The Rheola

• Decision Date: 12 April 1884
• Citation: 19 F. 926
• Parties: THE RHEOLA. v. THE RHEOLA and another. COUGHLIN
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

19 F. 926

THE RHEOLA.

COUGHLIN v. THE RHEOLA and another.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. New York.

April 12, 1884

Beebe Wilcox & Hobbs, for Appellant.

W. W Goodrich, for Defendants.

WALLACE J.

The libelant has appealed from a decree of the district court for the Southern district of New York dismissing the libel. The suit is in rem, and is brought to recover for personal injuries sustained by the libelant while unloading the Rheola, in July, 1879, when she was discharging cargo along-side a pier in the port of New York. The libelant was one of a number of laborers employed by one Hogan, a master stevedore, to discharge cargo, which consisted of tin in cases and iron ore in bulk. He and others, in all a gang of six men, were in the lower hold of the ship, filling the hoisting tubs with iron. He had hooked one of the tubs to the chain, and was in the act of filling another, when the chain broke while the tub was suspended over the hatchway, and the tub fell upon him. Three tubs were being used, and the work was done rapidly. The chain and hoisting apparatus were furnished by the steamer, under the bargain with the stevedore.

It is not suggested that the suit is not properly brought in rem if the master, while acting within the scope of the authority conferred upon him by the owners, in the management of the vessel, was guilty of negligence towards the libelant. Negligence, when committed upon navigable waters, is a maritime tort which subjects the vessel to liability to an extent coincident with the liability of the owner. Com'rs v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108. If the relations of the master of the steamer towards the libelant were such as to create a duty not to be negligent, the latter is entitled to recover if there was a breach of that duty. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99.

The learned judge in the court below was of the opinion that, as there was no privity of contract between the libelant and the owners of the steamer, they were not liable unless the thing by which he was injured was imminently dangerous; but he was also of opinion that if the degree of negligence which would make an employer liable to his employee were enough, such negligence was not established by the proofs. As the libelant was not directly employed by the master, and could only look to the master stevedore for his pay, there was no privity of contract between him and the ship-owners. Nor did the relation of master and servant, in its technical sense, exist between the libelant and the ship-owner. But it is conceived that this does not in the least affect the obligation of the master not to be negligent towards the libelant, or the degree of care which it was incumbent upon him to exercise. The libelant was performing a service in which the ship-owners had an interest, and which they contemplated would be performed by the use of appliances which they had agreed to provide. They were under the same obligation to him not to expose him to unnecessary danger, that they were under to the master...