The People v. The Owyhee Mining Co

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 1 Idaho 409
• Parties: The People, Respondents, v. The Owyhee Mining Company, Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 409

The People, Respondents, v. The Owyhee Mining Company, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1871

ASSESSMENT - TAXATION - POSSESSORY TITLE - IMPROVEMENTS - PUBLIC LAND.-It is proper to list and assess a millsite and the immovable improvements upon public land, as real estate; but movable property situated thereon, such as blacksmith-shop retort house, barn, carpenter shop, and the like must be listed, assessed, and taxed as personal property.

IMPROVEMENTS-DEFINITION.-By the term "improvements" on public lands, as used in the revenue law, is meant the buildings and improvements belonging to the possessory claimant, such as miner's buildings, quartzmills, sawmills, out-buildings, fences, etc.

ASSESSMENT-TAXATION.-The four classes of property mentioned in the revenue law as subject to taxation, are to be listed, set down, and valued separately in the assessment-roll.

ESTOPPEL-TAXATION-ASSESSMENT.-The owner of property subject to taxation is not estopped from disputing the correctness of the descriptions of property listed and given in by him under oath to the assessor.

ASSESSOR.-The assessor is not bound by the valuation placed upon real or personal property by the owner thereof. The assessor is responsible for the correctness of descriptions of property assessed by him.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.-In construing statutes, words are to be understood in their general signification; and when any doubt arises, although the doubt attaches only to a particular clause, the whole act is to be taken and examined together in order to arrive at the true legislative intent.

PUBLIC LANDS-TAXATION.-No law of the territory can authorize the sale of the lands of the United States for taxes; such a sale would be void.

ASSESSMENT.-In order to be valid, an assessment of property for taxation must substantially conform to the requirements of the revenue law in respect to the classification of the property. If it does not so conform it is void.

APPEAL from the Third Judicial District, Owyhee County.

H. L Preston and F. E. Ensign, for the Appellants. L. P. Higbee and J. W. Huston, for the Respondents.

NOGGLE C. J.,

delivered the opinion.

WHITSON, J., concurred. LEWIS, J., dissented.

This is an appeal from the district court for Owyhee county from the order of that court refusing a new trial. Judgment was rendered on the twenty-fifth day of November, 1869, against the defendants, for the sum of three thousand four hundred and thirty-seven dollars and ninety-one cents ($3,437.91) for taxes, and for eight hundred and sixty-four dollars and thirty-one cents costs of action. A motion was made for a new trial, which motion appears to have been filed January 30, 1870, and about that time overruled by the court. This case is now before the court upon appeal from the order refusing to grant a new trial. Several questions have been urged in favor of the judgment for taxes in the case, and also against the same. We have decided that the order refusing a new trial must be reversed for error in assessment hereinafter set forth, and for the following reasons: We do not find that the land on which the quartz-mill and other erections are is taxed, but the facts fatal to this case are that "a millsite situated on the east side of Jordan creek, about half a mile below Silver City in Owyhee county, Idaho territory, and known as East Ruby, together with a twenty-stamp quartz-mill and appurtenances, a blacksmith-shop, barn, retort-house, carpenter-shop, laboratory, warehouse, boarding-house, office, and other improvements thereon, and known as the Owyhee company's mill property, valued altogether at ninety thousand dollars."

In this case the millsite, buildings, and erections thereon, are all listed together under the head of real estate, and no

words were used to limit the interest in the lands intended to be taxed to a claim, or possessory interest, but the term used was "a millsite" situated, etc., together with a twenty-stamp quartz-mill and appurtenances, blacksmith-shop, barn, etc. It is unnecessary to claim that the quartz-mill and other buildings are not sufficiently described; but the description of the land does not conform in any particular to the description required under the third subdivision of the eighteenth section of the revenue act of 1869. The manner of listing the real estate should at least comply with the requirements of the fourth subdivision of said section 18, viz., "the cash value of real estate and the improvements thereon."

The land, mill, and other buildings are listed and valued in one estimate in gross. The millsite is agreed by both parties to be a possessory interest in public lands upon which there is erected for the owners' convenience the following personal property, viz.: A quartz-mill, blacksmith-shop, barn, retort-house, carpenter-shop, laboratory, warehouse, office, boarding-house, and other improvements. It is proper to list and value the millsite or land, and the immovable improvements thereon as real estate; but the quartz-mill, blacksmith-shop, retort-house, barn, carpenter-shop, laboratory, warehouse, office, boarding-house, and other erections, etc., being movable property, must be listed, valued, and assessed under the last part of section 5 of said revenue act as personal property.

By section 4 of the revenue act taxable property is divided into two general classes: 1. Real property, which simply means real estate. 2. Personal property. The term "real property" includes lands, and immovable improvements thereon, and the term "personal property" shall include all property except real property. By section 5 of said act, real estate, or real property, is declared to mean: 1. The ownership of any land. 2. Any possessory claim or interest in land, public or private, where the title, meaning the fee, is not in the possessory claimant, and the same revenue law provides that possessory claims shall be listed to the claimant under the head of "real estate," while personal property in section 5, aforesaid, is defined to

be all houses, buildings, fences, structures, erections, or other improvements built or erected on any lands, whether such lands be private property, or the property of the territory, or of the United States, etc. It is claimed by the plaintiffs, that these sections of the revenue act are inconsistent. That section 4 defines real estate to be lands and immovable property thereon, while section 5 makes buildings, fences, etc., on land (both private and public) personal property, because fences and buildings are claimed by the plaintiffs to be immovable property, a part of the realty. If these two sections can be harmoniously construed so that the validity of both shall be sustained, and so that both may stand in force, then the plaintiffs' position is not sound, and the admitted errors are fatal to the case.

Evidently, the ownership of land shall include all real estate, in its common-law signification, where the fee belongs to the person in possession, and the personal improvements belong to the owner of the fee. This is real estate in its highest sense. Lands, tenements, and hereditaments, are included under the general term, land. By including all leasehold estates, and all possessory claims and actual possession of public lands as the second class of realty, to be listed and taxed as such, then all improvements not immovable, such as buildings, fences, etc., put upon public lands, and all buildings, etc., put by the lessee upon his landlord's estate, which, by the tenure of the lease, are not to belong to the landlord, are, in contemplation of the revenue act, subject to be removed off, and do, in fact, belong to the tenant; and of this character of property are buildings, fences, etc., on public lands of the United States; and all such property is to be listed as personal property to the owner of the buildings, etc., and not to the owner of the fee; and this is upon the ground, that no permanent fixture can attach to a mere possessory interest in land. Hence, this rule must be particularly followed in regard to public lands, where the fee is in the United States.

If A is the owner of land in fee, and B has a leasehold estate in the land for any term, great or small, and has a shop

or any other building, or fence, erected thereon by him, and which belong to him, the land in fee, with the immovable fixtures belonging to the fee, must be listed to the owner of the fee A, as realty; the leasehold estate of B must be listed to him as realty, and the shop, buildings, or other improvements of B, which belong to him, must be listed to him as personal property; and where a party holds a possessory interest, or claim, upon lands belonging to the United States, that interest must be listed to him as real property, particularly showing whether it be a possessory claim, leasehold estate, or whatever it may be; but his buildings and improvements on such claim must be listed to him as personal property, with a description of the property. This construction is in harmony with the provisions of section 18 aforesaid, which provides that the assessment-roll shall contain "a list of all real estate, improvements on...