The President, Directors Company of the Bank of the United States Dandridge

Citation12 Wheat. 64,6 L.Ed. 552,25 U.S. 64
PartiesTHE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS and COMPANY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, against DANDRIDGE and Others
Decision Date28 February 1827
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Courts.

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia. The original action was debt on a bond, purporting to be signed by Dandridge, as principal, and Carter B. Page, Wilson Allen, James Brown, Jr., Thomas Taylor, Harry Heth, and Andrew Stevenson, as his sureties, and was brought jointly against all the parties. The condition of the bond, after reciting that Dandridge had been appointed cashier of the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States of Richmond, Virginia, was, that if he should well, and truly, and faithfully discharge the duties and trust reposed in him as cashier of the said office, then the obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. The declaration set forth the condition, and assigned various breaches. Dandridge made no defence; and the suit was abated as to Heth by his death. The other defendants severed in their pleas. It is not thought necessary to state the pleadings at large; it is sufficient to state, that Stevenson and Allen pleaded, among other pleas, non est factum generally, and also special pleas of non est factum, on which issues were joined; and that all the defendants in various forms pleaded, that the instrument was not the deed of Stevenson; and further pleaded, that the bond had never been approved, according to the provisions of the 30th article of the rules and regulations of the bank. Issues were also taken on these pleas; and the cause came on for trial upon all the issues of fact.

At the trial, evidence was offered for the purpose of establishing the due execution of the bond by the defendants, and particularly by Stevenson and Allen, and its approval by the plaintiffs. The evidence was objected to on behalf of the defendants, as not sufficient to be left to the jury, to infer a delivery of the bond, and the acceptance and approval thereof by the directors of the bank, according to the provisions of their charter; and the objection was sustained, the Court being of opinion, that although the scroll affixed by Allen to his name, is in Virginia equivalent to a seal of wax, and although proof of the handwriting of Stevenson, and the bond being in possession of the plaintiffs, and put in suit by them, and the introduction of Dandridge into the office of cashier, and his continuing to act in that office, would, in general, be prima facie evidence, to be submitted to the jury, as proof that the bond was fully executed and accepted; yet it was not evidence of that fact, or of the obligation of the bond in this case; because, under the act of Congress, incorporating the Bank of the United States, the bond ought to be satisfactory to the board of directors, before the cashier can legally enter on the duties of his office, and consequently before his sureties can be responsible for his non-performance of those duties; and that the evidence in this case did not prove such acceptance and approbation of the bond, as is required by law for its completion. This opinion constitutes the subject matter of the first bill of exceptions.

Farther evidence was then offered by the plaintiffs for the same purpose, the particulars of which are not now necessary to be enumerated; to which the defendants took various objections, and contended, among other things, that the whole of the evidence, if legal, was not sufficient to go to the jury, upon which to infer the delivery of the paper as the act and deed of the defendants, and its acceptance and approbation by the directors of the bank, pursuant to their charter; which objection was sustained; and the Court excluded the whole, and every part of the said evidence from the jury, being of opinion that the board of directors keep a record of their proceedings, which record, or a copy of it, showing the assent of the directors to this bond, was necessary to show that such assent was given; and if such assent had not been entered on the record of the proceedings of the said directors, the bond was ineffectual, and no claim in favour of the plaintiffs could be founded thereon against the defendants in these issues. This opinion of the Court constitutes the subject matter of the second bill of exceptions.

It has become the duty of this Court, upon the present writ of error, to decide whether these opinions of the Circuit Court, or either of them, can be maintained in point of law.

It is material to state, that the rejection of the evidence did not proceed upon the ground that it was of a secondary nature, leaving behind, in the possession of the plaintiffs, evidence of a higher and more satisfactory nature. On the contrary, the whole structure of the case shows, that there was in the understanding of both the parties, no record ever made of the approval of acceptance of the bond in question; and the principal controversy was, whether it could be established by any evidence short of such record proof.

The propositions maintained by the Circuit Court were in substance these. First, that the cashier could not legally enter upon the duties of his office, or make his sureties responsible for his non-performance of those duties, before his official bond was accepted as satisfactory by the board of directors, according to the terms of the charter. Secondly, that such acceptance could be established only by proof drawn from the records of the board of directors; and if no record had been kept of such assent and acceptance, the bond was ineffectual, and no secondary evidence could be admitted to establish the fact.

The last proposition will be first considered. The correctness of it in a great measure depends upon the soundness of the distinction taken between the acts of private persons and the acts of corporations. It is admitted in the opinion of the Circuit Court, that the evidence offered would, in common cases between private persons, have been prima facie evidence, to be submitted to the jury, as proof that the bond was fully executed and accepted. But it is supposed that a different rule prevails in cases of corporations; that their acts must be established by positive record proofs; and that no presumptions can be made in their favour, of corporate assent or adoption, from other circumstances, though in respect to individuals the same circumstances would be decisive. The doctrine, then, is maintained from the nature of corporations, as distinguished from natural persons; and from the supposed incapacity of the former to do any act not evidenced by writing; and if done, to prove it, except by writing.

Little light can be thrown on this subject by considerations drawn from corporations existing by the common law, or dependent upon prescription. To corporations, however erected, there are said to be certain incidents attached, without any express words or authority for this purpose; such as the power to plead and be impleaded, to purchase and alien, to make a common seal, and to pass by-laws.a In ancient times it was held, that corporations aggregate could do nothing but by deed under their common seal,

aCom. Digest, Franchise, F. 10. 13.

But this principle must always have been understood with many qualifications; and seems inapplicable to acts and votes passed by such corporations at corporate meetings. It was probably in its origin applied to aggregate corporations at the common law, and limited to such solemn proceedings as were usually evidenced under seal, and to be done by those persons who had the custody of the common seal, and had authority to bind the corporation thereby, as their permanent official agents. Be this as it may, the rule has been broken in upon in a vast variety of cases, in modern times, and cannot now, as a general proposition, be supported. Mr. Justice Bayley, in Harper v. Charlesworth, (4 Barnw. & Cresw. 575.) said, 'A corporation can only grant by deed; yet there are many things which a corporation has power to do otherwise than by deed. It may appoint a bailiff, and do other acts of a like nature.' And it is now firmly established, both in England and America, that a corporation may be bound by a promise, express or implied, resulting from the acts of its authorized agent, although such authority be only by virtue of a corporate vote, unaccompanied with the corporate seal.

But whatever may be the implied powers of aggregate corporations by the common law, and the modes by which those powers are to be carried into operation, corporations created by statute must depend, both for their powers, and the mode of exercising them, upon the true construction of the statute itself. The doctrine of this Court, in Head v. The Providence Insurance Company, (2 Cranch. 127.) on this subject, is believed to be entirely correct. It was there said by the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court, that 'without ascribing to this body, which in its corporate capacity is the mere creature of the act to which it owes its existence, all the qualities and disabilities annexed by the common law to ancient institutions of this sort, it may correctly be said to be precisely what the incorporating act has made it; to derive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of exerting its faculties only in the manner which that act authorizes.' In that case, the act of incorporation prescribed the mode in which contracts should be made, in order to bind the corporation, which was not complied with; and the Court...

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