The Queen of the Pacific 130

• Decision Date: 07 January 1901
• Citation: 21 S.Ct. 278,180 U.S. 49,45 L.Ed. 419
• Parties: THE QUEEN OF THE PACIFIC. No 130
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

180 U.S. 49

21 S.Ct. 278

45 L.Ed. 419

THE QUEEN OF THE PACIFIC.

No 130.

Argued and Submitted December 14, 1900.

Decided January 7, 1901.

This was a joint libel by the Bancroft Whitney Company, a California corporation, and the firm of Hellman, Haas, & Company, against the steamship Queen of the Pacific, owned by the Pacific Coast Steamship Company, to recover damages to certain miscellaneous merchandise shipped April 29, 1888, at San Francisco, to consignees at San Pedro, in the state of California.

The contracts of affreightment were evidenced by bills of lading in the usual form and with the usual exception of perils of the sea, and, amongst others, with the following stipulation:

'It is expressly agreed that all claims against the P. C. S. S. Co., or any of the stockholders of said company, for damage to or loss of any of the within merchandise, must be presented to the company within thirty days from date hereof; and that after thirty days from date hereof no action, suit, or proceeding, in any court of justice, shall be brought against said P. C. S. S. Co., or any of the stockholders thereof, for any damage to or loss of said merchandise; and the lapse of said thirty days shall be deemed a conclusive bar and release of all right to recover against said company, or any of the stockholders thereof, for any such damage or loss.'

The steamship left San Francisco about two o'clock in the afternoon of April 29, 1888, bound for the port of San Diego and intermediate ports, having on board a cargo of general merchandise and upwards of 200 persons. A little more than twelve hours after she sailed, and about half-past two o'clock in the morning of the 30th, the steamer was seen to have sprung a leak and to be taking in water through a watertight compartment known as the starboard alleyway. At this time she had a list of from 5 to 8 degrees to starboard, which, when she reached Port Harford, four or five hours afterwards, had increased to an angle of 30 degrees. When about 250 or 300 yards from the wharf where she usually made her landing, she took the bottom in about 23 feet of water, and, in about twenty minutes thereafter, filled, sank, and lay in a helpless condition for three or four days. A diver, procured for that purpose, after repeated efforts, found the leak and stopped it, whereupon the water was pumped out of the vessel, and she was towed to San Francisco, where she arrived the next day. Her cargo was all discharged upon the wharf, and delivery thereof tendered and accepted by the several owners, who gave the usual average bonds. On May 19 that portion of the cargo belonging to Hellman, Haas, & Company was sold by them at public auction. No claim for damage to the merchandise was made upon the owners of the Queen prior to the sale, nor were they invited to such sale. In short, nothing further appears to have been done for nearly four years, though the steamer was constantly running to and from San Francisco, when on April 28, 1892, this libel was filed. Exceptions to the libel were interposed and overruled (61 Fed. Rep. 213), and the case subsequently went to a hearing upon libel, answers, and testimony, and resulted in a decree for the libellants for the full amount of their claim (78 Fed. Rep. 155), which was affirmed by the court of appeals. 36 C. C. A. 135, 94 Fed. Rep. 180. Whereupon this writ of certiorari was granted.

Messrs. Thomas B. Reed and George W. Towle for petitioner.

Mr. Milton Andros submitted the case for respondents.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

The court of appeals in its opinion dwelt upon several propositions arising upon the pleadings and evidence, but in the view we have taken of the case we shall find it necessary to discuss but one, which is, in substance, that the libellants did not, as required by the bill of lading, present to the company their claims for damage to the merchandise within thirty days from the date of the bills of lading, April 27 and 28, 1888. There is no pretense of compliance with this condition. Two answers are made to this defense: First, that the limitation applies only to claims against the steamship company or any of the stockholders of said company, and not to claims against the vessel; second, that the limitation is unreasonable.

1. The first objection is quite too technical. It virtually assumes that there were two contracts, on with the company and one with the ship, the vehicle of transportation owned and employed by the company; and that while the company as to all its other property is protected by the contract, as to this particular property, used in carrying it out, it is not so protected. But, if such be the case with respect to this particular stipulation, must it not also be so with respect to the other stipulations in the bill of lading to which the company is a party but not the ship? Thus, 'the responsibility of said company shall cease immediately on the delivery of the said goods from the ship's tackles.' Can it be possible that the responsibility of the ship shall not cease at the same time? 'The company shall not be held responsible for any damage or loss resulting from fire at sea or in port ;accident to or from machinery, boilers, or steam,' etc.; but shall the company be exempt and not the ship? 'It is expressly understood that the said company shall not be liable or accountable for weight, leakage, breakage, shrinkage, rust, etc., . . . nor for loss of specie, bullion, etc., unless shipped under its proper title or name and extra freight paid thereon;' but shall the ship be liable for all these excepted losses notwithstanding that the company is exonerated? These questions can admit of but one answer. There was in truth but one contract, and that was between the libellants upon the one part, and the company in its individual capacity and as the representative of the ship, upon the other.

There is no doubt of the general proposition that restrictions upon the liability of a common carrier, inserted by him in the bill of lading for his own benefit and in language chosen by himself, must be narrowly construed; still, they ought not to be wholly frittered away by an adherence to the letter of the contract in obvious disregard of its intent and spirit. It is too clear for argument that it was the intention of the company to require notice to be given of all claims for losses or damage to merchandise intrusted to its care; and as such damage could only come to it while the merchandise was upon one of its steamers or in the process of reception or delivery, and as the owner would have his option to sue either in rem or im personam, it could never have been contemplated that in the one case he should be obliged to give notice, and not in the other. In either event, the money to pay for such damage must come from the treasury of the company; and we ought not to give such an effect to the stipulation as would enable the owner of the merchandise to avoid its operation by simply changing his form of action. It would be almost as unreasonable to give it this construction as to hold that it should apply if the action were in contract, but should not apply if it were in tort. The 'claim' is in either case against the company, though the suit may be against its property.

2. The question of the reasonableness of the requirement is one largely dependent upon the object of the notice and the length of the voyage. Thus, a notice which would be perfectly reasonable as applied to steamers making daily trips might be wholly unreasonable as applied to vessels engaged in a foreign trade. Indeed, a thirty-day notice, such as is involved in this case, would be wholly futile as applied to a steamship plying between San Francisco and trans-Pacific ports. Notice might also be deemed reasonable, or otherwise, according to the facts of the particular case. Thus, if the Queen had been driven out to sea, and was not heard from for thirty days, obviously the provision would not apply, since its enforcement might wholly destroy the right of recovery. The question is whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the requirement be a reasonable one or not.

The Queen was engaged in short trips and in general trade to San Diego, doubtless delivering merchandise in different parcels and in different quantities to large numbers of consignees at the...