The People v. Walter

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 1 Idaho 386
• Parties: The People, Respondents, v. Peter F. Walter, Apellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 386

The People, Respondents, v. Peter F. Walter, Apellant.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1871

CONTINUANCE-DISCRETION.-An application for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the court; and courts of review will refuse to disturb a ruling on such question, unless it appears that such discretion was abused, and the ruling arbitrary.

INSTRUCTIONS-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.-The proper mode of bringing before the appellate court, for review, the instructions given by the court on its own motion is, by embodying them in a bill of exceptions.

INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF.-If the defendant relies upon insanity to procure acquittal, he assumes the burden of proof as to that matter. He makes insanity an affirmative issue on his part; hence, to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, the defendant must, by a preponderance of evidence, show to the jury, that at the time of the commission of the act he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong, in respect to the act with which he is charged.

HOMICIDE-MURDER.-Every homicide, unexplained, is murder; but it is the province of the jury to determine, from the evidence and circumstances before them, whether the crime be murder in the first or second degree.

IDEM.-If the defendant admitted the killing, in this case, he admitted that he was guilty of murder, if he was not insane; and it should have been submitted to the jury, under proper instructions, to say, from the evidence, whether the crime was murder in the first or second degree.

APPEAL from the First Judicial District, Nez Perce County.

LEWIS J.,

delivered the opinion.

WHITSON J., concurred. NOGGLE, C. J., dissented.

On the sixth day of October, 1870, the grand jury of Nez Perce county presented a true bill of indictment against the defendant, charging that the defendant on the fifteenth day of September, 1870, at Nez Perce county, feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, etc., upon one Joseph Yotes, and him, the said Joseph Yotes, did feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder. On the 7th of October the defendant was arraigned, and on the 10th pleaded "not guilty." The cause was set for trial on the 13th of October, at 10 o'clock. On the 13th of October the defendant filed motion for a change of venue, which was overruled, to which defendant excepted. Defendant also filed his motion for continuance, which was denied, defendant excepting. The case was thereupon tried before the court and a jury, and after argument of counsel "the court" charged the jury as to the law, the counsel for the defendant excepting thereto.

Whereupon the jury, after consideration, returned a notice as follows: "The People of the United States in the Territory of Idaho v. Peter F. Walter.

"Indictment for murder in the first degree.

"We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, as charged in the indictment.

"LEVI ANKNEY,

"Foreman."

On the 19th of October, sentence and judgment of the court was pronounced, that defendant be executed on the ninth day of December, 1870. Upon the 14th of November, 1870, defendant gave notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence of the court.

Sundry errors have been assigned by defendant, to wit:

1. The court erred in refusing to grant a continuance; 2. The court erred in denying defendant's motion for a change of venue; 3. The court erred in refusing to admit certain testimony; 4. The court erred in charging the jury that the court was relieved from the necessity of defining the degrees of murder, etc.; 5. The court erred in charging the jury as to the law of evidence of insanity; 6. The court erred in charging the jury that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, or he is not guilty.

The first error assigned is that the court erred in refusing to sustain the motion for a continuance. An application for continuance is one addressed to the discretion of the court, and courts of review have uniformly refused to disturb a ruling on such questions unless it be shown that the discretion was abused and the ruling arbitrary. (Herron v. Jury, 1 Idaho, 164.) It is not apparent from the record that such discretion was abused, and the court committed no error in denying such motion. As to motion to change venue and ruling on the evidence brought here upon bill of exceptions, there was no error which could work to defendant's injury.

An important question as to practice has been raised in the argument of the case, and presented for our determination.

The instructions of the court are not signed by the judge. The certificate of the clerk is attached identifying the instructions copied in the transcript as a full and correct copy of the original instructions and charge of the court on file.

The minutes of the trial show that the defendant excepted to the instructions given by the court to the jury. On this condition of the record are the instructions properly before us. It is provided by section 420, Crim. Prac., that defendant may

except to a decision of the court in instructing the jury as to the law of the case.

Sec. 422. A bill containing the exceptions must be signed by the judge and filed by the clerk. Sec. 425. When any written charge has been presented and given or refused, the questions presented in such charge need not be excepted to, or embodied in a bill of exceptions, but the charge with the action of the court thereon indorsed shall form a part of the record. Section 449 declares what shall constitute the record; the sixth is the bill of exceptions; and seventh, the written charges asked of the court. A majority of the court are of opinion that the proper mode to bring before this court for review the instructions of the court given on its own motion, is by embodying them in a bill of exceptions; but this case involves the life of an individual, and the rule of practice has not been established. I do not think it justifiable to enforce this rule for the first time in the case at bar.

Therefore, for the purpose of this case, as the instructions of the court below are before us in the transcript, I think we should examine them as a part of the record of the case.

The instructions given by the court upon its own motion, so far as material to the consideration of the errors assigned, are as follows:

"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned. Express malice is that deliberate intention, unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow-creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Malice, in its legal sense, is a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. Ordinarily provocation is set up as a defense; or justification is in some way claimed in behalf of the defendants; and in such cases, where any such defense is interposed, it becomes neces-

sary for the court to give the law to the jury defining the different degrees of murder and manslaughter; this case, however, is a different one. The court is relieved from that duty, because the defendant and his counsel in this case admit the killing without legal cause or provocation, as charged, but insist that they have proved insanity, etc., at the time.

"In entering upon the investigation of this defense, however, the jury should remember that the defendant, having admitted the killing as charged, and setting up insanity, the burden of proving this defense to the satisfaction of the jury is upon the defendant; because the law presumes that every man is sane, and possesses a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crime. Until the contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the jury, and that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong, in respect to the very act with which he is charged.

"In this case, you have a case submitted to you which, for the purpose of this trial, the charges in the indictment against the defendant, upon the trial, and in the argument of counsel for defendant, are admitted to have taken place as charged. The defendant, not controverting the proof, insists, however that at the time the defendant did the act charged he was insane, and not responsible for what he did; they offer no proof to the contrary. This is really the only question submitted to the jury, the question of insanity, and that to establish a defense on the grounds of insanity it must be clearly proved by a...