other things provided: "That the legislative power of the territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the constitution of the United States and with the provisions of this act; but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States, nor shall the lands or other property of nonresidents be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents." This law of Congress was in force, and this territory had been organized and was in operation, long before the currency law was enacted by Congress. It was then a territory, possessing the inherent power of taxation, a government that could only be sustained by taxation.

We must therefore conclude that when Congress used the word state, in the currency act of 1864, or in the amendments thereto, they also meant territory wherever that term is applicable. This conclusion is arrived at after a careful review of the authorities quoted by the counsel on both sides of the case; from the case of McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 429, to Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 428. From all these authorities, as well as from the very interesting arguments of counsel on both sides, we feel confident that when Congress en-

acted the currency law of 1864, it intended to permit the shares in these national associations in the hands of individuals or corporations to be taxed, wherever such associations might be organized, whether in states or territories.

We will next dispose of the last point, and will consider the second point last.

The last point argued is by far the least important point in the case, and the court is now unanimous in the opinion that Congress did not intend that taxation should be uniform in all the different municipalities of states or territories that all that is meant in the first proviso of the forty-first section of the national currency act of 1864, by requiring that the shares in these national associations might be taxed where such bank is located, and not...

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