The State ex rel. McLeod Lumber Company v. Baker

• Decision Date: 18 November 1902
• Citation: The State ex rel. McLeod Lumber Company v. Baker, 70 S.W. 470, 170 Mo. 194 (Mo. 1902)
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. McLEOD LUMBER COMPANY v. BAKER et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

70 S.W. 470

170 Mo. 194

THE STATE ex rel. McLEOD LUMBER COMPANY v. BAKER et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

November 18, 1902

Appeal from Butler Circuit Court.-- Hon. J. L. Fort, Judge.

Reversed.

Phillips & Phillips for appellants.

(1)(a) The "board gave notice in two issues of the Daily Citizen, on Thursday and Friday, before Monday, on which the board undertook to hear objections to the said raise; that the said two issues of the Daily Citizen were afterward brought together in parts one and two of what was termed the Weekly Citizen," only goes to show that the board took more than ordinary means to give notice, and further to show that the relator not only had the notice given by section 7519, but also actual notice.State ex rel. v Springer,134 Mo. 227;State ex rel. v Railroad,101 Mo. 127;State ex rel. v. Lindell Hotel Co.,9 Mo.App. 456;Porter v. Railroad,76 Ill. 561;State ex rel. v. Cummings,52 S.W. 31.(b) The fact that relator's attorney then lived in the city of Poplar Bluff, where said notice was published, and that he appeared in person before the board on Tuesday, April 25th, and filed a complaint, setting forth certain reasons why the valuation of relator's land should not be raised and that he again appeared before said board on Wednesday, April 26th, and was heard, shows that relator had actual notice, as well as statutory notice, within reasonable time.(c) The complaint nowhere states that the raise in valuation was not uniform as to all lands of like character, in the community where relator's land was situate, but, on the contrary, does state "that the said pretended board of equalization proceeded to class all said land as of one grade, and fix the uniform rate of two dollars and fifty cents per acre, and over."This the board could do under the law, for they could fix the value under their own information, and without even hearing any evidence, provided they did not raise relator's lands above other lands of the same kind and character in the county, and the complainant does not charge that they did.State v. Railroad,8 Mo.App. 583;State v. Railroad,101 Mo. 120;Railroad v. Board,64 Mo. 294;State ex rel. v. Springer,134 Mo. 225.(2)(a) The board of equalization is but a part of the machinery of the government to ascertain a just and proper valuation of property, for the purpose of taxation.State ex rel. v. Springer,134 Mo. 226.(b) It had jurisdiction of the subject-matter.State ex rel. v. Board,108 Mo. 239;R. S. 1889, sec. 7518.(c) In performing its duties it acts quasi judicially, and its orders can not be impeached collaterally, save for want of jurisdiction or for fraud.Black v. McGonigle,103 Mo. 198;State ex rel. v. Vaile,122 Mo. 47;Ins. Co. v. Charles,47 Mo. 465;Railroad v. Maguire,49 Mo. 483;Cooley on Taxation (1 Ed.), 291;Lead Co. v. Simms,108 Mo. 222.(d) Though composed in part of the justices of the county court, it is a different body from the county court, altogether, and receives different pay.R. S. 1889, sec. 7523;State ex rel. v. Vaile,122 Mo. 42.(e) The board had an inherent right to adjourn from time to time as the business before it might, in its judgment, demand.State ex rel. v. Vaile,122 Mo. 43;Black v. McGonigle,103 Mo. 200.(f) The board had the power to hear complaints from any part of the county, and the relator could have appeared if he had desired to do so -- which in this case was done.State ex rel. v. Vaile,122 Mo. 44.(g) While the record kept by the board shows no order made at the meetings held, save the convening and adjourning orders, there is evidence to the effect that defendant and others appeared and presented their complaints.The fact that the board made no orders, either raising or decreasing assessments, does not show that defendant was deprived of a hearing.State ex rel. v. Vaile, supra.(h)Section 7519,Revised Statutes 1889, gives notice and opportunity for objections, by virtue of its own terms.A meeting of an equalization board, at a time and place required by law, imposed a duty on parties in interest, to take notice thereof.State ex rel. v. Springer,134 Mo. 227;State ex rel. v. Railroad,101 Mo. 127;State ex rel. v. Lindell Hotel Co.9 Mo.App. 456;Porter v. Railroad,76 Ill. 561.No irregularity or omission shall invalidate any proceeding, etc.R. S. 1889, sec. 7708;Railroad v. County Clerk,57 Mo. 224;Black v. McGonigle,103 Mo. 200.As to printed notice: State ex rel. v. Springer,134 Mo. 222.(i) Assessments will not be set aside or overthrown on mere technical grounds.State ex rel. v. Vaile,122 Mo. 43;Railroad v. County Clerk,57 Mo. 225.(j) Where a taxing board is authorized to act according to their opinion of the matter, it is not necessary to the validity of their action, that their record should show that the board heard the evidence on the subject.State ex rel. v. Springer,134 Mo. 225;Railroad v. County Clerk,57 Mo. 224.(3)(a) It is settled law in this State, that certiorari only brings up the record, and that the common law as to procedure prevails in such cases.Railroad v. Board,64 Mo. 308;State ex rel. v. Smith,101 Mo. 175;State ex rel. v. Kansas City,89 Mo. 38;State ex rel. v. Edwards,104 Mo. 126;State ex rel. v. Walbridge,62 Mo.App. 163;State ex rel. v. Cauthorn,40 Mo.App. 96.(b) There is no provision of law in this State for making and preserving a bill of exceptions, either in the county court, probate court or board of equalization.State ex rel. v. Cauthorn, supra;Ward v. Board,135 Mo. 320.(c) It is settled law that the merits of the cause, in proceeding by certiorari, can not be inquired into.State ex rel. v. Board,108 Mo. 242.(d) The writ of certiorari in Missouri is what is known as the common-law writ, and its office is to bring up for review only such facts as appear on the face of the record.The writ can not be issued in vacation by the judge, but must be issued by the court, and the motion to quash the writ herein should have been passed upon and sustained.Railroad v. Board,64 Mo. 294;State ex rel. v. Smith,101 Mo. 175;State ex rel. v. Edwards,104 Mo. 126;State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 62 Mo.App. 163.

J. Perry Johnson for respondent.

GANTT, J. Sherwood, P. J., and Burgess, J., concur.

OPINION

GANTT, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Butler county, Missouri, quashing the record of the board of equalization of said county in which the assessment of certain real estate belonging to the McLeod Lumber Company was increased at the annual meeting of said board in April, 1899.The record recites that the court quashed the proceedings of the board of equalization for the reasons "that no order was made by said respondents acting as said board of equalization, directing and ordering the clerk or secretary thereof to give notice to the parties owners of lands, the value of which had been raised above the assessment made by the assessor; that the said board of equalization, as shown by their said return, did not hear or act upon the protest of the relators herein pleaded before said board of equalization, and proceeded without jurisdiction."The return of the board of equalization contains the record, not only of the said board in the first instance, but also of the board of appeals which met on April 25, 1899, to give parties whose assessments had been increased an opportunity and a day to show cause why such increase should not be made.

The propriety of the judgment quashing the record must be determined in accordance with the statute law of this State in force at the time the board of equalization raised and equalized the assessments.By section 7517,Revised Statutes 1889, the county board of equalization consists of the judges of the county court, the county surveyor, the county assessor, and the county clerk.The last named is required to act as secretary of the board, but can not vote.Among the duties imposed upon said board is that found in section 8520,Revised Statutes 1889, which provides that "they[the board of equalization] shall raise the valuation of all such tracts or parcels of land and any personal property as in their opinion have been returned below their real value, according to the rule prescribed by this article for such valuation."And by section 7518,Revised Statutes 1889, it is made their duty "to hear complaints and to equalize the valuation and assessments upon all real and personal property within the county which is made taxable by law."The propriety, even necessity, of such a board under an organic law which ordains that "all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value," is self-evident.That the board of equalization of Butler county had jurisdiction to raise the assessments of relator's real estate in a proper way must be accepted as the settled law of this State.

But that such increase may not be made the means of unjust discrimination, it is wisely provided that "after the board shall have raised the valuation of such real estate, it shall give notice of the fact, specifying the property and the amount raised, to the persons owning or controlling the same, by personal notice through the mail, or by advertisement in any paper published in the county, and that said board will meet on the fourth Monday in April, to hear reasons, if any may be given, why such increase should not be made."[Sec. 8520, R. S. 1889.]

This brings us to the first contention of relator, towit, that "said board wrongfully and without authority of law, and without any legal or proper notice to the relator, did proceed to increase the valuation of its lands."If by this, relator means that the board must in the first instance notify every taxpayer before it...