The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati And St. Louis Railway Co. v. Adams
Decision Date | 10 February 1886 |
Docket Number | 11,378 |
Parties | The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company v. Adams |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Miami Circuit Court.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded with instructions to the court to sustain appellant's motion for a venire de novo, and his motion for a rule upon appellee to make his complaint more certain and specific.
N. O Ross, for appellant.
J. L Farrar, J. Farrar, W. C. Farrar, A. C. Harris and W. H Calkins, for appellee.
Appellee brought this action to recover damages resulting from a personal injury received upon appellant's road. The following, partly a summary, and partly a copy, is as much of the complaint as needs to be set out, viz.:
In 1881, appellee, then under twenty-one years of age, was in the employ of appellant as a section hand, and in no other or different capacity. While thus employed, he was "ordered by Patrick Clary, a person standing towards plaintiff in the relation of superior in the employ of defendant," to get upon and go with a construction train, and perform such service as might be required of him. The construction train was sent out for the purpose of gathering up iron along the track. "In obedience to said order, though totally unacquainted with the business of coupling cars, braking, or the general method or order of running trains, * * except as a section hand," appellee went upon the train. There were not upon the train the usual and necessary number of brakemen to manage and control it. While upon the train, appellee was "ordered by said Patrick Clary, his superior in authority in defendant's employ as aforesaid, to act as brakeman at the rear end of the train, a business for which he was not hired, and of and about which he knew nothing." He obeyed the order, and while so acting as brakeman it became necessary to couple other cars to the rear end of the train. Being at the rear end of the train, and after it was upon a side-track to let other trains pass, he etc.
The foregoing statement is an abbreviation of the second paragraph of the complaint. The first paragraph is substantially the same, except that the coupling is alleged to have been a duty resulting from the position of brakeman, and there is no averment that appellee received specific orders from any one to make the coupling.
Appellant moved for a rule upon appellee to make his complaint more specific and certain, so as to show the position in its service, and the relation to it and to appellee, occupied by Clary and Courtney, the persons alleged to have given the orders to appellee. We shall see during the course of this opinion that this motion should have been sustained.
It is assigned as error that the court below erred in overruling appellant's demurrer to the complaint.
The contention on the part of appellant's counsel, amongst other things, is, that it is not alleged that appellant knew, or with reasonable care might have known, of the unsafe condition of the rail, and that it is not alleged that appellee did not know, or with reasonable care might not have known, that the rail was in an unsafe condition. Upon the hypothesis that the gravamen of the action is alone the negligence of appellant in connection with the rail, and that to constitute negligence in that regard it is essential that appellant knew, or with reasonable care might have known, of its unsafe condition, still, the general averment that appellant negligently left the sliver or splint projecting from the rail, is sufficient under many decisions of this court. Cleveland, etc., R. W. Co. v. Wynant, 100 Ind. 160, and cases there cited. And so, too, in relation to the general averment that appellee was without fault or negligence.
Whether or not these former rulings are in entire consonance with the provisions of the code upon the subject of pleading we need not now inquire. They have been so long adhered to as to become the settled law of the State.
The jury returned the following special verdict, upon which judgment for $ 7,000 was rendered against appellant and in favor of appellee, viz.:
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