The Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, Appellants v. the Philadelphia and Havre De Grace Steam Towboat Company

Citation64 U.S. 209,23 How. 209,16 L.Ed. 433
PartiesTHE PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON, AND BALTIMORE RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANTS, v. THE PHILADELPHIA AND HAVRE DE GRACE STEAM TOWBOAT COMPANY
Decision Date01 December 1859
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland, sitting in admiralty.

It was a libel filed by one corporation against another corporation in the District Court of Maryland, under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the court. The District Court decreed in favor of the libellants, the appellees, and awarded damages to the amount of $7,000.36. The Circuit Court, on appeal, affirmed the decree, and the railroad company appealed to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Schley and Mr. Donaldson for the appellants, and by Mr. Dobbin for the appellees.

The counsel for the appellants made the following points:-

1. That the District Court of the United States has no jurisdiction in a case like the present.

The cases show that 'marine torts,' over which courts of admiralty have jurisdiction, are trespasses done and committed on navigable waters, as in the case of a collision between two vessels; and a main ground on which such cases have been put is the power in rem possessed by those courts, but not by courts of common law.

The placing and leaving the pile in the bed of the Susquehanna, and within the body of a county, was a nuisance at common law, and the appellee's remedy was in the State courts, in an action on the case for particular damage caused by that nuisance. Indeed, the ordinary rules of an admiralty court in apportioning damages could not be made applicable to such a case.

The question is not one of mere locality. The subject matter itself is not within the admiralty jurisdiction; and it is believed that none of the decisions of this court have gone to an extent which would include it.

Conkling, 21, 24.

Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn., 9, 10.

Cutler v. Rae, 7 How., 737.

Schooner Tilton, 5 Mason, 465.

Waring v. Clark, 5 How., 467.

Angell on Tide Waters, 113.

Hancock v. York N. and B. R. W. Co., 70 E. C. L. Rep., 347.

Abbott on Shipping, 233.

9 Stat. at Large, 1851.

2. That the appellees could not recover in this case, because they were engaged in an unlawful act at the time when the accident occurred, which caused the injury complained of. The steamer Superior left her wharf at Havre de Grace, with a fleet of canal boats, on Sunday, the 11th May, 1856, and while engaged in towing the boats down the Susquehanna on that day, struck the pile which disabled her.

It is the law of Maryland, that no person whatever shall work or do any bodily labor, or willingly suffer any of his servants to do any manner of work or labor, on the Lord's day, works of necessity and charity excepted; and a penalty is prescribed for the breach of the law.

There is nothing in this provision inconsistent with any of the laws of the United States regulating commerce, and the Federal courts would therefore take notice of and conform to the law of the State.

Act of Assembly of Md., 1723, c. 16, sec. 10.

Bank of U. S. v. Owens, 2 Pet., 527.

Bosworth v. Inhabitants of Swansea, 10 Metc., 363.

Robeson v. French, 12 Metc., 24.

Phillips v. Innes, 4 Clark and Fin., 234.

Smith on Contracts, 171.

3. That even if the appellees could in the present case recover in admiralty against any party, they still had no cause of action against the appellants; the act of negligence which caused the injury not having been the act of the appellants or of its servants.

The evidence shows that the Superior struck upon a sight-pile driven by the servants of Messrs. Goss, Cooke, & Co., who had contracted for a stipulated compensation to build the piles of the bridge across the Susquehanna.

By the second sentence of the 9th section of that contract, the contractors were 'to furnish (and remove when done with) all scaffolding and piles that may be used while building;' which terms, according to the testimony of engineers and experts, included the sight-piles, which were necessary to the proper construction of the bridge. It was the duty of the contractors to remove these sight-piles when done with; and the act of the contractors, or of their servants, in sawing off those piles below the surface, and leaving them so as to obstruct the navigation, was in no sense the act of the appellant.

There is nothing to show that the appellant ever had knowledge of the fact that these piles were sawed off, instead of being removed, as the contract required; and the termination of the contract could not make the appellants liable for the consequences of a previous wrongful act of the contractors, the appellants not consenting either to making or continuing the nuisance.

Allen v. Hayward, 53 E. C. L., 974.

Reedie v. London and N. W. R. W. Co., 4 W., H., and G., 244, 245.

Knight v. Fox, 5 Exch., 721.

Steel v. S. E. R. W. Co., 32 E. C. L., 366.

Overton v. Freeman, 73 E. L. and E. Rep., 866.

Peachey v. Rowland, 13 C. B., 182, (76 E. C. L. Rep.)

Blake v. Ferris, 1 Seld., 48.

Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray, 354.

Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. and W., 710.

Milligan v. Wedge, 40 E. C. L., 177.

Burgess v. Gray, 1 C. B., 578, (1 Man., Grang., and Scott.)

4. That the sinking of the Superior after striking upon the sight-pile was owing to the mismanagement of her captain, and the appellees cannot be entitled to recover the damages consequent upon her sinking, for the cost of raising her, or the loss of time while she was under water.

The testimony of a number of steamboat captains, and of persons well acquainted with the river near Havre de Grace, shows that the true course for the captain to have pursued, after the vessel struck, was to run her upon the flats indicated on the illustrative map by the letters C, B, D; and that if he had done so, she would not have sunk.

Even if there was no error in returning to the wharf, the evidence shows great want of care in the omission properly to secure the vessel to the wharf, and in other particulars.

5. That the amount of the decree is greater than the actual loss which naturally or necessarily resulted from the injury; and greater, indeed, than the total value of the injured boat.

Mr. Dobbin, for the appellees, made the following points:

1. That the steamer 'Superior,' the subject of the injury, being, at the time of the wrong committed, a licensed vessel, sailing in her lawful business, on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide, a court of admiralty has jurisdiction to redress any trespass upon her, notwithstanding an action at law might have been maintained for the same injury.

3 Story on Con., 530.

2 Brown's Civil and Ad. Law, 110, 203.

Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumner, 9.

The Ruckers, 4 Rob. Ad. R., 73.

Steele v. Thatcher, Ware's Rep., 98.

Thackery v. the Farmer, Gilp. R., 529.

Waring v. Clark, 5 How., 464.

New Jersey S. B. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How., 431, 432.

Manro v. Almieda, 10 Wheat., 473.

Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mason, 383.

Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242.

Bees Ad. R., 369.

Angell on T. W., 119.

The Volant, 1 W. Robinson, 387.

Zouch, 117, 122.

Com. Dig. 'Admiralty' E., 13.

Sir Leoline Jenkins, 2 Brown's C. and Ad. L., 475.

De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall., 437.

Judge Winchester, 1 Pet. Ad. Dec., 234.

2. That the act of Assembly of Maryland did not contemplate a restraint on the sailing of vessels engaged in foreign commerce, or in the coasting trade, and that, if it did, such restraint is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that the 'Superior,' being a vessel duly enrolled and licensed, in the district of Philadelphia, for the coasting trade, had a right to pursue such trade without any restraint thereon by the laws of the State of Maryland, in respect to the time within which such coasting trade might be prosecuted.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 240.

Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat., 448.

Brown v. Jones, 2 Gall., 477.

Willard v. Dorr, 3 Mason, 93.

3. That the railroad company, and not the contractors under them, are responsible for the injury:-

First—because the whole work was done under the direction and superintendence of the company, the contractors undertaking to do only as directed by the company's engineers; and there being no proof that the contractors violated their instructions, the presumption is that all that was done was by order of the company's superintendent.

Second—because the pile upon which the steamer ran was not such an one as is contemplated by the contract, where it speaks of 'scaffolding and piles that may be used while building,' the proof being that this was one of a group erected away from the line of the bridge, for the exclusive use of the company's engineers employed in performing the duty of superintendence, which the company had reserved to itself.

Third—because, at the time of the accident, the company had discharged the contractors, and taken possession of all that was built of the bridge, in its then unfinished condition; and they are responsible for any damage which might arise from their leaving the work in a position to inflict injury upon vessels navigating the Susquehanna.

4. That the captain of the steamer exercised the utmost prudence, skill, and judgment, after the accident, as the record abundantly shows; but even if this were less apparent as a question of fact, it having undergone full examination in the District Court, and in the Circuit Court on appeal, this court will not disturb the decree, unless in a clear case of mistake.

Walsh v. Rogers, 13 How., 284.

5. That the sum decreed against the appellant is less than the proof shows to have resulted from the injury.

Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How., 110.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

A brief statement of the facts of this case will be sufficient to show the relevancy of the questions to be decided.

The appellants were authorized by a statute of Maryland to construct a railway bridge over the...

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