The Queen

• Decision Date: 25 November 1896
• Docket Number: 10,301.
• Citation: 78 F. 155
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: THE QUEEN. v. THE QUEEN. BANCROFT-WHITNEY CO. et al.

78 F. 155

THE QUEEN.

BANCROFT-WHITNEY CO. et al. v. THE QUEEN.

No. 10,301.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

November 25, 1896

Andros & Frank, for libelants.

Geo. W Towle, Jr., for claimant.

MORROW District Judge.

The action is for a breach of contract on the part of the carrier, and includes some 37 claims, made by various shippers of goods shipped on board the steamer Queen, for damages by sea water, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the master, officers, and crew of the steamer while said goods were being transported from the port of San Francisco to the port of San Diego, state of California. Testimony was introduced with respect to but two of the shipments, viz. that of the Bancroft-Whitney Company and that of Hellman, Haas & Co. It was intimated at the hearing that these two claims would present all the questions arising on the several claims, and that, after a final decision has been reached with respect to them, the others would be a matter of subsequent arrangement.

The question of laches, which was raised when the exceptions to the libel were argued, was again urged at the final hearing. While the court, at the argument of the exceptions, strongly intimated that it would deny this ground of exception, still the question was left open, subject to the introduction of evidence as to whether or not the libelants had been guilty of laches in failing to bring their suit within four years from the date of the contracts of affreightment. That portion of the opinion, rendered in ruling on the exceptions to the libel, so far as it is material to the present inquiry, is as follows:

'In other words, the deduction from the authorities is that while there is no such thing as a statute of limitation in the admiralty law, yet courts of admiralty, in the furtherance of justice, will act by analogy, and refuse to entertain any suit where the party seeking to enforce his claim or lien has been guilty of laches. It is, in fact, the equitable doctrine of laches, depending upon the circumstances of the case. What would be laches in one case might not constitute such in another. The question is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court, dependence, to be determined hereafter upon the facts as they may appear. ' The Queen of the Pacific, 61 F. 213, 216.

Counsel for claimant refers to several provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of California, which provide different periods of limitation within which suit can be brought. Among these statutes of limitation which would be applicable, assuming that the court were justified in acting by analogy, and setting up the equitable bar of laches, is section 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a limitation of four years in which 'an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability, founded upon an instrument in writing executed in this state,' can be brought.

As the contracts of affreightment which are involved in the present libel were all executed in this state, it follows that, if the court should determine that the libelants have been guilty of laches, the section referred to contains a rule applicable to this case. The libel was filed on the last day of the four-years limitation as to most of the contracts, although as to some of them it is one or two days behind the time. The claimant contends that this delay in bringing the libel constitutes laches. There is nothing in the case, however, outside of mere delay in bringing suit, which indicates that the libelants have been unduly negligent or unnecessarily slow in prosecuting their claims for damages. The most that can be said against them is that they have availed themselves of the full statutory period allowed by the state provision before instituting their suit. But this, of itself, without some proof of any exceptional circumstances from which laches would be imputable, is not sufficient to justify a court of admiralty in declining to entertain a suit, and refusing to pass upon its merits. As was said by Judge Lacombe, in Southard v. Brady, 36 F. 560:

'It is true that there is no statute of limitation in admiralty, but courts of admiralty, like those of equity, will not lend their aid to enforce stale demands. Exceptional circumstances sometimes induce a court of admiralty to pronounce a claim stale after a lapse of time less than the local statutory period of limitation. Where there is nothing exceptional in the case, the court will govern itself by the analogies of the common-law limitations.'

Judge Brown, in Nesbit v. The Amboy, 36 F. 925, after stating that the courts of admiralty will enforce the doctrine of laches as against procrastinating litigants, where it appears that third parties have acquired a bona fide lien or right in a vessel, continues thus:

'But where no subsequent bona fide liens have arisen, there is no good reason why a suitor should not be permitted to proceed in rem in courts of admiralty, so long as he may sue in personam, or maintain a suit at law for the same debt.'-- citing The Lillie Mills, 1 Spr. 307, Fed. Cas. No. 8,352; The Bristol, 11 F. 162; The Martino Cilento, 22 F. 859.

The circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit, in the case of Bailey v. Sundberg, 1 C.C.A. 387, 49 F. 583, speaking through Judge Wallace, said, in passing, upon a contention, as in the case at bar, that the libelants had been guilty of laches in delaying the commencement of the suit:

'Inasmuch as the present action was commenced within six years from the time when the cause of action accrued, and there are no special circumstances to charge the cargo owner with laches, we think there is no equitable bar to the suit upon the ground of delay. Where there is nothing exceptional in the case, courts of admiralty govern themselves by the analogies of common-law.'

Further citation of authority is unnecessary. It only remains to apply the rule therein enunciated to the case at bar.

In the first place, it does not appear that the claimant, by this delay of four years, has been prejudiced in any of his rights, or that any defense which could or would have presented has been impaired or jeopardized. It does not appear that the claimant could or would have presented a stronger or better defense, had the action been commenced sooner. No pretense is made that, by reason of the delay, witnesses have died or gone away, or that testimony, once accessible and material to a defense of negligence, has been lost., in other words, there is no showing by claimant of any special or exceptional circumstances which would justify this court, as a court proceeding upon equitable principles, to hold that the libelants have been guilty of such laches as, in good conscience and equity, amounts to an equitable defense and bar to this libel. While it is true that the long delay of four years is unexplained, and the court is at a loss to understand why the libel was not sooner filed, still such laches as there may have been is, under the facts of this case, not sufficient to justify this court in dismissing the case without considering its merits. The contention of counsel for claimant in this respect is, therefore, overruled.

With respect to the limitation of one year, contained in section 813 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to suits to enforce the lien given by the state statute for injuries to goods shipped on board a vessel, what was said by this court in the opinion upon the exceptions to the libel (see opinion, 61 F. 213, 216, and cases there cited) is applicable and pertinent at the present time. It is sufficient to say, as was there stated, that the libelants are not suing to enforce the lien which the state statute purports to give, but they are suing to enforce the lien given by the general maritime law. See particularly, The Key City, 14 Wall. 653; 660; Henry, Adm. Jur. & Proc. 185.

The libel sets forth that the goods comprising these several shipments were shipped in good order and condition, under the contracts contained in the shipping receipts; that the steamer sailed from the port of San Francisco with said goods on board, bound for the port of San Diego, but were returned to the port of San Francisco in greatly damaged condition having been wet with sea water during the voyage, which, it is alleged, gained access to the interior of the vessel, where the goods were stowed, by reason of the negligence of the steamship company and its officers and servants. The answer admits these facts, with the exception, however, that it denies specifically that said goods were so wet with sea water during said voyage through or by the negligence of the steamship company or its officers or servants. As a further and separate defense, the answer avers, substantially, that the said steamship, when she sailed from the port of San Francisco, was stout, staunch, strong, and seaworthy in every respect; that she was completely manned, officered, and otherwise thoroughly equipped for her than intended voyage; that she left San . francisco on April 29, 1888, at about 2 o'clock p.m., and proceeded down the bay, out through the Golden Gate, across the bar, and on her course in a southerly direction with a fresh northwest wind blowing and northwest chop sea; that no unusual incident was known to occur during said 29th day of April; that about 1 o'clock a.m. of the next day, April 30th, said steamship was noticed to have a slight list to starboard; that efforts were then made to correct such list by shifting freight to port in the between-decks, and burning coal mostly from the starboard bunkers; that about 2:15 or 2:30 o'clock a.m. of the same morning water was discovered to be dropping from a point in the iron bulkhead on the starboard side of the engine room, and...