The Shrewsbury

Citation69 F. 1017
PartiesTHE SHREWSBURY. v. THE SHREWSBURY. ELEY et al.
Decision Date12 July 1895
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

R. R Kinkade, for libelant Eley.

R. M McKee, for Woodruff & Anderson.

I. N Huntsberger, for Toledo Foundry & Mach. Co., Henry P. Tobey Edward G. Ashley, Vulcan Iron Works, M. I. Wilcox Cordage & Supply Co., Stollberg & Parks, Vrooman, Anderson & Bateman, Catawba Island Dock Co., J. N. Dewey & Co., and R. Brand Co.

A. W. Eckert, for W. F. Brenzinger.

F. N. Sala, for C. Tallmadge & Co.

F. W. Rickenbaugh, for La Salle & Koch, Breyman Bros., Wm. W. Wales, Nathaniel A. Haughton, and Christian Umbehaum & Son.

Goulder & Holding, for Cleveland & Buffalo Transit Co., Victor Manuf'g Co., F. O. Little Electrical Construction & Supply Co., Charles P. Walsh, and John O'Day.

Beard & Beard, for Maumee Baking Co.

Andrew Farquharson, for Kirschner Bros.

Moses G. Bloch, for G. W. Fonner.

RICKS District Judge.

This case is a proceeding in admiralty, and now comes before the court upon exceptions to the report of Special Master George A. Bassett, who has, in accordance with an order of reference heretofore made, filed his report as to the several claims and liens asserted against the steamer Shrewsbury, as set forth in his report and the testimony accompanying it. The briefs of counsel give evidence of great industry and ability in examining the authorities which they seem to think are controlling, in this case, and I have read them very carefully, with great profit, and have been very much aided by them in reaching the conclusion in this case.

There are a few general principles which must control us in this case, and they may as well be stated at the outset of this opinion. The following statement of facts, briefly expressed by the master in his report, is necessary for the proper application of these principles of law:

'On or about the 8th day of June, 1893, Charles Hubbard and Sherman Canfield, residents of Toledo, Ohio, entered into a written contract with the Buffalo & Niagara River Navigation Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, with its principal place of business at Niagara Falls, in said state, whereby the said Hubbard & Canfield agreed to purchase the steamer Shrewsbury of said navigation company for the gross sum of $45,000, the terms of which contract more fully appear as Exhibit G, hereto annexed. That in pursuance of said contract, and on their making a down payment of $2,500, said Hubbard & Canfield were to have said vessel delivered to them in good order, with all her equipments, and such other parts as belonged to said steamer, etc. * * * That on or about the 10th day of June, 1893, said navigation company did deliver said steamer to Hubbard & Canfield, and thereafter the master and crew employed by said Hubbard & Canfield proceeded from Buffalo with said steamer, with the intention of taking her to the city of Toledo, in the state of Ohio, where she duly arrived on the 13th of June, 1893.'

The master then proceeds to state that from and after that day she plied regularly between the ports of Toledo and Put-in Bay, until she was seized under the process of this court.

Proctors for the claimants contend that said contract for the sale of said steamer provided that the title thereof should remain in the vendors until certain conditions were complied with; that said conditions never, in fact, were complied with; and that, therefore, the title to the steamer never passed from the vendor. If this proposition be true, both in fact and in law, then the owners of said boat were residents of the state of New York, and the said boat was a foreign, not a domestic, craft when running between the ports of Toledo and Put-in Bay. The liens for supplies and material furnished her were therefore not delivered at her home port, and therefore became maritime liens whenever they were necessary, and furnished at the solicitation of the master. But I prefer to accept the conclusion of the master, that the parties who had possession of this boat during the time she carried on the business of transportation of merchandise and passengers between Toledo and Put-in Bay were entitled to the custody of the boat, and to operate the same, and that they were residents of the state of Ohio, and that, therefore, she was a domestic vessel, and that the liens now claimed against the same were made such liens by virtue of section 5880 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which reads as follows:

'Any steamboat or other water craft navigating the waters within or bordering upon this state shall be liable, and such liability shall be a lien thereon, for all debts contracted on account thereof by the master owner, steward, consignee or other agent, for materials, supplies or labor in the building, repairing, furnishing or equipping of the same, or for insurance, or due for wharfage, and also for damages arising out of any contract for transportation of goods or persons, or for injuries done to persons or property by such craft, or for any damage or injury done by the captain, mate, or other officer thereof, or by any person under the order or sanction of either of them, to any person who is a passenger or hand on such steamboat or other water craft, at the time of the infliction of such damage or injury.'

The scope and effect of this statute, and the rights conferred upon parties who have furnished materials or supplies by reason thereof, are very clearly set forth by Mr. Justice Gray in the case of The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1, 13 Sup.Ct. 498. In that opinion, speaking for the supreme court, he says:

'Whenever the statute of a state gives a lien, to be enforced by process in rem, against the vessel, for repairs or supplies in her home port, this lien, being similar to the lien arising in a foreign port under the general law, is in the nature of a maritime lien, and therefore may be enforced in admiralty in the court of the United States.'

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4 cases
  • THE POZNAN, 243.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 13 d1 Julho d1 1925
    ...that the same may be enforced by a proceeding in rem against the vessel, or by a suit in personam against the owner." And in The Shrewsbury (D. C.) 69 F. 1017, 1020, District Judge Ricks states that "a lien for wharfage is made, under the general maritime law, a lien next in rank to wages."......
  • The C. Vanderbilt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • 12 d2 Abril d2 1898
    ...vessel is maritime in its nature: Ex parte Easton, 94 U.S. 68; The Virginia Rulon, 13 Blatchf. 519, 520, Fed. Cas. No. 16,974; The Shrewsbury, 69 F. 1017 (hence lien authorized by local statute attached): The Atlantic Dock Co. v. Wenberg, 9 Ben. 464, Fed. Cas. No. 622; Town of Pelham v. The......
  • The Sterling
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 3 d4 Fevereiro d4 1916
    ...comfort of the crew. Cases have been cited from other jurisdictions involving statutes of states. The Mayflower (D.C.) 39 F. 41; The Shrewsbury (D.C.) 69 F. 1017; and The Satellite (D.C.) 188 F. 717. These cases, however, not throw any light upon the issue here. I do not think that the inte......
  • The Satellite
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 20 d3 Abril d3 1910
    ...furnished to be dispensed to passengers on an excursion boat, plying in the vicinity of Pittsburgh. On the other hand, in The Shrewsbury (D.C.) 69 F. 1017, it was that there was no lien, under similar provisions of an Ohio statute, for liquors furnished to be dispensed at a lunch counter an......

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